HomeMy WebLinkAbout2021-02-11 Info Packet
City Council I nformation Packet
February 11, 2021
IP1.Council Tentative Meeting S chedule
February 16 Work Session
IP2.Work Session Agenda
IP3.Memo from City Manager & Police Chief: O I R Group Report [Previously
distributed in the 01/28/21 I nformation P acket]
IP4.Pending City Council Work S ession Topics
Miscellaneous
IP5.Memo from City Attorney: Retirement
IP6.B L M & S ystemic Racism Detailed S tatus Report
IP7.Press Release: Office of Equity & Human Rights announces free virtual training
on microaggressions
IP8.Civil S ervice E xamination: Climate A ction A nalyst
IP9.Civil S ervice E xamination: Construction I nspector I I
Draft Minutes
IP10.Historic P reservation Commission: J anuary 14
February 11, 2021 City of Iowa City Page 1
Item Number: 1.
F ebruary 11, 2021
Council Ten tative Meeting Sched u l e
AT TAC HM E NT S :
Description
Council Tentative Meeting S chedule
City Council Tentative Meeting Schedule
Subject to change
February 11, 2021
Date Time Meeting Location
Tuesday, February 16, 2021 5:00 PM Work Session Zoom Meeting Platform
7:00 PM Formal Meeting
Tuesday, March 2, 2021 5:00 PM Iowa City Conference Board Mtg Zoom Meeting Platform
Work Session
7:00 PM Formal Meeting
Tuesday, March 16, 2021 5:00 PM Work Session Zoom Meeting Platform
7:00 PM Formal Meeting
Tuesday, April 6, 2021 4:00 PM Work Session Zoom Meeting Platform
6:00 PM Formal Meeting
Tuesday, April 20, 2021 4:00 PM Work Session Zoom Meeting Platform
6:00 PM Formal Meeting
Item Number: 2.
F ebruary 11, 2021
Work Session Agen d a
AT TAC HM E NT S :
Description
Work Session Agenda
Electronic
City Council Work Session Agenda
Tuesday, February 16, 2021
Zoom Meeting Platform
5:00 PM
Electronic Meeting
(Pursuant to Iowa Code section 21.8)
An electronic meeting is being held because a meeting in person is impossibl e or
impractical due to concerns for the health and safety of Council members, staff and
the public presented by COVID-19.
You can watch the meeting on cable channel 4 (118.2 QAM) in Iowa City, University
Heights and Coralville, or you can watch it online at any of the following websites:
• https://citychannel4.com/live
• https://www.youtube.com/user/citychannel4/live
• https://facebook.com/CityofIowaCity
If you have no computer or smartphone, or a computer without a microphone, you
can call in by phone by dialing (312) 626-6799 and entering the meeting ID 972-5467-
3255 when prompted. Attending in person is not an option.
• Discussion of the OIR report
• Clarification of Agenda Items
• Information Packet Discussion [February 4, February 11]
• Council updates on assigned boards, commissions, and committees
Item Number: 3.
F ebruary 11, 2021
Memo from City Man ager & Pol ice Chief: O IR G roup Report [Previou sl y
d istributed in the 01/28/21 Information Packet]
AT TAC HM E NT S :
Description
Memo from City Manager & Police Chief: O I R Group Report
Date: January 28, 2021
To: Mayor and Council
From: Geoff Fruin, City Manager
Dustin Liston, Police Chief
Re: OIR Group Report
The OIR Group has completed their independent review of the Iowa City Police Department’s
actions surrounding the June 3rd protest event. The City Manager’s Office and the Iowa City
Police Department want to thank the City Council and the community for your patience as this
external review was completed.
After your review of the document, we will be happy to respond to your questions regarding the
report narrative and recommendations. Additionally, we look forward to future conversations
with the City Council that will establish clear expectations for Iowa City Police Department’s
response in similar situations should they arise in the future. Setting such expectations is a
critical step before pursuing needed adjustments to internal department policies, conducting
related trainings and establishing clear understandings with our mutual aid law enforcement
partners. We recommend that the City Council initiate these discussions at your earliest
convenience after your review of the OIR Group’s report.
The OIR Group has offered to make themselves available in the future should you need any
clarification on their report or wish to request additional comment from them.
IOWA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT:
An Independent Review of ICPD
and the J une 3, 2020 Protest
January 2021
P r e s e n t e d b y :
Michael Gennaco
Stephen Connolly
Teresa Magula
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323-821-0586
7142 Trask Avenue | Playa del Rey, CA 90293
OIRGroup.com
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Table of Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 6
Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 11
Before June 3: A Growing Protest Movement ...................................................................... 14
Background ............................................................................................................................. 14
Events in Other Jurisdictions ................................................................................................ 14
Events Within Iowa City......................................................................................................... 15
November 11, 2016: Precedent on I-80 ............................................................................. 17
Less Lethal Munitions Defined ............................................................................................. 18
Wednesday, June 3: Overview of Events ............................................................................. 19
Timeline ................................................................................................................................... 19
The Confrontation on Dubuque Street ................................................................................ 22
ICPD on June 3: Issues and Assessments ........................................................................... 27
Jurisdiction, Mutual Aid and Responsibility for Decision-Making ................................... 27
RECOMMENDATION 1 .................................................................................................... 29
RECOMMENDATION 2 .................................................................................................... 29
Decision to Deny Access and Block Dubuque Street ...................................................... 29
RECOMMENDATION 3 .................................................................................................... 31
Lack of Negotiation with Protestors on June 3 .................................................................. 31
RECOMMENDATION 4 .................................................................................................... 33
RECOMMENDATION 5 .................................................................................................... 33
RECOMMENDATION 6 .................................................................................................... 33
RECOMMENDATION 7 .................................................................................................... 33
RECOMMENDATION 8 .................................................................................................... 35
Crowd Proximity to Skirmish Line ........................................................................................ 36
RECOMMENDATION 9 .................................................................................................... 37
Declaration of Unlawful Assembly ....................................................................................... 37
RECOMMENDATION 10 .................................................................................................. 39
Dispersal Orders and Warnings ........................................................................................... 39
RECOMMENDATION 11 .................................................................................................. 40
RECOMMENDATION 12 .................................................................................................. 40
RECOMMENDATION 13 .................................................................................................. 40
RECOMMENDATION 14 .................................................................................................. 41
Use of Flashbangs, Tear Gas, and Other Munitions ........................................................ 41
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RECOMMENDATION 15 .................................................................................................. 43
Additional Force Deployments ............................................................................................. 43
RECOMMENDATION 16 .................................................................................................. 46
Coordination of Medical Response ..................................................................................... 46
RECOMMENDATION 17 .................................................................................................. 47
Inability to Identify Officers .................................................................................................... 47
RECOMMENDATION 18 .................................................................................................. 48
Decision to Arrest Protester .................................................................................................. 48
RECOMMENDATION 19 .................................................................................................. 50
After June 3: A Shift in Approach ............................................................................................ 51
Additional Policy and Procedural Issues ................................................................................ 55
Use of Force Directives in Resolution 20-159 ................................................................... 55
RECOMMENDATION 20 .................................................................................................. 57
Crowd Control Policy ............................................................................................................. 57
RECOMMENDATION 21 .................................................................................................. 60
RECOMMENDATION 22 .................................................................................................. 61
RECOMMENDATION 23 .................................................................................................. 61
RECOMMENDATION 24 .................................................................................................. 61
RECOMMENDATION 25 .................................................................................................. 62
RECOMMENDATION 26 .................................................................................................. 62
RECOMMENDATION 27 .................................................................................................. 63
RECOMMENDATION 28 .................................................................................................. 63
RECOMMENDATION 29 .................................................................................................. 63
Use of the Incident Command System & Incident Action Plan ....................................... 63
RECOMMENDATION 30 .................................................................................................. 65
RECOMMENDATION 31 .................................................................................................. 65
RECOMMENDATION 32 .................................................................................................. 65
Command & Communication ............................................................................................... 65
RECOMMENDATION 33 .................................................................................................. 67
RECOMMENDATION 34 .................................................................................................. 67
RECOMMENDATION 35 .................................................................................................. 67
RECOMMENDATION 36 .................................................................................................. 67
RECOMMENDATION 37 .................................................................................................. 67
RECOMMENDATION 38 .................................................................................................. 67
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Public Information Officer ...................................................................................................... 68
RECOMMENDATION 39 .................................................................................................. 69
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 70
Appendix A: Lead Up Timeline ................................................................................................ 72
Appendix B: Recommendation Summary .............................................................................. 76
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Introduction
The May 25 murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis initiated a powerful wave of
reaction throughout the United States. Iowa City joined countless other communities in
grappling with the issues of police violence, racism, and structural inequity that the
Floyd matter had painfully reintroduced. The “Say Their Names” rally on Saturday, May
30 attracted hundreds to the Pentacrest; attendees stood in solidarity and listened to
remarks from activists and local elected officials. And the gatherings and
demonstrations continued into the following days, with street protests and organized
forums – and sustained and substantial acts of vandalism.
On the night of Wednesday, June 3, activity in the streets of Iowa City reached a new
level of intensity. A few hundred demonstrators joined together on a march from the
Pentacrest toward the Interstate 80 highway via Dubuque Street; it was approximately
10:30 on Wednesday night. Their intention was to physically block the highway to
exemplify the type of disruptive, needed change they considered long overdue.
As the marchers got closer to the onramp, they found themselves in a standoff with a
large cadre of officers from multiple law enforcement agencies, positioned across
Dubuque Street’s four traffic lanes in an effort to deny the protestors access to the
Interstate. That standoff, in turn, eventually transitioned into a different sort of clash –
one that became Iowa City’s highest-profile version of the divisive encounters occurring
all over the country.
After issuing announcements of questionable audibility and negligible effect, the
assembled officers on Dubuque Street deployed flashbangs, tear gas, and other
munitions in an effort to disperse the crowd and end the protest – which they had
formally characterized as an “unlawful assembly” under Iowa state law. This
immediately prompted a significant crowd reaction, driving the group back but also, in
many respects, increasing the protestors’ determination. After approximately forty more
minutes of additional, intermittent confrontations and force deployments, the remainder
of the crowd left on its own volition. There was one arrest that night.
While the key enforcement activity of June 3 ended near midnight, it had engendered a
public reaction that influenced events for days and weeks to come. This was the first
time in recent memory that Iowa City law enforcement had used tear gas, pepper balls
and flashbangs on protestors exercising their First Amendment rights. The outrage that
swiftly followed this incident further energized the protests in Iowa City; a much larger
group, including the Mayor and entire City Council, participated in the next night’s
demonstrations. Condemnations of the police response came from City officials as well
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as aggrieved members of the public. And hundreds assembled to repeat the march
toward I-80 on June 4 – and this time were allowed access.
In this aftermath, the narrative that emerged about June 3 was simple and
straightforward: “The police used tear gas on peaceful protestors.” It seemed to fit within
the troubling parameters of a larger national landscape, and to exemplify the disconnect
between law enforcement and local communities that had given rise to the
demonstrations in the first place.
This independent report is one of several ways that the City of Iowa City has sought to
respond to this contentious chapter in its recent history. It uses the “tear gas on
peaceful protestors” allegation as a beginning point for a more comprehensive
assessment of that controversial event. It seeks to describe what happened that night
and explain why it did. And it also explores the issues of what could or should have
happened instead, and how that line of thinking might inform some useful adaptations
for the Iowa City Police Department (“ICPD”) going forward.
The report also offers a timeline of key events, an assessment of ICPD policies and
procedures, and recommendations for enhancing future effectiveness.1 Ideally, it will
add clarity and nuance to people’s understanding of what occurred, as a starting point
for adaptations that will benefit ICPD as well as the community.
The report was prepared by OIR Group, a team of police practices experts. Its members
have worked in the field of civilian oversight of law enforcement for nearly twenty years,
serving in a range of capacities for jurisdictions throughout California and in other
states. (For example, it completed a year-long, full-scale evaluation of the Madison,
Wisconsin Police Department in early 2018 that produced dozens of implemented
recommendations).2 Led by Michael Gennaco, a former federal prosecutor and
nationally recognized authority on police oversight, OIR Group has issued numerous
public reports that can be found on its website: www.OIRGroup.com
1 As discussed in detail below, there were several different local law enforcement entities
involved in the “mutual aid” response to the June unrest, which extended for several days
beyond June 3. This report was commissioned by the City. Accordingly, it is focused primarily
on the actions of ICPD – an agency that was not only central to enforcement efforts during
those days but also is uniquely subject to the authority of the City government. But as detailed
below, the decision-making and participation by other agencies cannot be ignored in any
comprehensive after-action review.
2 In addition to this report for Iowa City, OIR Group has also been retained to perform
independent evaluations of recent protest activity and law enforcement response for the cities of
Santa Monica and Santa Rosa in California, and Kalamazoo in Michigan.
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The findings and conclusions covered below are based on lengthy interviews with ICPD
and City leadership, and some of the participants in the protest activity. It relies on
official ICPD reports and documentation relating to the events, as well as many hours of
recordings from the scene itself: primarily body-worn camera video produced by the
Department, but also news video that provided an important view of events on Dubuque
Street from what was literally the opposite direction.
While the focus of the report is on the events of June 3, our review of the incident
suggests that is it best understood in the context of the preceding and subsequent days
of public protest in the City. The shifting developments within that larger span of time
help to explain the decision-making on Dubuque Street, show the limitations of that
decision-making, and illustrate how, to its credit, ICPD and the City evolved in their
approach and avoided similar clashes in the days to follow – even as the protest activity
continued unabated well into June.
Like other jurisdictions around the country, Iowa City was in many ways unprepared for
the scope and intensity of response to George Floyd’s death; veteran law enforcement
personnel from multiple agencies told us that the demonstrations were unprecedented
in their own long careers. Prior to June 3, the involved agencies were dealing with a
growing level of unrest that had several different facets. They were adjusting as they
went along and needed to adjust again when the hundreds of protestors decided on the
night of June 3 to direct their collective attention to the I-80 as part of their
demonstration against police violence. This effort constituted a “ramping up” of intensity
to the protest and involved a target that was newly complicated from a public safety
perspective.
As discussed below, the Iowa City Police Department was working throughout those
days as part of an effort at “unified command” in which different agencies were
contributing to the response – and had different areas of primary responsibility. The
Interstate fell under the ultimate jurisdiction of the Iowa State Patrol (“ISP”), which
committed to the blocking of access on June 3 and made the key decisions about
effectuating it. But ICPD ended up playing the dominant role in the actual force
deployments to effectuate it.
In retrospect, the decisions to “draw a line in the sand” on Dubuque St. that night, to
move to the ultimatum phase with little attempt at negotiation or de-escalation, to
consider the crowd members to be collectively on notice after an acoustically limited
effort at warning them, and to use flashbangs and tear gas in effectuating the dispersal
order, are all subject to fair criticism and disapproval. The ICPD, even though providing
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support to ISP as opposed to being primarily responsible, owns some of these
shortcomings.
But fairness and accuracy also require a recognition of the imperfect information,
experience level, and resources that hampered law enforcement effectiveness on June
3. It deserves mention that potential concerns about aggression and threats from a
contingent of the protestors were seemingly merited. Additionally, it should be noted
that, with rare exception, officers were professional and controlled in their performance
throughout a tense, dynamic situation – attributes that distinguished them from some of
their peers across the country in those volatile weeks.3 And the lack of serious
documented injury to crowd members or law enforcement was a positive outcome that
more traditional force options – such as the use of batons and shields to drive the crowd
from the restricted area – may well not have produced.4
Most notably, if June 3 represented a nadir of sorts, its flaws and hard lessons also
prompted shifts in enforcement strategy that paid dividends on future nights: protestors
were allowed safe access to the interstate on both June 4 and June 5, and no further
uses of tear gas or other less lethal munitions occurred. ICPD’s role was marked by a
new and more deferential approach to the demonstration activity – and an overt shift
into a support role (behind the State Patrol) with regard to demonstrations that had the
I-80 as focus. Better information and further on-the-ground familiarity led to more
productive dialogue and other approaches that defused confrontation. And the protests
themselves took on a substantive momentum that has influenced – and will seemingly
continue to influence – City government in the direction of concrete policy changes.
By offering an objective, outsider’s consideration of June 3, this report will ideally
contribute to the City’s ongoing efforts to identify issues, promote positive changes, and
rebuild trust. It brings an objective, independent eye to the task of explaining what
occurred and gleaning useful lessons for the future. And it does these things with a
3 We regularly review police and video recordings in the context of our oversight work and have
done so for several years. The use of profane, demeaning, or otherwise unprofessional
language is unfortunately a regular feature of those recordings. This is especially true in
antagonistic, high-stress contexts – as seen in the various examples of gratuitous police
conduct that emerged from protest scenes throughout the U.S. in the summer of 2020. With
this in mind, the consistently controlled demeanor of the ICPD officers made a positive
impression.
4 Four injuries related to this event were reported. One officer reported being struck in the head
with an object thrown by a protestor, a protestor experienced what was identified by the
responding EMS unit as a “panic attack,” and two protestors reported leg injuries related to
being struck with tear gas canisters – none of these required treatment or hospitalization. We
did not receive report of any other injuries.
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sense of optimism. The number of people we spoke to who were involved in the
incident – on both sides of the skirmish line that night – was small. But they were each
extremely thoughtful, sincere, and genuinely dedicated to the City and its people. To
the extent they are representative of larger dynamics in Iowa City, there is cause for
encouragement.
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Methodology
In keeping with the scope of work prepared by the City for this project, we studied the
Iowa City Police Department’s actions on June 3 in two primary ways: by reviewing
written and recorded evidence of various kinds, and by speaking with representatives
from both the City and ICPD. Unfortunately, travel restrictions precluded our ability to
physically meet with people and to learn about the City and its communities in a more
organic way – and in keeping with our usual approach to assignments such as this. But
thanks in large part to the cooperation of City officials and the extensive amount of
recorded evidence at our disposal, we were able to develop the foundation that informs
the findings and recommendations we provide below.
Our insight into the ICPD perspective on events was shaped by lengthy interviews with
key members of the Department’s leadership, who also provided responsive
supplemental materials as our process continued over several weeks. We also got a
first-hand perspective with respect to the ICPD response at the scene of the June 3
confrontation. The people we spoke with were candid in their appraisal of the events
and constructive in both their defenses and self-critiques of what had occurred.
Our request for written reports and other documents produced the following materials:
Documents related to ICPD’s public After Action Report
Materials related to the City’s press release
ICPD’s internal After-Action Reports written by personnel who responded to
Dubuque Street on June 3
All operational materials, including any Incident Action Plans, related to events
from May 30 to June 3
All relevant Department policies regarding uses of force, tactics (for responses
generally and specifically, such as those of ICPD’s Special Response Team),
crowd control, civil rights, mass arrest, and communications
Reports that detailed the types and counts of less lethal munitions used on June
3
Memoranda of Understanding regarding mutual aid agreements between
responding agencies.
Central to our impressions of what happened were the 82 unique, time-stamped videos
provided by ICPD, each containing up to two hours of footage. This video evidence
included clips from City surveillance cameras located at City Hall and other locations in
downtown Iowa City. It also featured the full, unadulterated Body-Worn Camera (BWC)
and In-Car Camera footage of all ICPD officers who responded to the events of June 3,
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both in downtown Iowa City in the early evening and on Dubuque Street in the later
evening.
OIR Group team members also collected extensive digital evidence from public
sources, including social media platforms, to better inform our review. OIR Group
discovered digital evidence in personal and organizational Facebook and Instagram
pages and Twitter feeds. We reviewed Live Feed and streaming video footage from
mainstream and alternative media pages in Iowa City. We especially benefitted from
reviewing the extensive live coverage of the June 3 Dubuque Street clash that was
reported by KCRG-TV9.
Additionally, OIR Group reviewed media articles about the events both in Iowa City as
well as throughout the State to understand the full context of the event and identify
important players. This review largely contributed to our understanding of the events
around Iowa City from late May to early June.
OIR Group also reviewed all Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) evidence, including
written logs and all radio broadcast communications, from June 3. We used this
detailed evidence, plus BWC, In-Car, and surveillance video, to construct the detailed
timeline included in this report.
The City also requested that we incorporate interviews with complainants into our
process. Five individuals who had participated in the protests had submitted formal
written complaints about their experience to the Iowa City Community Police Review
Board, which provides independent civilian oversight of ICPD. Because the acting Chief
– who has a customary role in the intake and investigation of complaints – was a
potential subject (as a decision-maker on June 3) in these cases, the City believed that
submission of OIR’s report to the CPRB as the “Police Chief’s report” under the
ordinance would be preferable, including independent interviews of complainants.
We reached out to the five individuals and heard back from two. We interviewed each
of them at length, and their perspective contributed significantly to our overall
impressions; their cooperation is appreciated.
Lastly, OIR Group also sought perspective from representatives of the primary agencies
that provided mutual aid to and with ICPD during the days at issue. These included the
Iowa State Police, the University of Iowa Police Department, and Johnson County
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Sheriff.5 To their credit, UIPD and the Sheriff responded to our questions via email in
written format, although we would have greatly preferred an opportunity to talk with “on
the ground” representatives of the two agencies. However, ISP responded to our
request with an emailed declination.6 We were therefore unable to gather any direct
information about their involvement and command, which, as we note throughout this
report, was significant both on June 3 and on subsequent nights. Nor are we aware of
any public report of significance produced by ISP regarding its own involvement in
responding to the protests of this past summer. The chance to gain that agency’s
perspective would obviously have helped fill relevant gaps in the understanding of
influential decision-making that occurred at that time and the lack of any substantive
responsiveness to requests for information from ISP is disheartening.
The reticence of other involved agencies enhances our appreciation for the full
cooperation we received from ICPD and the City. It also reflects well on the City’s
commitment to address this incident through a public report by an independent entity.
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5 Our understanding is that other neighboring law enforcement agencies also provided
assistance in Iowa City during that time; however, their role was largely supportive in nature and
involved a relatively small number of personnel.
6 We were also advised that entreaties for information directly from Iowa City about its role in the
events of June 3 were similarly rebuffed by ISP.
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Before June 3: A Growing Protest Movement
Background
Law enforcement in Iowa City is primarily the responsibility of the ICPD. However, a
number of features of the city complicate this from a jurisdictional perspective, and other
agencies play a prominent – or even leading – role with regard to both responsibility and
decision-making at specific locations within the city limits. Some of the key components
to this dynamic include the following:
Iowa City local streets and City Hall are the primary jurisdiction of ICPD
The County courthouse and jail facilities are the primary jurisdiction of the
Johnson County Sheriff
The “Old Capitol,” including the Pentacrest, is the primary jurisdiction of the
University of Iowa Police Department (UIPD)
The interstates, the most relevant herein being Interstate 80, are the primary
jurisdiction of the Iowa State Patrol.
The UIPD has a memorandum of understanding with the ICPD that members of
UIPD make up part of ICPD’s Special Response Teams (SRT)
In the days leading up to June 3, each of the above agencies responded to or became
aware of incidents of protest accompanied in some cases by civil unrest elsewhere in
the state, both within Iowa City and in other Iowa cities, such as Coralville, Davenport,
Cedar Rapids and Des Moines. How these incidents played out, and, more importantly,
law enforcement’s significantly varied responses to them, resulted in uncertainty about
the intentions of some of the protestors and best strategies for law enforcement.
Events in Other Jurisdictions
Iowa residents, like those in cities across the US, responded to the May 25 killing of
George Floyd through protest, the first of which occurred in Des Moines on Friday, May
29. These continued daily throughout Iowa (see Appendix A). For example, Davenport
experienced a high level of activity from May 29 to May 31. Late night events at the
Coralville Mall on May 31, in which suspected looting activity and vandalism prompted a
significant police response, which in turn generated a spontaneous demonstration by
protestors, typified the blurred lines that were at times complicating the narrative locally
and around the country.
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The incidents in the jurisdictions surrounding Iowa City created a heightened tension
and uncertainty around what might happen next and what the appropriate police
response should be.
In the days leading up to June 3, ICPD officers provided mutual aid to their adjacent
neighbor, Coralville, and Department leadership tracked neighboring protest activity.
According to one Department official, these escalating events had an impact on ICPD’s
uncertainty regarding the intention of protestors overall and also served to inform what
responses were and were not effective to address protest activities. Law enforcement
responses to these initial events spanned the spectrum of possible outcomes, from
deployment of less lethal munitions and arrests to negotiation with protestors and
officers removing riot gear or “taking a knee” in support of the protest. In Des Moines on
May 29, negotiation with protestors failed; officers eventually deployed tear gas to
disperse the crowd.
The conduct of protestors and their intentions also spanned the spectrum. While the
majority of participants in the growing movement were peacefully expressing First
Amendment rights, others were finding an outlet for their frustration (or exploiting
unstable conditions) in conduct that was aggressive or even criminal.
When violence did occur, the officers and their equipment (specifically, police vehicles)
or city or private property were often the primary targets of the protestors’ anger. The
ambush of police in the early morning of June 1 in Davenport was perhaps the most
extreme example of this, and presumably contributed to heightened safety concerns
among law enforcement.
Events Within Iowa City
On May 29, the ICPD Interim Chief made a public statement in which he condemned
the murder of George Floyd, stating, “The manner in which these officers treated Mr.
Floyd is inconsistent with how we train police officers to conduct their interactions with
the public.” The following day, Iowa City had its first large-scale demonstration, and the
protest activity grew and took on new forms as the week progressed.
The first event in Iowa City was the planned “Say Their Names” Rally. Held on May 30
at noon in the Pentacrest (the primary jurisdiction of UIPD), the rally was organized by
residents and supported by the Mayor and a County Supervisor.7 Portions of downtown
7 The organizers of that rally and other participants would soon coalesce into a grassroots
activist group known as the Iowa Freedom Riders. They continued to be an influential driver of
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Iowa City, specifically, Clinton Street and Iowa Avenue, were closed with road
barricades for the safety of protestors. ICPD was prepared to respond should a
“significant disturbance” occur, and then only to take life-saving measures. ICPD noted
specifically within its internal directives that, while they might take measures to protect
property, this was a lower priority than life and safety. UIPD was similarly briefed. A
series of speeches gave the rally its focus, and hundreds attended what proved to be a
peaceful gathering that did not involve any sort of police response.8
The City and ICPD leadership maintained this posture for other local events leading up
to June 3. Actively monitoring events as they unfolded, the authorities worked to strike
a balance between respect for the protests and the obligation to preserve order and
safety. Even with increased protest activity, including vandalism on the evenings of
June 1 and 2 (see Appendix A), ICPD did not actively deploy to protect property or
impede protest. ICPD leadership informed us that they observed, but did not prevent,
vandalism of City and County property. On June 1, one window of City Hall was
reportedly broken and significantly more on June 2, with a total of 19 glass panels that
needed to be replaced. There was also spray painting of City Hall and the County
Courthouse and reported spray painting and damage to private property along the
course of the protestors’ march.
While recognizing that protest activity was becoming progressively more varied and
intense during June 1 and 2, and that clashes with law enforcement from different
agencies were taking on an increased edge (including an episode in which Johnson
County Sheriff’s deputies deployed pepper spray and encountered projectiles thrown by
protestors), ICPD maintains that it lacked a workable sense of who (if anyone) was
emerging as the organizers of the growing crowds. But there did seem to be greater
levels of coordination in terms of both the acts of vandalism (with, for example, some
participants obscuring their cohorts’ faces with cardboard and seemingly being more
intentional in carrying tools to break windows), and the more traditional, constructive
planning of demonstrations (with “meet-ups” publicized on social media and the
Pentacrest emerging as a regular gathering place). And, as we discuss below, it is
unfortunate that more outreach and efforts at communication were not achieved early
on – a dynamic that may have helped de-escalate the later dynamics on Dubuque
Street.
reform efforts and strategic demonstration activity through the summer and beyond, and we
mention some of their accomplishments below.
8 As we discuss below, the adoption of this “low profile” approach from ICPD was partly the
function of a request by rally organizers, who expressed their preference that law enforcement
refrain from a significant presence in order to forestall potential conflict.
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The objective of allowing protest activity with no response to acts of vandalism
remained the mission on the afternoon of June 3 even as ICPD observed a 300-400-
person crowd marching through and, on occasion, vandalizing downtown Iowa City. On
the afternoon of June 3, ICPD increased their visible presence throughout downtown
Iowa City deployed in riot gear but they did not inhibit or otherwise engage with
protestors marching or intercede to prevent vandalism. Street units lined downtown
streets and were later joined by the Special Response Teams (SRT), tactical teams that
were deployed to critical locations such as the courthouse and jail.
As they did on May 30, ICPD and other responding agencies set up barricades to direct
traffic for safety in downtown but did not otherwise intervene. But this approach
changed significantly when the interstate highway became a discernible focus for the
protestors as the evening of June 3 progressed.
November 11, 2016: Precedent on I-80
The incidents in the days immediately prior to June 3, 2020 certainly created a
heightened tension around what should be the appropriate police response. But it is
also relevant to note that this was not the first time in recent memory that protestors in
Iowa City had attempted to access the Interstate 80. A similar situation played out
during the “Not My America” march on November 11, 2016 and resulted in protestors
ultimately gaining access to the highway.
On November 11, 2016, a group of approximately 100 protestors marched from
downtown Iowa City to the Interstate 80 via Dubuque Street in response to the election
of President Donald Trump. According to media reports, ICPD patrol cars accompanied
the protestors, though ICPD officials informed OIR Group that they were not prepared to
respond to this march. The protestors successfully entered the I-80, where they
physically blocked traffic for approximately 30 minutes. The Iowa State Patrol
eventually responded; within 19 minutes, the group was removed from the highway with
no use of force reported.
In what one official called a “political storm,” Iowa City officials were rebuked for having
“allowed” protestors on the I-80. In addition to the significant safety risk to both civilian
and officer safety, the State argued that the highway blockage was costly to the State,
both in terms of resources to clear (or close) it and delays in interstate travel. The
incident even prompted a proposed law in early 2017, which would have increased the
penalty for persons obstructing a highway to a Class D felony. Preventing protestors
from having access to the I-80 clearly emerged as the State leadership’s preferred
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approach, and presumably shaped the mindset of decision-makers within the unified
command.9
Less Lethal Munitions Defined
In the interest of informing those who may not be familiar with less lethal force options
used by ICPD over the course of this incident, we provide the following definitions.
Later in this report, we detail the count and estimated timeline of each munition and
analyze their deployment.
Flash bang(s). These were the first devices deployed by ICPD to disperse the
crowd on June 3; these devices create a loud explosive sound and bright light
that is meant to shock, surprise or otherwise distract a subject in the context of a
tactical operation. Contrary to their name and sound, flash bangs are not
actually an explosive device.
Tear gas. This term is applied to two different types of chemical munitions. The
first is Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) gas, commonly referred to as “OC” or “pepper
gas.” OC gas is an inflammatory agent derived from the oil of hot pepper plants,
which causes heat, redness, and swelling to the skin and irritation to the nose
and eyes. The second is Ortho-Chlorobenzalmalononitrite (CS) gas, or what
most people refer to when they say, “tear gas.” CS gas is an irritant, which
causes intense stinging to the eyes and respiratory system.
CS and OC gas was disseminated on June 3 using one of three methods. The
first method was via a “triple chaser grenade,” a hand-held grenade that
contained three separate canisters of the gas that released in three increments.
CS and OC gas was also deployed via a launcher, sometimes referred to as a
“37-millimeter (mm) launcher,” which looks something like a shotgun. In this
deployment method, the gas is contained in up to five canisters within a single
shell (“skat shell”) that is ejected from a launcher. The canisters deploy in rapid
sequence. This method is used to shoot the gas canisters to a father distance.
9 ICPD leadership acknowledged experiencing considerable external criticism after having
“allowed” the 2016 protest to reach the interstate, but offered two points in addition to this: first,
that it simply lacked the resources to blockade the highway in time to forestall that November 11
event, which had put it in a completely different decision-making posture than on June 3; and
second, that the political fallout from that earlier event had not influenced its resolve in
supporting ISP’s highway blockade plan on June 3.
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OC spray was deployed using a handheld canister that an individual officer
wears on his/her belt and is typically carried by most law enforcement officers.
At least one ICPD officer used pepper spray on protestors on June 3.
Smoke. ICPD officers also deployed canisters of Saf-Smoke. This less lethal
tool disseminates white smoke and is typically used by law enforcement for
distraction or concealment during an operation. On June 3, ICPD reported that
they used smoke to increase the effect of the tear gas because the smoke can
trap and suspend gas for a longer increment of time. While it is non-toxic, smoke
can sometimes cause dizziness or a choking sensation.
Stinger Grenade. A “stinger grenade” is a tool that combines approximately 180
small rubber pellets and a chemical agent like OC or CS powder into an
approximately 3-inch ball that looks like a traditional military grenade. It is meant
to cause both irritation of the skin/respiratory system and pain. These are
different from “rubber bullets.” As detailed below, ICPD deployed stinger
grenades on June 3.
Pepper balls. These are small, powder-filled projectiles that are shot from a
37mm launcher similar to that referenced above. These are meant to be target-
specific; upon impact, they cause pain and saturate the area with the enclosed
powder. ICPD used two types of pepper ball on June 3. The first contained OC
powder, which, like the gas, is an inflammatory agent. The second contained an
inert powder.
Wednesday, June 3: Overview of Events
Timeline
A detailed timeline is presented below. Dispersal orders, declarations of unlawful
assembly, and warnings of use of chemical munitions, all issued by ISP via their
vehicle’s loudspeaker, are in blue. Deployment of less lethal munitions are listed in red.
We list “protestors” as a collective, while also understanding that the group was not one
cohesive unit but rather made up of various types of protestors with differing goals and
intentions. We included University of Iowa Police Department personnel in the category
“ICPD” because UIPD officers were part of ICPD SRT Metro.
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Table 1: Timeline of June 3, 2020
Time of Day Event/Action Agency/ Group
6:36:39 PM
Crowd of 300-400 protestors convene at the Pentacrest
in downtown Iowa City. Protestors block traffic and
vandalize areas of downtown Iowa City. Protestors
6:36:58 PM Crowd marches through downtown Iowa City Protestors
7:06:55 PM
Special Response Team (SRT) deploy to various
locations in downtown Iowa City ICPD
8:58:37 PM
Iowa State Patrol (ISP), 11 units, arrive to downtown
Iowa City ISP
9:17:58 PM Crowd moving east away from Pentacrest Protestors
9:21:28 PM Report of male carrying infant and toddler in crowd Protestors
9:57:06 PM Crowd begins movement toward I-80 NB Dubuque Protestors
9:58:41 PM Reports of crowd burning things Protestors
10:00:17 PM
DOT aware of potential I-80 blockage; changes signs to
warn drivers
Dept of
Transportation
10:29:41 PM
Request assistance shutting down I-80 on ramps - EB
Dubuque
Johnson County
Sheriff
10:29:59 PM
ICPD deploys to Dubuque and I-80. Arriving units to
park N of I-80 on ramps. ICPD units walk toward Foster
Rd. ICPD begins to deploy in formation across lanes of
Dubuque St. ICPD
10:34:21 PM
Sheriff receives instruction from ISP to shut down EB
Dubuque St.
Johnson County
Sheriff
10:35:34 PM Crowd estimate at "300+" Protestors
10:37:28 PM Reports of 20-30 vehicles behind crowd Protestors
10:46:00 AM
First protestors arrive to police line on foot, bicycle, and
motor scooter Protestors
11:03:04 PM
Warning issued - unlawful assembly, dispersal
order, and warnings of use of chemical munitions -
from ISP loudspeaker ISP
11:04:49 PM
Flash bangs deployed, followed by tear gas
canisters ICPD
11:06:09 PM Hold the line ICPD
11:09:29 PM Need global command ICPD
11:09:29 PM Emergency medical required - notify all hospitals of gas ICPD
11:11:17 PM Additional warnings and dispersal order from ISP ISP
11:12:19 PM Additional order to disperse ISP
11:12:45 PM
Protester(s) heard shouting, “we have the right to
assemble” Protestors
11:13:02 PM
ICPD instructs officers to use targeted less lethal if
protestors throw items at the police line. Instructs line to
watch for the vehicles ICPD
11:13:33 PM Additional orders to disperse ISP
11:13:37 PM Crowd heard chanting, “We won’t go” Protestors
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Time of Day Event/Action Agency/ Group
11:14:01 PM
Additional orders to “Disperse from this area. Turn
around and go the other direction, please.” ISP
11:14:02 PM
Crowd/individuals stating, “we have the right to be here”
and “we haven’t done anything” Protestors
11:14:34 PM
“Those of you in the vehicles, turn them around in
the other direction” ISP
11:14:48 PM Crowd chants, “hands up, don’t shoot” Protestors
11:15:40 PM Members of the crowd heard calling out for a medic Protestors
11:16:03 PM A vehicle approaches line from within the crowd. Protestors
11:16:13 PM
ISP loudspeaker warns vehicle to turn around or
less lethal munitions will be deployed. ISP
11:16:59 PM Vehicle moves back. ISP
11:17:08 PM
ICPD instructs officers that if crowd comes closer, they
can use additional less lethal munitions ICPD
11:17:37 PM
ISP again instructs vehicle to turn around and go
the other direction ISP
11:19:40 PM
Deployment of less lethal (pepper ball used, tear gas
used) ICPD
11:21:53 PM
Discussion of plan if protestors breach the line. ISP
informs ICPD that there may be a traffic plan for I-80
closure. Not confirmed. ISP
11:22:20 PM ICPD officers request to use additional less lethal ICPD
11:22:46 PM ICPD requests that ISP give another warning ICPD
11:22:48 PM Order heard to deploy less lethal munitions ICPD
11:22:52 PM Tear gas deployed ICPD
11:23:23 PM Tear gas deployed, PepperBall deployed ICPD
11:23:42 PM Tear gas deployed ICPD
11:24:39 PM
Protestor on bike approaches. Officer requests
permission to use targeted less lethal. ICPD instructs
officer to “leave him” and use gas instead. ICPD
11:25:42 PM
ICPD officers request to spray protestors who are not
leaving. ICPD instructs officers to “Leave them.” ICPD
11:26:12 PM
EMS requesting assistance Dubuque/Foster; things
being thrown at them/surrounded Johnson County
11:27:05 PM Reports of vehicles approaching the skirmish line ICPD
11:27:12 PM Ambulance to drives over the median ICPD
11:27:38 PM People running away ICPD
11:28:29 PM Officer warns that a group is coming up the side ICPD
11:29:02 PM Fire truck approaches, moves through line Johnson County
11:31:02 PM Various less lethal munitions deployed ICPD
11:31:31 PM Small groups of protestors to Dubuque/Park ICPD
11:32:21 PM ICPD instructs officers to hold the line ICPD
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Time of Day Event/Action Agency/ Group
11:33:21 PM
ICPD requests a team to arrest a protestor that refuses
to move ICPD
11:35:25 PM
ICPD officers report that they are nearly out of less
lethal munitions except handheld Stinger rounds. ICPD
instructs officers to use those rounds ICPD
11:36:53 PM
ICPD and ISP discuss plan. Second discussion about
letting protestors reach the highway; ISP attempts to
confirm if highway is closed. Both officers resolve to
"wait [it] out." ICPD
11:41:24 PM Crowd begins to disperse. ICPD
11:53:11 PM Protestors moving back to downtown ICPD
11:54:27 PM Abandoned car in Dubuque/Foster Rd ICPD
The Confrontation on Dubuque Street
As the marchers made their way from downtown to the Interstate 80 onramp on
Dubuque Street, the law enforcement “unified command” began to consider its
response. The first decision – and the one from which others followed – was the most
basic: whether the protestors would be allowed to access the highway in furtherance of
their demonstration. Given the understanding between the different agencies involved,
this decision fell to the Iowa State Patrol by virtue of its jurisdictional authority over the
interstate system. ISP was led by a lieutenant who had been given overall responsibility
for the joint operation. And ISP’s choice was to deny access but knowing it did not have
sufficient officers to do so, it recognized it would need to enlist the aid of the other
departments in order to be able to effectively block Dubuque Street.10
Approximately 37 ICPD patrol-level officers were deployed to Dubuque Street to
effectuate the skirmish line that was being formed across all lanes of Dubuque Street.11
Additional officers from ISP and from the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office 12 also
responded to this location.
10 Because ISP did not cooperate in this review, we were unable to learn how many ISP officers
were actually deployed on June 3.
11 A “skirmish line” in this context refers to a side-by-side line of officers, typically wearing
tactical or “riot” gear and holding batons and/or shields, used to prevent forward movement (e.g.
of a crowd) or protect assets. A second line of officers or specialized teams (e.g., officers
specially trained to deploy less lethal munitions) often stands behind the first line of officers.
The line is usually led by one or more squad leaders or other command-level personnel.
12 Asked several months later about the number of JCSO officers involved, that department’s
leadership was unsure about the exact total, but characterized it as “more than 10.” It is curious
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In addition to these patrol-level resources, another prominent component of this rapidly
assembled response was the Iowa City Metro Special Response Team (“SRT”). This
cadre of officers existed within ICPD “to handle unusual operational activities and
problems, such as hostage situations, barricaded situations, and high-risk
apprehensions.”13 Participation in the SRT was a collateral duty for the involved officers
and entailed a significant amount of specialized training and equipment.
There were 22 SRT members on duty that night (18 of whom were from ICPD and 4
from the University of Iowa Police Department), divided into two groups that were each
led by an ICPD sergeant. They had begun their shift at about 6:00 PM and were initially
deployed in various locations throughout downtown Iowa City in response to unfolding
developments. Their first role was to provide “as needed” support for the regular patrol
officers in case arrest or other enforcement scenarios engendered a large-scale hostile
response from the crowds in the streets. In this context, SRT members reported verbal
aggression from protestors that was later characterized as “violent and threatening”; as
they stood by the Civic Center (which had been vandalized the night before), they
encountered at least one individual who challenged them to fight.
As the assembled crowd began to march, protest leaders made announcements
relating to the intention to go to the Interstate 80 – and allegedly included warnings to
participants about the possibility of confrontation. At one point, observing officers
broadcast information about a group member carrying a “red bucket with chemical odor”
and individuals “starting to burn some things.” These factors contributed to the mindset
of officers as they prepared to block Dubuque Street – which led to the most proximate
onramp to the I-80 from the downtown area. With various stops at intersections along
the route, the group of marchers took the better part of an hour to proceed from
downtown to the eventual site of the incident with police personnel.
As for the SRT, its members received direction at approximately 10:15 to bring their
teams to the staging area on Dubuque Street that ISP was establishing. Other
preparations were unfolding as well. Significantly, these included efforts (in
coordination with Iowa State’s Department of Transportation) to close a portion of the
that an agency would not have more precise records of deployment of officers to an event such
as this.
13 This language comes from the 2017 agreement between the City and the University of Iowa,
which provided for the addition of University Police Department members to the SRT for the
mutual benefit of the parties in terms of shared resources and distinctive opportunities for
staffing and training. Since the time of the agreement (and on the night of June 3), most of the
SRT personnel continue to be ICPD members.
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interstate as a precaution for drivers and any protestors who managed to reach highway
area in spite of police operations. Computer dispatch records note that by 10:00 PM,
the Department of Transportation was “aware of potential interstate blockage” on the
part of the demonstrators.
As the SRT units arrived in two separate vans, one ICPD sergeant took the lead in
coordinating with supervisors from ISP and the Johnson City Sheriff’s Office. SRT
personnel, armed with less lethal munitions, took support positions behind the front line
of officers that was forming a “skirmish line,” across the four lanes of Dubuque Street.
The first-row officers wore helmets and carried plastic shields for crowd control and
protection.
Meanwhile, as they awaited the marchers, the ISP incident commander worked with
leadership from the other law enforcement agencies to devise a plan for engagement
with the protestors. It consisted of announcements that would formally declare an
unlawful assembly, followed by orders to disperse, followed by warnings about chemical
munitions, the deployment of “flash bang” diversionary devices, and then the
deployment of tear gas. The point person for communications – including the formal
announcements – was to be the ISP lieutenant on scene. And, because of their larger
numbers and their specific tactical resources and training, the SRT members agreed to
take the lead role in the potential execution of the ISP plan’s final phases: the
deployment of the munitions.
At this point, the crowd of marchers was estimated to be between 300 and 500 people.
They had come together somewhat organically and were proceeding in a loosely
coordinated fashion as they made their way from downtown to the I-80 via Dubuque
Street. Along the way, they stopped periodically at intersections and for
communications purposes. Informal preparations for a possible conflict intensified as
they approached the police line: a telephone number for bail services was distributed,
and marchers were asked to kneel so that participants with medical aid abilities could
be identified.
It was approximately 10:45 PM when a lead group of several protestors, seemingly self-
appointed, arrived at the police line well ahead of the main crowd of participants. Some
were on foot, while others were on bicycles; one person was riding on a motorbike.
They engaged with the police for several minutes in an exchange that was less about
dialogue or negotiation than a forum for the protestors to express their grievances
against police violence and discrimination, make occasional taunts, and issue
challenges relating to the group’s intent to breach the line. One individual offered
25 | P a g e
assurances that the crowd’s intentions were peaceful, and they did not intend an
aggressive breach of the line.14
For his part, the ISP incident commander had a focused message: he urged the
leadership to turn back and keep the rest of the protestors from advancing and warned
that chemical munitions would be used if they did not comply with law enforcement
directives. This was unavailing.
After about fifteen minutes, some members of the small group made their way back to
the main crowd of protestors that was waiting about a hundred yards away – and the
crowd then came forward toward the police line. Many of the protestors in the front of
the crowd were chanting in unison as they advanced within a few feet of the front line of
officers. Some of the first row of protestors were animated and gesticulating while
others were relatively steady in holding their position. Per the plan, the ISP commander
again issued formal announcements through the public address speaker of a law
enforcement vehicle. These had no discernible effect on the crowd, which continued to
chant loudly. At least one of the protestors was unequivocally “on notice” of the intent to
use tear gas and used a megaphone to alert the others to that effect. But the extent to
which the protest group as a whole had heard and understood the warnings is very
much unclear.
Approximately two minutes after the front of the main crowd reached the skirmish line,
the order to “deploy munitions” was issued by the ISP commander, and several flash
bangs were deployed by ICPD. Seemingly startled by the flash bangs, the crowd
scrambled back, with many of them screaming. After a brief pause and without waiting
to see whether the flash bangs alone had effectively defeated the crowd’s intent on
advancing, ICPD deployed tear gas, and the main group of protestors further retreated
for a hundred yards or more. Others remained near the police line, either laying on the
ground, on their knees, or standing in the cloud of gas. But those few did not leave.
A large percentage of protestors remained in the area – back from the skirmish line area
but clearly determined to remain a presence on Dubuque Street in defiance of (or
response to) the law enforcement actions. Some worked to assist people who had
become affected by the gas and others regrouped as if to advance toward the line
14 This same protester encouraged the officers to kneel as the large group arrived, presenting it
as a potential way to defuse tension. There was no direct response from either ICPD or ISP
leadership to this request; ICPD had already decided that it was not going to take a knee. We
discuss this further below, in the context of a larger discussion about the limited range and
effectiveness of communications with the protest group.
26 | P a g e
again. And video footage shows a few moving on Dubuque Street back toward Foster
Road away from the event.
Additional orders and warnings were provided by the ISP lieutenant at intervals in the
next half hour. Further munitions – including a second round of tear gas canisters,
pepper balls, handheld OC spray, and “stinger grenades” that carried rubber pellets –
were used to offset crowd actions and continue to promote departure from the area.
Meanwhile, the anti-police rhetoric (including some recorded music) and the passion of
remaining protestors intensified. In the first recorded act of physical aggression,
protestors on Dubuque Street threw munitions canisters back in the direction of the
police. On the other hand, others seemed to be genuinely mystified by what had
happened. At one point, a protestor appeared to be in medical distress, and bystanders
called out that he was having a seizure. With no coordination from law enforcement, (a
matter we discuss in detail below), a Johnson County Ambulance made its way on to
the scene to render aid, although the man ultimately declined to be transported and left
the area under his own power.
Finally, and gradually, the remaining members of the crowd decided to leave the area.
Approximately one hour had passed since the group leaders had first approached the
skirmish line on Dubuque Street to engage with the police. One individual who
continued to refuse orders to leave was taken into custody by ICPD after minimal
controlling force, but that was the only arrest at the scene.15
[THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
15 A second person was arrested for offenses related to the Dubuque Street protest, but this did
not occur until a few days later. We talk later about the implications of this arrest decision.
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ICPD on June 3: Issues and Assessments
Jurisdiction, M utual Aid and Responsibility for Decision-
Making
Once it became known that the protestors were intent on marching from the downtown
area to the interstate as a next phase in their demonstrations, the primary jurisdictional
authority for the law enforcement response fell to the Iowa State Patrol. It is clear that
on June 3, 2020, the ISP was intent on not allowing the protestors to access the I-80
and assumed the ultimate responsibility for figuring out how to effectuate that decision.
It was the ISP on-site commander who represented law enforcement presence in
speaking with the lead cadre of protestors, and who formally declared the unlawful
assembly, who issued the order to disperse, and who ordered the deployment of the
munitions soon thereafter.
It is, however, also true that the other involved agencies – and particularly the ICPD and
the Sheriff’s Office – accepted ISP’s decision and agreed to participate in the operation.
On June 3, ISP lacked the on-site resources to accomplish its objective without the
assistance of the other agencies who on the ground comprised the “unified command”
in Iowa City. Accordingly, it fell to the other agencies to provide the needed personnel
and equipment to supplement ISP’s presence. And it was the Iowa City Metro Special
Response Team (ICPD and UIPD), at the behest of ISP, that actually provided and
deployed most of the crowd control munitions (flash bangs, tear gas, pepper balls) that
became the source of consternation and concern in the ensuing days.
Importantly, in our repeated interactions with ICPD for this review, the Department’s
representatives were steadfast about acknowledging their own agreement with the plan
and contributions to its particulars.16 They recognized the criticism that the events of
June 3 have provoked and are open to the idea that there were shortcomings in their
overall preparedness and handling of specific incidents. But they continue to maintain
that the overarching objective of ISP to prevent protestors from reaching the Interstate
was sound, and in order to effectuate this objective the decision to block the highway
and disperse the crowd with gas was justified by the circumstances – and was
16 The same was true of the JCSO, although those communications with us were limited to
relatively brief email exchanges. While we appreciated the information provided, it would have
obviously been immensely more preferable to have had the opportunity to talk with “on the
ground “JCSO leadership.
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decidedly preferable to other force options such as a forward push with batons and
shields.
This is important insofar as it allows for a critique of the decision-making that, for better
or worse, is fairly attributable to ICPD itself rather than treating it as a scapegoat for the
choices of other participants.17 We therefore proceed from that perspective, while noting
that the changes in strategy in subsequent days (and the new “divisions of labor” among
the agencies in the joint command) are also critical for purposes of analysis.
But we were also struck by the relative paucity of written material or agreements to
stipulate or guide the understanding between the agencies. Iowa City is home to
multiple law enforcement agencies within a relatively small geographic space, making
the question of “who commanded where” a key point of evaluation. This incident
spanned the jurisdiction of various agencies. And, significantly, while a 4-page
agreement (from 1985) between the City, the city of Coralville, Johnson County, and the
University provides at least some guidance, it does not include ISP and could potentially
benefit from updating and further detail.18
As detailed below, the agreement by ICPD leadership to accede to the overarching
objective of ISP of preventing the protestors to reach the interstate and then to become
the instrumentality of that objective by deployment of tear gas, pepper balls, and flash
bangs was countermanded the next day by City leadership. Appropriately, ICPD
responded to this different direction with ICPD advising ISP that it could no longer
deploy less lethal munitions to keep protestors off the interstate for future protests.
UIPD’s direction from University leadership was to remove its officers from the Special
Response Team altogether.
Especially now that those directions have been verbally provided by the City’s
leadership, ICPD should set out in writing and advise other law enforcement entities of
evolutions in its enforcement and deployment parameters, so that all are clear about
them on a forward going basis.
17 It is also interesting to note in this context that ICPD’s General Order 89-04, “Civil Rights,”
states that “the City of Iowa City and the Iowa City Police Department expressly prohibit any law
enforcement agency operating within its jurisdiction from using excessive force against any
individuals engaged in non-violent civil rights demonstrations.” Thus, the Department would, on
some level, be accountable for the actions on Dubuque Street even if it sought to deflect
responsibility to ISP.
18 A comparable agreement was reached in 1994 that included Iowa City and a total of eight
other jurisdictions (including Johnson County and Coralville). Again, though, ISP is not part of
this mutual aid protocol.
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RECOMMENDATION 1
ICPD should re-visit its existing mutual aid/joint law enforcement agreements with
outside agencies and should develop or refine as needed any written protocols that set
out limitations on deployment of munitions or enforcement activity with which the Police
Department will not assist.
RECOMMENDATION 2
ICPD should endeavor to reach a mutual aid/joint law enforcement agreement with ISP
regarding its limitations on deployment of munitions or enforcement activity, and if one
cannot be struck advise ISP in writing of these limitations.
Decision to Deny Access and Block Dubuque Street
The decision by ICPD leadership to accede to ISP’s determination to prevent the
protestors from reaching the Interstate was framed in terms of concern for the disruption
of traffic and the safety of motorists and protestors themselves. There is obviously
legitimacy to this position. We acknowledge that, in theory and under ordinary
circumstances, the presence of pedestrians on an interstate highway is fraught with
problems from a safety and logistics perspective.
But these were not ordinary circumstances. Instead, it was period of protest and
emotion unprecedented in recent memory, at a scale reflective of a strong community
voice coming together to be heard. The various efforts to accommodate the protests in
prior days had, to some extent, been reflective of the City’s recognition of this
phenomenon. Moreover, and as set out above, protestors had accessed the highway
four years earlier with no reports of injury and with considerably less time for authorities
to prepare.19
An additional counterweight to the stated justifications for the blockage – and the
insistence on enforcing it through deployment of munitions – is the supplemental steps
that were taken by authorities on June 3 to close down a section of the I-80 during the
time in question. This was meant to provide an added safeguard against injury or
accident in case protestors somehow got beyond the skirmish line. Recorded
transmissions address the involvement of the Department of Transportation in providing
19 We do note here that vehicles on the interstate ended up being quite close to the 2016
marchers, and that the situation was a dangerous one. But the precedent of a “no injury”
shutdown – and the additional time that authorities on June 3 had to prepare for an occurrence
that was happening much later in the evening than the 2016 protest – is nonetheless instructive.
30 | P a g e
assistance, and our understanding is patrol personnel from neighboring cities were also
involved in this effort.
To this day, it is not entirely clear whether and when the law enforcement leadership on
Dubuque Street “knew” the highway had been closed.20 Obviously, clear information in
this regard could and should have been a priority. It follows also that it could and
should have shaped decision-making as to the level of conflict with protestors that was
proportional to the articulated public safety rationales.
If the law enforcement contingent gathered on Dubuque Street knew or could have
known that the primary asserted reason for not allowing the crowd to move forward was
no longer “real”, it then causes one to question why the police contingent there
remained so intent on preventing the crowd from proceeding, to the point of eventual
deployment of tear gas and other munitions. While we reiterate that decisions by ICPD
to follow the lead of ISP were made in the midst of a challenging situation and in mutual
aid of another agency’s plan, the creditable efforts to close the interstate as a backstop
safety measure reduce the legitimacy of the inflexible mindset that prevailed on
Dubuque Street.
20 We did not receive a conclusive response when we asked if the I-80 at Dubuque was, in fact,
successfully closed at the time of the standoff on June 3. When we asked ICPD leadership,
they were unable to provide a definite statement that the I-80 was closed. And because ISP did
not cooperate in our review, we were unable to learn whether the I-80, over which it has primary
jurisdiction, was in fact closed, and if it was, the precise time that such occurred.
We noted two relevant conversations that occurred on the line between ICPD and ISP
leadership that further evidence the “in the moment” uncertainty over the highway closure. The
first, occurred at approximately 11:21PM and immediately before the second round of less lethal
munitions was deployed. An ICPD officer asked the ISP commander, “what do we do if [the
protestors] go around us?” The ISP commander responded, “there’s another 16 troopers at the
top of the hill.” The ICPD officer asked, “have we diverted any traffic yet?” And ISP responded,
“we had a traffic plan to move […traffic],” but this conversation is interrupted with questions
about deploying less lethal munitions. At this point, there is no further recorded conversation
about the highway closure.
In the second conversation toward the end of the incident (approximately 11:36PM), ICPD again
asked the ISP supervisor about the highway. The ICPD officer, concerned that they had nearly
run out of less lethal munitions, asked the ISP commander, "If we're diverting traffic, what are
the odds that we let them get there? What do we lose? There's nobody up there, right?" To
which ISP responded, “Should not be.” After speaking into his radio, the ISP officer returned and
reported, "they're checking the cameras to see if we got it, everything shut off." Again, there is
no subsequent recorded conversation on Dubuque Street about whether the highway was
closed.
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For the City’s civilian leadership, the countermand the next morning to the decision the
night before was swift and unequivocal. And the subsequent decision by ISP itself the
very next evening to no longer press the issue and allow protestors to gain access to
the interstate on subsequent nights raises further questions about Dubuque Street’s
status as a definitive “line in the sand.” 21
Of course, some of this analysis is much clearer in hindsight. And we mention again
that the jurisdictional and decision-making authority rested first and foremost with the
State Patrol. But ICPD now has the benefit of that hindsight on a going forward basis.
As recommended above, it should memorialize its City’s expectations in light of this
experience and the evolving standards to which law enforcement is always rightfully
attuned.
RECOMMENDATION 3
ICPD, with input from the City, should evaluate its protocols for responding to
pedestrian activity on the interstate, both on its own and in a mutual aid context with
ISP, to provide more specific guidance as to enforcement strategies and priorities.
Lack of Negotiation with Protestors on June 3
One of the noteworthy features of the encounter was the lack of effective
communication between the protestors and police. This had different components –
some of which preceded the night of June 3 and some of which related to the unfolding
events on Dubuque Street.
Iowa City’s “Say Their Names” rally on May 30 provides an instructive contrast in terms
of the relative challenges faced by law enforcement as events progressed. Organized
by young activists who remained prominent in the protest movement as the summer
progressed, this pre-planned, well-publicized, daytime event attracted a few hundred
participants and featured speeches from a range of organizers and elected officials. It
was put together in direct response to the death of George Floyd and the broader
injustices exemplified by that tragedy; in fact, a few carloads of participants left for
Minneapolis from the rally with support from local grassroots fundraising.
21 In fairness, a variety of factors (including outreach by elected officials and a strong public
reaction) made circumstances different on June 4 and 5; we discuss some of these dynamics
below. But we note that the end of the tear gas deployments also coincided with ISP learning it
would have virtually exclusive responsibility for deploying those munitions on subsequent nights.
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While issues of police violence were central to the themes of the “Say Their Names”
rally, there were no reported clashes with ICPD, and the event remained peaceful.
Several factors contributed to this – not the least of which was the intentional, pre-
arranged “low profile” that the Department maintained. Organizers had reached out to
City officials, including ICPD representatives, to express their interest in avoiding
conflict by not having the police be an overt and potentially antagonizing presence. And
ICPD had cooperated, while developing a plan to be available quickly should a public
safety issue emerge.
Several factors distinguished June 3’s march to the I-80 from this earlier event. These
included daytime vs. night, planning vs. spontaneity, outreach to officials vs. none, and
– perhaps most significantly – a static, peaceful series of speeches vs. an effort to gain
access to an interstate highway. Underlying all of this was a change in the energy of
the crowd and of the movement itself into something more overtly confrontational.22
Taken together, these elements may have made any efforts by law enforcement to de-
escalate the situation on Dubuque Street through outreach or dialogue more
challenging. Yet a more overt focus on such gestures may have been productive, and
the effort would at least have helped solidify the legitimacy of subsequent decision-
making: if they had at least tried, the police would be in a better position to cite
reasonable efforts at collaboration and the provision of unequivocal warnings.
Sometimes, police agencies have achieved success by the introduction of agency
personnel who have special crisis negotiation training. Those officers with this special
skill are regularly deployed to talk to those in confrontations with police to resolve issues
peaceably. There was no evidence that on June 3 there was consideration by ICPD
command to deploy those specially trained ICPD personnel in an effort to de-escalate
this situation.
As cited above, prior to the June 3 march toward the I-80, ICPD had observed that
protest activity generally in Iowa City was becoming progressively more intense over
June 1 and 2, that protest activity was seemingly more organized, and that crowd size
22 One of the repeated themes from our discussions with ICPD representatives was their
familiarity with – and support for – demonstration activity as a common feature of civic life in
Iowa City. They professed to be well-accustomed to facilitating large crowd dynamics and
promoting First Amendment expression and were struck by the difference between their usual
ability to serve as – and be recognized as – a constructive presence and the antagonism that
marked the early June days of the protest movement. Of course, one significant difference is
that unlike, for example, the Women’s March, the whole raison d’etre for the protests this past
summer was concerns about police abuse.
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was steadily growing. Moreover, ICPD and other affiliated agencies were attempting to
gain insight into potential “next moves” by monitoring social media and providing
informational bulletins to each other. But these efforts did not pay dividends, at least in
terms of helping ICPD identify parties who were recognized leadership figures.
One ICPD official informed us that, because they did not have robust intelligence on the
ground, law enforcement command was watching live media feeds in the Command
Post as their means of information (see Command Structure) and gleaning what it could
from officers in the field overhearing communications among the protestors. Instead of
outreach that might have led to clarification of expectations and the facilitation of
peaceful protest, law enforcement was in reaction mode – and scrambled to gather on
Dubuque Street just as the crowd of marchers began to move from downtown.
RECOMMENDATION 4
ICPD should dedicate resources to strengthening its ability to gather useful information
from social media and other sources about community sentiment, activism, and
potential protest activity.
RECOMMENDATION 5
When circumstances allow, ICPD should pursue a strategy of more pro-active
identification of and outreach toward protest leadership in an effort to achieve beneficial
clarity on both sides.
RECOMMENDATION 6
ICPD should consider using personnel specially trained in crisis negotiation techniques
to de-escalate potentially tense confrontations with protestors prior to resorting to
deployment of force.
RECOMMENDATION 7
ICPD should develop a crowd control policy that requires, when feasible, attempts at
de-escalation with protestors through negotiation, pace, and other de-escalation
strategies and documentation of all efforts to de-escalate the situation.
Interestingly, a “last chance” presented itself in the form of the small group protestors
who first reached the law enforcement skirmish line on Dubuque Street. Those people
were speaking with (or yelling at) the police for at least ten minutes as the main crowd
assembled and then waited a hundred yards away.
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It was during this time that the incident commander from the ISP stated to these
individuals that they were not going to be allowed to access the interstate, that they
needed to leave, and that they would ultimately be subjected to tear gas and other
interventions. He urged them to go back to the crowd and tell them not to advance. In
response, while one female protestor did state they could breach the line if they wanted
to, she also said that they came in peace. And another vocal male protestor stated
several times that they would not push the line.
These exchanges were significant in a couple of ways. One was the overt and
unequivocal expression by law enforcement of their own intentions to deny access and
to effectuate that by force if necessary. This goes to the issue of whether the protestors
were collectively “on notice” that the use of tear gas and other munitions was imminent
– an issue that was much disputed and which we discuss in more detail below. The
other was the lack of effectiveness in terms of de-escalation and/or constructive impact
on the events that followed.
It should be noted that the initial group to arrive at the police line appeared to be there
informally (as opposed to serving as a designated leadership team representing the
hundreds of individuals behind them), and that their own communications lacked focus
and any clear sense of negotiation or collaboration with law enforcement.23 But it is
nonetheless striking that, beyond articulating its own position as clearly and firmly as
possible, the police command made no efforts to engage, defuse, or otherwise move
the encounter off a confrontational footing.
As the larger mass of marchers began coming forward, chanting as they walked, one of
the ICPD officers can be heard on the body camera recordings talking about “taking a
knee” as a gesture of solidarity and compromise that could help avoid a more direct
conflict. The idea did not take hold. It was literally a last-minute suggestion; moreover,
we were advised that ICPD’s executive team had already decided against this form of
conciliation (which was occurring in locations around the country) out of concerns for
officer safety.24
23 While it was understandable that the joint law enforcement presence considered this first band
of protestors to be representative of the group, it also caused them to impute their seeming
intractability and expressions of aggression to the crowd as a whole. Our sense – as later
acknowledged in discussions with ICPD – was that the crowd was far from monolithic in its
specific intentions and attitudes toward antagonism with the police.
24 To this point, the Department had identified and forwarded to its officers a June 2 tweet sent
by a University of Iowa student stating: “if a cop takes a knee in a protest, take the opportunity
to blow their kneecaps out”. And in Coralville, during the May 31/June 1 unrest, an ICPD officer
had been assaulted with a closed fist, projectiles had been thrown at officers with a Coralville
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There are a couple of dimensions of this worth exploring. The first is ICPD leadership’s
blanket rejection of “taking a knee” out of safety concerns. While safety is always of
course a worthy consideration, we are unaware of incidents in which that conciliatory
gesture has led to actual harm for officers; conversely, we can cite instances in which it
helped to defuse conflict or build relationships. Law enforcement’s willingness to show
solidarity with demonstrators who are seeking a connection (as opposed to capitulating
to antagonistic demonstrators who are testing them) has powerful symbolic
resonance.25 As such, it merits due consideration as an option that should be available
when circumstances align appropriately.
This leads to the more specific issue of whether this specific context was or would have
been an effective one for attempting the gesture. We refrain from definitive speculation
in this regard, given the momentum of the crowd and the poor acoustics and lack of
advance planning among the different agencies. But the mention of taking a knee
showed both the desire by at least one ICPD officer for a different outcome and the
unsettled nature of the police response plan. As difficult – and potentially fruitless – as
it might have been, some effort to communicate with the protestors in a mode other than
stern authority could and should have been part of the law enforcement approach – as it
was in subsequent days.
Indeed, our understanding is that the Iowa State Patrol sent specially experienced
personnel to Iowa City in the aftermath of June 3 with the specific goal of improving the
quality and effectiveness of dialogue with protest leadership. This is a reflection of two
things: the evolution of law enforcement’s approach within that week (for which it
deserves credit), and the benefit of this skill set as part of an agency’s “tool kit” for
navigating new public expectations.
RECOMMENDATION 8
ICPD should assess its internal capabilities (in terms of training and expertise) with
regard to effective communication with protestors or adversarial groups, and devote
resources as needed to increase its options for dialogue and negotiation in future
events.
officer being rendered unconscious, and firearms had been taken from protestors. We do not
dispute the officer safety issues that existed on June 3; we simply question whether their
presence demanded the summary rejection of a de-escalation approach that had been effective
in other jurisdictions.
25 In fact, as noted above, City leadership had already taken a knee in different contexts during
the prior days of protest.
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Crowd Proximity to Skirmish Line
In our different discussions with them, ICPD personnel acknowledged they allowed the
crowd to get too close to the skirmish line. Indeed, shortly before the main group began
marching, recordings from the scene show the supervisors from different agencies
discussing how close to let the marchers get and settling on a streetlamp that was
approximately thirty yards away – only to concede that they did not have a specific
vision for enforcing that idea. Instead, the marchers proceeded steadily until they came
within a few feet of the skirmish line.
In reviewing the BWC recording from officers at the scene, we observed that protestors
were nearly face to face with officers, and certainly within just a few feet of them. In
some instances, protestors were screaming directly into the faces of the front-line
personnel.26 While these officers maintained their composure, the proximity
undoubtedly contributed to their perceptions of crowd aggression, and presumably
accelerated the pace with which they believed escalated action was necessary.
The crowd’s proximity created other tactical disadvantages as well. For one thing, it
precluded effective dialogue with the group as a whole. For another, it meant that the
deployment of less lethal munitions would occur without any initial margin for the
protestors to react and leave the area before experiencing the gas directly.
One means of creating a more tactically beneficial gap could have been the use of
portable barricades, such as the “Jersey Barriers”27 that were initially deployed by the
City’s Department of Public Works throughout the city to protect various public facilities.
The Jersey Barriers were utilized effectively to preclude highway access during
subsequent days of the protest activity. Again, this speaks to the improved planning
and preparedness that subsequently created a contrast with June 3. It is difficult to
know whether there would have been time on June 3 for ICPD to request Public Works
to bring physical barriers to the scene and thereby create the desired space for more
deliberate engagement. Clearly, though, officers themselves were deployed from
26 It should also be noted that, however unpleasant, most verbal antagonism falls within the
category of protected speech. Moreover, many of the protestors were simply chanting a
message – “Hands up, don’t shoot” – that is overtly intended to be non-threatening.
27 A Jersey Barrier is a temporary and mobile sloped concrete or plastic barricade,
approximately 30 inches tall and 10 -30 feet long, typically used to block or direct traffic.
37 | P a g e
various locations and were staged prior to the arrival of the first protestors at
approximately 10:45 PM.28
The value of distance is a key tactical principle for law enforcement (and was cited as
such in the “After Action” memo prepared by ICPD’s on-site lead supervisor, who
acknowledged the disadvantages that protestor proximity created). While we reiterate
the extraordinary nature of events in early June, and the preparedness issues
confronted by agencies across the country, we encourage ICPD to incorporate this and
other lessons into its training and future strategies.
RECOMMENDATION 9
When possible, ICPD should utilize physical barriers or other methods to maintain
distance in crowd control contexts, so as to improve potential for communication and
increase time for evaluation of potential threats.
Declaration of Unlawful Assembly
As detailed above, the incident command team put together a plan as the main body of
marchers was still about ten minutes from reaching their blockade line. It entailed the
formal declaration of an unlawful assembly, the issuing of orders to disperse, and then
the deployment of chemical munitions. This declaration and plan was initiated and
formally executed by the Iowa State Patrol in its capacity as the lead agency for this
operation within the unified command. Accordingly, it is ISP that “owns” the lion’s share
of responsibility for the decision-making and its rectitude. Nonetheless, we pursue the
following analysis with the idea that ICPD pointedly declined to dodge its accountability
and involvement, and with the goal of offering useful considerations for the future.
While there was potential legal justification and legitimacy to each of these steps, the
speed with which they unfolded contributed to much of the subsequent perception that
law enforcement had been heavy-handed and excessive in its response. Within about
ninety seconds of the crowd’s arrival at the line, the initial flashbang and tear gas
combination was deployed.
28 Deployment of such barriers is the responsibility of the City’s Department of Public Works;
Public Works personnel may not have been available to respond on the evening of June 3.
Subsequent to June 3, and to the credit of the City, Public Works was placed on standby to set
up Jersey Barriers on roadways as needed to help manage protest activity after June 3.
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The relevant code section for an Unlawful Assembly in Iowa is 723.2, which reads as
follows:
An unlawful assembly is three or more persons assembled together, with them or
any of them acting in a violent manner, and with intent that they or any of them
will commit a public offense. A person who willingly joins in or remains a part of
an unlawful assembly, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that it is
such, commits a simple offense.
Assuming that the protestors remained determined to advance past the skirmish line
and make it to the interstate (and there is considerable evidence that this was true for
“them or any of them”), then the second part of the state’s legal definition was satisfied.
Less obvious was the notion that the behavior of the protestors upon their arrival
satisfied the “acting in a violent manner” prong of the offense.
Asked about this, one of ICPD’s representatives whom we spoke with was clear about
his own perception of threat. Even while acknowledging his familiarity with more overt
acts of aggression from other protest scenes across the country, he took exception to
the characterization of the Dubuque Street protestors as uniformly and unquestionably
“peaceful.” But there are important gradations between “not entirely peaceful” and a
conclusion that they were “acting in a violent manner”.
Along with the belligerent and threatening comments from some of the protestors and
their preparations to persevere in spite of potential tear gassing, he also cited the
several vehicles that were idling among the crowd as a concerning variable. The feeling
was that there was no advantage – in terms of de-escalation or alternative resolution –
to be gained by waiting. On the contrary, in his view, the likelihood of actual violence
and physical attempts to breach the line was only bound to increase.
With due respect for this officer’s experience and firsthand perceptions, we again note
that the unlawful assembly call and dispersal order was made by ISP and we were not
able to learn from that agency what facts formed the basis for that decision. And we
also note that on June 3, officers did report receiving continual and sustained threats of
harm by some of the protestors. The question becomes whether the reported sustained
“threats” of violence (as opposed to actual “acts” of violence) qualify as “acting in a
violent manner”.
The multiple instances of property damage observed by officers during the course of the
march, while complicating the portrayal of the crowd’s “peacefulness,” was also not a
direct threat to law enforcement – and was consistent with conduct that had been
39 | P a g e
tolerated earlier in the days of unrest. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, it is
obvious that large swaths of the group were indeed peaceful, sign-holding individuals
whose priority was to exercise their First Amendment rights of expression in a non-
violent way.
We have looked at scenarios from different jurisdictions during the same period, in
which the mixture of motivations and behaviors of large crowds contribute to the
challenging circumstances for law enforcement. Even in the face of more overt
provocations, agencies can bear the brunt of sincere criticism from participants whose
own behavior was completely restrained, and who were genuinely unaware of any
inciting conduct that led to an “unlawful assembly” determination. Here, this dynamic
was even more in play.
This reality gave additional import to the dispersal orders and accompanying warnings
that were the precursor to the use of force. Unfortunately, that process turned out to be
a significant weakness in the operation. On a forward going basis, it would be helpful for
ICPD and the City to further consider what set of facts should be requisite in a public
protest setting prior to the use of the state’s Unlawful Assembly Statute.
RECOMMENDATION 10
The City should consider what specific manner of statement or acts constitute “acting in
a violent manner” in a protest situation and would be requisite prior to the initiation of
Iowa’s Unlawful Assembly Statute, so as to better equip ICPD in making these
assessments.
Dispersal Orders and Warnings
It is clear that the incident commander from ISP did issue the order to disperse and
accompanying warnings on multiple occasions in the moments preceding the use of
chemical munitions. It is also clear that some members of the protest group heard
these communications and were aware of the possibility that tear gas would follow from
a failure to leave the area; one woman (who had been part of the first contingent to
engage) announced this very fact to the crowd through a megaphone in the seconds
before deployment. Additionally, the identification of “street medics” within the protest
group, and the availability on scene of materials to treat those affected by the gas,
suggests that some level of awareness existed among the crowd at large of the
potential deployment of tear gas.
But a significant amount of evidence also supports the notion that many of the individual
marchers had no awareness that the actual deployment of tear gas was about to
40 | P a g e
happen.29 In reviewing the relevant recordings from multiple perspectives, we were
struck by the way that, from many angles, the relevant announcements through the
police loudspeaker system were simply inaudible. This limited capacity – another
function of preparedness challenges – undermined the notion that the crowd was
collectively and meaningfully “on notice” and thus accountable for the consequences
that ensued.
While the dispersal declaration and orders were taken directly from the Iowa statute,
there should be care taken to ensure that the instructions are able to be heard by all
protest participants. Moreover, while not required by the statute, protestors should be
advised on what route the crowd should take to disperse.
These circumstances had important implications for the deployment of munitions that
followed, and certainly factored into the widespread negativity that characterized public
(and local government) response to the events of June 3.30 Accordingly, improvements
and innovations in this arena are a worthwhile focal point.
RECOMMENDATION 11
ICPD should ensure that any future declarations of unlawful assembly and orders to
disperse in a protest situation are audible and include directions for crowd departure.
RECOMMENDATION 12
ICPD should include specific language in its crowd control policy, which we discuss in
greater detail below, to provide more specific guidance than the current direction to
“issue warnings.”31
RECOMMENDATION 13
ICPD should invest in equipment and study alternative techniques that would help
ensure that orders and warnings were comprehensively clear and audible in the large
crowd context.
29 This was a consistent theme in both the written complaints to the Community Police Review
Board and the supplemental interviews we had with participants: each insisted that the tear gas
came as a complete and unjustified surprise, and the lack of forewarning contributed to their
strong criticism of police action that night.
30 In our and others’ evaluation of these types of events throughout the summer, we have found
that unclear or unheard dispersal orders are a repeated tactical deficiency.
31 We discuss ICPD’s crowd control policy more generally, and with additional
recommendations, below.
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RECOMMENDATION 14
ICPD should explore innovative approaches to crowd notification – such as real-time
social media broadcasting– that could facilitate enhanced communications with the
public.
Use of Flashbangs, Tear Gas, and Other Munitions
It is noteworthy that the Iowa City Metro Special Response Team, staffed and led
primarily by ICPD personnel, was the on-scene group with the most training and
experience in deploying the chemical munitions that were used on June 3. It is also
noteworthy that, prior to June 3, they had not been deployed in crowd control contexts,
and lacked experience and training that was specific to the situation that confronted
them that night. Indeed, flashbangs and tear gas are most frequently used in very
specific contexts involving armed and dangerous individuals, such as hostage rescue or
“dynamic entries” against barricaded suspects.
Accordingly, their use against a crowd of a few hundred marchers who were
demonstrating against racial injustice and who were largely static (if clearly animated),
had a particular resonance. It clearly shocked and frightened many of the participants.
By their very nature, the munitions did not distinguish between the aggressive and the
passive, the aware and the unaware, or the defiant and the obedient. In these ways,
and in the specific context of George Floyd movement, these tactics invoked images of
“crackdowns” against dissent in other countries and in other repudiated chapters of our
own country’s racial and political history.
All of this is problematic, and the best evidence of the disconnect between the
deployment and the larger circumstances is that tear gas was effectively “taken off the
table” as an option for ICPD’s ongoing participation in the joint command.32 City officials
issued a formal apology for what had happened, and assured protestors that they were
committed to ensuring that it did not recur.
That said, ICPD’s representatives respectfully continued to defend the tactic in
discussions for this review. And they did so for a simple reason: that the situation was
an untenable one, that action to enforce the dispersal order was needed, and that other
methods could well have resulted in significantly greater injuries to both the public and
law enforcement.
32 Additionally, in the aftermath of June 3, the University of Iowa Police Department directed its
own members of the Metro SRT to “stand down” from operations within the joint command in
which the use of chemical munitions was likely to occur.
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In other words, their strongest defense of use of gas was that it obviated the need to
confront the crowd by other means – specifically the batons and shields with which their
frontline officers were equipped. They took some measure of pride in the lack of arrests
and reported injuries and felt that the criticisms had been based on an incomplete
characterization of the dynamics on Dubuque Street.
ICPD’s framing creates a thought-provoking new dichotomy: not between tear gas and
nothing, but instead between tear gas and other physical force options that presented
their own risks of harm to both officers and crowd members. However, while we
acknowledge that other physical approaches to enforcement of the order carried their
own pitfalls (if not some of the stigmas associated with tear gas), we also see flaws in
this argument.
The problem with ICPD’s proposed framing is that it takes as a presumption that force
of any kind was justified. It assumes with questionable legitimacy that the requirements
for declaring the unlawful assembly that legally predicated the force had in fact been
satisfied. And it accepts that preventing the protestors from reaching the interstate was
itself a goal worth engaging in acts of crowd control and deployment of munitions
unprecedented in Iowa City’s recent history.
Most significantly, the haste with which the final moments before deployment unfolded
are a cause to second guess.33 The formulation of the plan and sequencing minutes
before the large group had actually arrived was, on the one hand, necessary if it were to
happen at all. And ICPD’s preliminary encounter at the blockade line with several
members of the group presumably did little to increase the Department’s optimism
about compliance and non-aggression. But the rapidity of the actual deployment,
particularly in relation to the close proximity of the only (and somewhat inaudible)
warnings and the apparent lack of direct physical aggression from the crowd, suggests
that at some point the result had become foreordained.
We make these observations while reiterating our overall impression of the officers’
professionalism and lack of malice throughout the event – again in marked contrast to
other jurisdictions. In our extensive review of body camera video and accompanying
audio, we heard very few comments that were even arguably hostile to crowd members.
This reflected well on the agency and its personnel.
33 We again note that the ultimate decision-making authority in the operation – including the
timing of the order to deploy the munitions – rested with the Iowa State Patrol supervisor. But if
ICPD had wanted to, they could have declined the mission.
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At the same time, we note at least one exception to this finding. During the lengthy
aftermath of the initial flashbangs and munitions, a supervisor was asked about
additional responses to remaining protestors and remarked that they should just “Let
‘em enjoy the gas.” While this was said in the context of limiting further force, the tone
suggested a callousness that did not comport with the larger quality of the
communications. In an era of both increased transparency and strained relations
between law enforcement and the community, we encourage ICPD to be mindful of
these recorded demeanor issues as part of its regular review process.
RECOMMENDATION 15
ICPD should review body camera footage after critical incidents, identify any remarks
that are inconsistent with Department expectations, and ensure accountability and
remediation as appropriate.
More broadly, these techniques – and others that were used later in the encounter (as
we discuss next) – have raised questions about whether their use in the crowd control
context is consistent with public expectations and best practices. Ideally, there is
considerable overlap between these two standards. We know that the City is committed
to hearing and responding to the concerned voices that have emerged since June 3.
For example, City Council members drafted a 17-point resolution that incorporates
some of the reforms proposed by the Iowa Freedom Riders.
Additional Force Deployments
After the initial use of flashbangs and tear gas drove the crowd back and changed the
dynamics of the encounter, a significant number of protestors remained in the area for
the better part of an hour. The unified law enforcement agencies on the skirmish line
held their ground and periodically used additional measures – including further chemical
munitions – to reinforce the dispersal order and to respond to subsequent individual
acts of aggression (which included crowd members throwing projectiles – such as gas
canisters – back at the line of officers).34 The table on the following page details
deployment.
34 We know that the majority of the force on June 3 was used by members of the Iowa City
Metro SRT, most of whom were from ICPD and who acted at the direction of an ICPD
supervisor. In response to a Public Records Act request, the Iowa State Patrol acknowledged
its personnel using one tear gas canister. The Sheriff’s Office informed us that its personnel did
use force at the scene but did not provide particulars.
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Table 2: Less Lethal Munitions Deployed on June 3, 2020
Less Lethal Name Classification Delivery
Method
Time Total
Count
Oleoresin Capsicum (OC)
Triple-Chaser Grenade
Inflammatory:
localized heat,
redness, swelling,
and pain to
skin/tissue
Hand
thrown
11:04,
11:22
7
Ortho-
Chlorobenzalmalononitrite
(CS) Triple-Chaser
Grenade
Irritant: irritation to
eyes and
respiratory system
Hand
thrown
11:04,
11:22
9
Saf-Smoke White
Grenade
Distraction/conceal-
ment; can multiply
effect of OC/CS
gas
Hand
thrown
11:04,
11:31
5
37mm OC Skat Shell Inflammatory Launched 11:04,
11:22,
11:35
4
37mm CS Skat Shell Irritant Launched 11:04,
11:22,
11:35
4
Stinger Grenade Rubber
Pellets CS
Pain compliance /
irritant
Launched 11:19
and/or
11:22
2
Live (OC) & Inert (no
irritant) PepperBall
Pain compliance /
inflammatory
Launched 11:19
or
11:22
or
11:31
15
(estimated)
12g Distraction Devices
(“flashbang”)
Distraction device Hand
thrown
11:04 5
OC Spray Inflammatory Handheld 11:04 Various
officers
deployed
While the use of tear gas seemed to generate the most notoriety and criticism in the
incident aftermath, it was accompanied by other types of munition that included
45 | P a g e
handheld OC (or “pepper”) spray, rubber pellets for pain compliance, and pepper balls
fired from a special less-lethal weapon.35
Overall, the assessment of these additional measures in the later stages of the
encounter falls within a different context than the initial flashbangs and tear gas
combination. This is because, whatever the initial confusion, the remaining protestors’
subsequent awareness of the circumstances (including the “unlawful assembly” and
related orders and warnings) is obviously clear – as were the overt acts of aggression
from a small number of participants. Still, to the extent possible, ICPD should make a
formal assessment of each use of force to evaluate it within the context of prevailing
facts and Department policy.
In our review of the recordings, for example, we had questions about an ICPD officer’s
visible use of handheld OC spray in the face of a non-aggressive (if non-compliant)
protestor; this was in seeming contravention of the “active resistance” requirement
under which the use of such spray is characterized. Conversely, the ICPD’s lead
supervisor provides guidance that is clear and consistent with policy when he authorizes
the PepperBall launcher specifically for protestors who are throwing things at the line.
Our understanding from ICPD leadership was that, in lieu of their normal force review
process, they asked participating officers for a written narrative describing their
observations and actions on Dubuque Street.36 This was in part because of their
awareness that outside scrutiny of the incident – including this review – was going to
occur, and they therefore wanted to refrain from reaching judgments prematurely. This
view appears to be a misperception of the objective of this review; it is not an internal
investigation into specific uses of force by ICPD officers that should be undertaken in
every force incident.
35 We noted that, sometime toward the latter half of the incident, ICPD command discussed that
it might “run out” of less lethal munitions at the scene and requested that additional munitions be
brought to Dubuque Street. It was, perhaps, because of this that ICPD deployed inert
PepperBall rounds, which are more commonly used in training scenarios rather than in live
incidents. We also noted that, in their report regarding the types of munitions used, ICPD
reported that they requested additional munitions from the City’s Emergency Management
Department, and that Emergency Management provided several Stinger Grenades from the
Iowa Medical and Classification Center (IMCC), a correctional facility located in Coralville. The
incident was resolved without needing additional munitions. But that they nearly “ran out” again
points to the scale of the incident, the extensive and sustained deployment of munitions, and the
extent to which it exceeded the agency’s normal preparedness level.
36 We were provided these narratives, which range in detail and were clearly considered
unusual by the officers from a protocol perspective.
46 | P a g e
And it was in contrast to the standard protocol they followed in conjunction with the
controlling force used to effectuate the one arrest that night (of the lone individual who
was the last to remain on scene and showed no intention of leaving). While we
understand this rationale – and while the highly unusual scope and volume of force
against individuals who were not taken into custody created documentation issues for
myriad agencies during this time – we recommend that the Department conduct a more
formal force investigation review and glean what it can from the actions of its personnel
on June 3.
RECOMMENDATION 16
ICPD should assess the individual uses of force by its personnel on June 3 in keeping
with its standard protocol, and should respond with accountability measures, additional
training, or other feedback as appropriate.
Coordination of Medical Response
There was seemingly confusion about the Fire Department and Johnson County
Ambulance’s response to June 3, especially as it related to providing medical care to
protestors immediately following the first deployment of less lethal. We identified this
briefly in our review, above, and elaborate upon it here.
In reviewing evidence, we determined that emergency medical assistance was
requested to Dubuque Street via dispatch at 11:09 PM, approximately five minutes after
the first deployment of less lethal munitions. An ambulance arrived at the scene
sometime shortly thereafter and, as viewed in video evidence, drove slowly into the
crowd to assist with what was reported to be a seizure victim.37 Around this same time,
ICPD deployed a second round of less-lethal munitions, some of which appear to have
struck the side of the ambulance. At approximately 11:25 PM, the responding
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) team requested assistance as Dubuque Street and
Foster Road via radio, stating that “things were being thrown” at them and that they
were being surrounded by the crowd. At approximately 11:30 PM, ICPD requested, via
radio, that the ambulance shut off its headlights as the oncoming beams were “blinding”
the officers on the skirmish line and instructing the ambulance to drive over the median
and cross the skirmish line to a safer location.
37 As mentioned previously, our understanding is that the afflicted individual ultimately declined
medical transport of his own volition.
47 | P a g e
City leadership reported that the Johnson County Ambulance and the Iowa City Fire
Department fire engine were instructed to stage on the west side of the Iowa River at
the onset of the June 3 incident. When these stand-by units received the radio call from
dispatch to respond into the crowd for the seizure incident, the responding Ambulance
unit assumed that this order had already been approved by the law enforcement on
scene and responded into the crowd.
However, according to ICPD leadership, the medical response had not been approved
by law enforcement at the Command Post or on the ground. As such, ICPD reported,
the Ambulance unit, staffed by two Paramedics, responded prematurely into the crowd
and into an active scene before receiving clearance to do so. As a result, the
ambulance and Paramedics were impacted by less lethal munitions and by the agitated
crowd (one Paramedic reported that she felt “threatened” by the crowd and that one
protestor grabbed her vest).38
Clearly, there was miscommunication and lack of coordination here that could have had
dire consequences and did not contribute to a sense of professionalism expected of
individuals working toward a common goal. It is incumbent upon the various
stakeholders to consider this part of the response with an objective of improving
coordination on a going forward basis.
RECOMMENDATION 17
The City, in collaboration with ICPD, Johnson County Ambulance, the Joint Emergency
Communications Center, and the Iowa City Fire Department, should review the
miscommunication that occurred and work to develop protocols intended to improve
coordination for police and rescue response for future incidents.
Inability to Identify Officers
On June 3, all ICPD patrol level officers were attired in the agency’s tactical uniform:
black pants with external cargo pockets, black long or short-sleeved shirt, external
protective vest, gloves, and helmet with face shield. Some officers wore a gas mask
throughout the incident and others put it on immediately prior to deployment of gas.
Some line officers carried a shield and/or baton. ICPD Special Response Team officers
were attired in a gray tactical uniform with external leg holster; the front and back of
38 One of the protestor participants whom we interviewed mentioned specifically that the sight of
munition canisters striking an ambulance that was there to render aid contributed significantly to
the impression of police wrongdoing.
48 | P a g e
their external vests were labeled with the word “POLICE” in white and their gray long-
sleeved shirts had the ICPD insignia.
Both ICPD tactical uniforms do not have any identifying information and, when coupled
with a face shield and/or a gas mask, it is nearly impossible to identify individual
officers. One officer in command on the scene noted that his inability to identify the
officers on the line made command and control difficult as he could not identify who was
who. To his credit, this supervisor included this same issue in his post-incident written
summary and suggestions for improvement.
In the wake of “para-militarized” police responses to protests across the nation, there
has been much discussion of law enforcements’ tactical uniform, often referred to as
“riot gear.” Some argue that the tactical uniform creates a perception of domination and
militarization, serving to hide and dehumanize officers and strike fear and intimidation.
Others retort that the tactical uniform increases officer safety and provides the
command presence necessary in crowd control events. Regardless, one theme
emerges from many of these discussions: the tactical uniform should provide clear
identification of the officer, both for the public and for effective command and control as
well as post-incident review of force incidents. Many agencies now label tactical gear,
such as helmets and vests, with badge numbers and/or officer last names for the
purposes of identifying officers; ideally, the identification should be visible from both
front and back. We encourage ICPD to align its uniform policy in keeping with this
approach.
RECOMMENDATION 18
ICPD should revise its uniform regulations to ensure that officers in tactical gear can be
clearly identified during their operations, both internally and for purposes of public
accountability.
Decision to Arrest Protester
As noted above, on June 7, 2020, ICPD arrested a protester (and leader of the Iowa
Freedom Riders) for his actions on June 3 (as well as a possession of marijuana charge
that was discovered incident to his arrest). The protester was charged with unlawful
assembly and disorderly conduct, spent several days in jail, and while in custody, was
not able to participate in subsequent protest activity.
This action temporarily sidelined one of the movement’s more provocative members,
and it came at a cost regarding public trust: there was speculation that the “retroactive”
49 | P a g e
arrest of this individual, who had emerged as a vocal Black leader of the protest
movement, was a form of disparate treatment that was motivated by a desire to interfere
with his First Amendment activity. The arrest itself became the basis for further
protests.
The narrative of the police report speaks of a group of individuals vandalizing street
signs and committing other property damage but does not attribute any act to this
arrestee. And the narrative notes that several individuals threw rocks, bricks, and tear
gas canisters and that a police officer was injured as a result of a thrown object – but
again does not attribute any of these actions to the person arrested. Finally, the report
notes that a female in the group stood nearby the arrestee and threatened officers with
violence, but the report does not attribute the arrestee with making similar statements.
In short, the report itself does little to dissuade those who believe that the man arrested
several days later was singled out more for his believed leadership role in the process
than his direct involvement in any violent criminal activity. The City has provided us with
further details about the rationale behind the decision and the legitimacy of concerns
about the man’s actions; additionally, our understanding is that other justice system
entities were consulted. These factors – and the resultant conviction – are relevant as
counterbalance to the notion that the arrest was baseless. Nonetheless, the perception
gap was real, and the explanations only go so far in closing it for those who believed the
arrest to be unreasonably selective.
On June 17, 2020, the Mayor of Iowa City wrote a letter to the Johnson County Attorney
on behalf of City Council requesting that all charges be dismissed against Black Lives
Matter protestors, including this individual. He had been charged with both unlawful
assembly and disorderly conduct, but, two days later, pursuant to a plea agreement,
pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct while the unlawful assembly charge was dismissed.
He received “time served” for his days in jail prior to the plea.39
Police agencies generally and traditionally have had largely unfettered discretion
regarding when and whether to arrest individuals, particularly misdemeanors. The
opportunity to deliberate is even greater when enforcement action is not
contemporaneous. In the context of policing and First Amendment activity, it would be
39 The issue of the charges pending against the protestors as a result of the June 3 and other
protests was recently revisited in the public narrative when it was reported that a man who
drove his car purposely in the direction of protestors later in the summer received a plea
arrangement whereby he also received a “time served” sentence after spending over two
months in jail and avoided additional jail time. Allegations were again made about disparate
treatment within the justice system considering the difference in severities of the two offenses.
50 | P a g e
helpful to have engagement and dialogue with Iowa City leadership and the public to
receive input on when and whether to arrest individuals on the basis of their conduct,
and whether charges should be pursued when arrest occurs.40 Such an exchange
would help ensure not only that the Department was reflecting community priorities in its
approach but that the consensus was based on accurate information as to the
underlying facts.
As Iowa City continues to reimagine its public safety response, this is a policy area
where the Police Department could benefit from additional community input on a
forward going basis.
RECOMMENDATION 19
Iowa City should engage in dialogue with its police department on how best to address
protestors involved in disorderly conduct and use the tools available within the criminal
justice system.
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40 Once the case is filed by the County Attorney, these decisions no longer belong to the Police
Department; at that point, disposition of the charges becomes the County Attorney’s
prerogative.
51 | P a g e
After June 3: A Shift in Approach
As discussed above, the actions of law enforcement on Dubuque Street were met with
strong public disapproval throughout Iowa City. The choice to thwart the protestors’
desire to demonstrate on the I-80 was itself likely to be unpopular in the context of the
powerful, heartfelt reactions to the death of George Floyd; the use of tear gas and other
munitions to forcefully drive away a crowd of hundreds compounded this disconnect.
The aggressive crowd control tactics were unprecedented in recent memory, and they
prompted anger, bewilderment, and official apologies in the coming days.
The events of June 3 had two other immediate consequences as well: they galvanized a
broader and deeper wave of support for the local Black Live Matter movement, and they
provoked a significant alteration of strategy and operational responsibility among the
participating agencies of the joint command.
On June 4, protestors again met at the Pentacrest in downtown Iowa City, this time
accompanied by the Mayor and other elected officials. After marching for nearly five
hours, the crowd again marched down Dubuque Street toward the highway. Shortly
after 9:30 PM, the crowd, numbering more than 1,000 people, moved toward the on-
ramp. Along the way, some protestors vandalized the pavement, exit signs, and road
barriers.
At the on-ramp, protestors were met with ICPD and ISP police vehicles and officers.
Unlike on June 3, however, the officers reportedly moved their police vehicles. At some
point, ISP requested that the Department of Transportation reroute traffic on the I-80.
Shortly after 10:00 PM, the protestors marched onto the empty highway. After marching
for approximately 20 minutes, the crowd exited the highway and returned to downtown
Iowa City via Dubuque Street.
And this access to the I-80 occurred again on June 5, though for a much longer length
of time and with considerable spray painting to the roadway and median barriers, but
with no clashes between police and protestors.
On June 6, ISP again prohibited access to the highway. Protesters in other jurisdictions
throughout Iowa State, such as Coralville, were copying Iowa City by marching on their
local highways (such as Highways 1 and 218), creating a state-wide situation that ISP
52 | P a g e
indicated it could not adequately staff.41 Instead, the protestors marched to Kinnick
Stadium, where they vandalized the stadium statue, stadium, and surrounding buildings
and roadways. As noted above, on June 7, ICPD arrested a protest leader, prompting
more protests on the evening of June 7 and 8.
On the evening of June 8, the Iowa Freedom Riders (“IFR”) – a grassroots activist group
that had organized and found its voice with remarkable speed – called for the end of
vandalism and, on June 9, urged the halt of all protest activity while focusing on direct
engagement with elected officials.42 The City Council called an emergency session to
hear the Iowa Freedom Riders’ demands in an effort to address the structural dynamics
that had prompted nation-wide reform movement in late May.
Protests and demonstrations recurred intermittently in the latter stages of the summer,
and ICPD was sometimes a focus of criticism for its handling of these subsequent
events. Late August, for example, saw the Iowa Freedom Riders call for four days of
additional protest, and there were incidents involving cars allegedly driving into
demonstrators on purpose before leaving the scene, including the arrest of one
described above. Through all of these developments, there were no further tear gas or
other less lethal munition deployments in the City after June 3.
The stark differences between the law enforcement tactics on June 3 and the approach
on the subsequent days of the protest movement – particularly as illustrated by the
facilitating of access to the interstate on the nights of June 4 and 5 – were the function
of several factors. Some of these related to evolutions in the agencies’ ability to
recognize and adjust to the scale of what was occurring.43 Preparedness, or the lack
thereof, was a consistent issue in jurisdictions across America that had not foreseen the
sudden and dramatic rise of demonstration activity and unrest that unfolded at that time.
And, in Iowa City and for ICPD, the shift was a direct response to perceived and actual
missteps in the handling of Dubuque Street.
Iowa City’s leadership made a collective decision that ICPD was to stand down from
any sort of additional front-line participation with the Iowa State Patrol in blocking
41 It would have been helpful to have learned what ISP’s plan would have been should the
protestors have demanded to access the Interstate on this date. Unfortunately, we were not
able to do so as a result of ISP’s determination not to cooperate in this review.
42 While the IFR called for an end to vandalism, some continued to vandalize Iowa City public
and private property.
43 For example, we discuss below the bolstering of the unified command structure in Iowa City
that occurred after June 3.
53 | P a g e
protestor access to the interstate.44 This was particularly true in relation to the Metro
SRT forces, and the responsibility for using chemical munitions of any kind against
protestors.
Moreover, the City took steps to actively engage with and support subsequent protest
activity – including the march that reached the I-80 on June 4.
City officials and ICPD communicated this new mandate to the Iowa State Patrol, which
reportedly accepted and accommodated it without significant friction between the
agencies. Indeed, a significant change in the course of that week stemmed from the
simple fact of ISP’s devotion of greatly increased resources to Iowa City in terms of
personnel, equipment, and command-level staff. By the afternoon of June 4, ISP had
substantially more capability on scene, thus lessening its reliance on ICPD and other
agencies. And, in a notable adjustment, for two days ISP changed its insistence on
blocking highway access to protest activity.45
As a result of increased ISP deployment, ICPD could provide mutual aid of a different
nature. On June 4 and 5, then, ICPD deployed officers and vehicles to the highway to
support various missions, ranging from “peacekeeping,” traffic control, and highway
safety to, at some points, front line support and arrests.46 This “freed up” all State Patrol
personnel to be the commanding front line and, if needed, to deploy their own chemical
munitions. (They did not do so.) Our further understanding is that ISP pursued avenues
of communication/negotiation with protestors to a much greater extent, and with
beneficial results.
ICPD leadership also reported that both its Command Post and command structure
became more robust as the days progressed. On the evening of June 4 and for
approximately ten days after, the Command Post was staffed with the City Manager,
more senior personnel from ISP, including the ISP Commander at some points, the
Sheriff, Johnson County Emergency Management, the Fire Dept. Deputy Chief, and
personnel from the County Attorney’s office. These higher-ranking personnel brought
more experience and the capacity to make executive decisions. The Command Post
44 The new direction was for the Department to provide backup resources as needed, and only
to directly engage or use force in the event of an emergency situation.
45 We were told that this happened, at least in part, at the request of Iowa City officials.
46 While the fundamental shift away from the latitude to use tear gas was relatively clear, it
should be noted that the dynamic conditions on the ground made the subsequent days
challenging in their own right, and the leadership’s vision for how and where to engage was not
always seamless or consistent. This was, understandably, a source of frustration for line-level
officers at times.
54 | P a g e
also established an intelligence capacity, including ICPD and Coralville detectives and
agents from the State Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). The technological
capacity increased as well, with monitors to view live feeds from the University
surveillance cameras and a dedicated technology officer.
The adjustments made by law enforcement were to their credit in many respects, and
they illustrate the ways that some of the troubling aspects of the June 3 confrontation
were reflective of preparation issues and inexperience more than malice toward the
protestors or a disregard for their cause.
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55 | P a g e
Additional Policy and Procedural Issues
As part of the scope of our assignment, ICPD provided relevant General Orders,
Guidelines, manuals, and plans for our review. OIR Group noted that ICPD’s policies
related to crowd control and use of less lethal weapons call for updating and
consolidation to ensure that future events are managed with more efficacy and are in
line with modern policing models for crowd control. We also take this opportunity to
address other structural issues relating to large-scale events like the summer’s protests
and discuss them in the context of guidance already provided by City officials.
Use of Force Directives in Resolution 20-159
On June 16, 2020, Council passed a 17-point resolution calling for a “restructuring” of
ICPD with more focus on community policing – a continuation of the model that the
Department has pursued since 2013 but one infused with new thinking and driven by
the direct input of activists in the aftermath of the June protests. This resolution also
featured responsive elements that related to use of force. For example, and
significantly, the resolution directed the City Manager to “expressly ban, in the ICPD’s
general orders, any use of chokeholds or any other maneuver that cuts off oxygen or
blood flow.” The resolution further prohibits “the use of tear gas, rubber bullets and
flashbangs against peaceful protestors.”
With regard to the use of neck restraints, direction for ICPD leadership and its officers is
clear: the use of the hold is no longer authorized as a force option. However, the
resolution provides considerably less clarity about the conditions under which less lethal
munitions may be used against individuals engaged in protest activity. This speaks in
part to the difference between “crowd control” (which refers to a range of activities, from
a large-scale public celebration to civil unrest) and Constitutionally-protected “speech”
or “assembly” in the form of marches of other demonstrations – which can, of course,
involve large crowds.
Interestingly, the resolution does not apparently contemplate a “ban” on deployment of
less-lethal munitions, even in dealing with protest activity (which leadership in other
cities has done). Rather, the current language infers there may be situations
authorizing use of the identified munitions against “non-peaceful” participants engaged
in protest activity. But there is no further guidance regarding the conditions under which
such munitions might be deployed.
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While the disapproval of certain techniques “against peaceful protestors” seems
eminently reasonable and appropriate – and while it is partly a reaction to actual
excesses by American law enforcement agencies this summer – the application of that
concept is complicated by blurred lines and the divergent conduct found within crowds
of demonstrators. The intentions of the majority of peaceful, passively resistant
participants can easily be undermined by the aggressions or assaultive behavior of a
few, with detrimental implications for crowd and officer safety.
Accordingly, the most useful policies will reflect – and try to accommodate – the
complexities that often arise. Designing such a policy is, of course, easier said than
done. But there are core principles that can help constructively shape the mindset of
officers while providing them with the discretion to respond effectively under exigent
circumstances.
First is an emphasis on alternatives to force that promote the use of de-escalation
tactics (including patience, clear announcements, negotiation, and other techniques).
The use of less-lethal munitions and other force options in the protest context should be
reserved for “last resort” situations involving actual assaultive behavior and/or
significant, potentially dangerous threats of property destruction. Crowds should be
given every opportunity to understand the bases for enforcement action, time to comply,
and a clear means of avoiding munitions (such as tear gas) by leaving the area through
an obvious route. Another important principle relates to targeting any necessary force
to the extent possible: looking for proportional responses that focus on violent
behaviors and individuals while preserving the rights and safety of the larger group.47
The City might consider providing the police further instruction that invectives, verbal
aggression, hostile gestures, and threats alone are insufficient to justify the use of less
lethal munitions but authorizing potential use in situations where police are being
subject to hurled projectiles or other physical activity jeopardizing their safety.
The City should advise the police on what type of property protection would justify the
use of less lethal munitions with perhaps minor vandalism such as defacing of signs or
breaking of windows being insufficient to deploy munitions but authorizing potential
deployment to prevent major and dangerous property damage such as arson of police
vehicles or city buildings or looting of businesses.
47 Some agencies found success during the summer’s challenging, large-scale crowd events by
designating specific, small cadres of officers to move with more flexibility and address specific
problems through targeted arrest or other focused interventions.
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Finally, the City should provide further guidance on whether less lethal munitions are
authorized to prevent unauthorized access or forced entry to some sensitive City
facilities such as City Hall and the Police Station within but that they are not to be used
to prevent access to City streets or the Interstate.
It is, of course, important for ICPD to be active participants in this process – responsive
to the City’s policy vision while contributing its own expertise and ideas about how best
to effectuate it. We also take the view that the City and its police department should not
develop and finalize policies relating to crowd control completely on their own. Rather,
consistent with former President Obama’s Task Force on 21 st Century policing and the
current commitment that the City has placed on community engagement as it
reimagines its public safety function, the parties should continue to engage the Iowa
City community as policies are being reconsidered and refined.
RECOMMENDATION 20
Iowa City leadership should seek community input and feedback from ICPD experts in
crafting policy parameters for use of force and deployment of munitions in the context of
protest activity.
Crowd Control Policy
Throughout this report, we make recommendations related to crowd control policies and
tactics. As such, we evaluated ICPD’s currently existing crowd control policy and
determined that ICPD does not have a comprehensive policy to guide operations.
Below, we provide a detailed analysis of ICPD’s current guidelines and the gaps within
them.
Specifically, we found references to crowd control guidelines and tactics in three
different, currently active, ICPD policy documents. These documents each have
elements of crowd control policy, but as shown in the table below, none are
comprehensive. For example, the “Mass Arrest / Disturbance” policy provides
guidelines for use of less lethal munitions in a “situation that escalates or appears that it
may escalate to the point where [less-lethal] munitions are being considered” but does
not explicitly define if or how to deploy less lethal in a crowd control scenario except for
use of pepper ball. The policies are summarized in Table 3, below.
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Table 3: Existing Policies Related to Crowd Control
Name Updated Policy Contains “Gaps” in Policy
SOG 01-01:
Mass
Arrest/
Disturbance
October
2001
Details some procedures
to be followed in crowd
and mass arrest
situations
Guidelines for use of less
lethal in a “situation that
escalates or appears that
it may escalate to the
point where [less-lethal]
munitions are being
considered” but no
specific crowd control
language
Details calling other
agencies for mutual aid
Specific guidance on use
of PepperBall
Detailed arrest protocol
Specific guidelines for
use of force (all kinds)
in crowd control
Specific tactics for
crowd control
Dispersal order
language or
instructions
Does not provide
guidance for
form/function of mutual
aid
SOG 07-01:
All Hazards
Plan
August
2019
Details the Incident
Command System, or
actions required when
responding to an
“unusual occurrence” like
June 3
Includes Command,
Planning, Operations,
Logistics, and
Finance/Admin
Comments on requests
for mutual aid, stating that
ICPD retains command
Requires mandatory
annual training on ICS
Any policy / guidelines
for use of force (all
kinds) in crowd control
Dispersal order
language or
instructions
Does not provide
guidance for
form/function of mutual
aid
General
Order 89-
04: Civil
Rights
April
2020
Policy to consolidate all
other polices related to
Civil Rights, including
right to peaceful
assembly
Any guidelines for use
of force (all kinds) in
crowd control
Any tactics related to
crowd control
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Name Updated Policy Contains “Gaps” in Policy
Police are responsible for
protecting participants
and non-participants and
for “dealing” with illegal
acts promptly
Details that ICPD
prohibits other agencies
operating in their
jurisdiction to use
excessive force on non-
violent demonstrators
Dispersal order
language or
instructions
Various organizations have recently offered guidance for law enforcement agencies that
are creating updated, comprehensive crowd control polices.48 Importantly, some of the
common themes to emerge reflect current sensibilities about the evolving relationship
between police practices and demonstration activity – including protests against the
police. They include the following focal points:
Protecting and facilitating peaceful free speech and expression
The likelihood that police action will improve the situation
The seriousness of the offense(s) and objective dangers that they present
Minimizing the use of weapons/militarization: specific guidelines for uses of force,
and, when appropriate, explicit prohibition of use of some munition types
Increasing communication and coordination: specific guidelines for de-escalation
techniques, mutual aid coordination, etc.
Indeed, there are specific model policies from which ICPD can create a comprehensive
and clear crowd control policy. Specifically, this policy should contain the elements
noted above.
48 A good example of the work product that has emerged this year was issued by the Policing
Project at the NYU School of Law in October. It is entitled “Policing Protests to Protect
Constitutional Rights and Public Safety.”
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We also suggest the addition of specific operational guidelines or protocols related to:
Definitions of crowd control-related terms as defined/established by Iowa City
and/or ICPD, specifically. For example, how to define an “unlawful assembly” or
“civil disturbance” or “demonstration”
Specific tactics and techniques related to crowd control, especially those related
to officer deployment, information gathering, negotiation and de-escalation
Crowd dispersal, including specific dispersal order language, instructions for
dispersal, method(s) for issuing the order, and designation of dispersal routes
Specific role/expectations for mutual aid/joint responses
Logs, such as logging when and by whom dispersal orders were made,
munitions deployed or injuries
Specific guidelines for deployment of less lethal munitions (discussed in more
detail later in this report) in crowd control
Deactivation
We do note that ICPD does have a robust policy related to management response and
logistics planning for mass disturbances such as protests. ICPD’s “All Hazards Plan”
clearly defines and outlines the Incident Command System, a management response
system used by many agencies nationwide. As we detail later in this report, however,
ICPD did not effectively utilize the Incident Command System on June 3. These
specific cases highlight that merely having a policy does not always result in successful
implementation of said policy. Other factors, such as training, planning, and
coordinated leadership in the face of unfolding events, are generally needed to reinforce
the guidance policy provides. Still, we recommend that ICPD create a consolidated,
clear policy related to crowd control as a foundation for its future responses.
RECOMMENDATION 21
ICPD should review, consolidate, and update its different crowd control policies to
eliminate gaps, increase clarity, and reflect current community standards and
expectations, in consideration of the principles articulated herein.
With regard to the use of PepperBall in a crowd control context, the relevant policy
language reads as follows:
PepperBall may also be used to disperse unruly or rioting crowds which
have or are threatening to unlawfully damage property or threatening physical
violence.
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There is no definition in the policy as to what constitutes an “unruly” crowd, providing
insufficient guidance as to appropriate deployment of the weaponry and leaving its use
to a wide range of interpretation. ICPD should revise its existing policy and limit use to
physically aggressive or combative individuals, rather than as a general tool for
dispersal of an “unruly” crowd.
RECOMMENDATION 22
ICPD should re-evaluate and codify its approach to the use of less lethal munitions for
crowd control in a manner that, by creating narrow, particularized standards for
deployment, emphasizes the wide latitude that should be given to speech activities and
recognizes the public’s right to peaceably demonstrate.
RECOMMENDATION 23
ICPD should modify policy related to use of pepper ball rounds in crowd control
situations to limit use only against physically aggressive or combative individuals, rather
than as a general tool for dispersal of an “unruly or rioting” crowd.
Additionally, we note that, in the interest of transparency and fostering community trust,
increasingly law enforcement agencies are publishing all policies, such as entire Policy
Manuals, on their Department websites.49 ICPD’s website lists the Department’s
General Orders, but these are not searchable nor comprehensive, and the website does
not list Special Operations Guides. Consistent with former President Obama’s 21 st
Century Policing Task Force Recommendation, posting an online, public and
searchable policy manual may go a long way as ICPD seeks to establish more
transparency with its community.
RECOMMENDATION 24
ICPD should post its policy manual on its website with a searchable function.
Training
One consistent theme nationwide is that agencies were largely insufficiently trained for
the magnitude and nature of the summer’s protest activity. This was especially true in
Iowa City.
49 Some agencies have chosen not to post operating guidelines that, if public, might undermine
their efficacy (for example, policies related to Special Operations teams tactics or protection
details). Because we have seen overuse, this practice should be carefully crafted and limited to
only the most sensitive of policies.
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While the City was familiar with peaceful protests, especially protests held in the
University setting, ICPD reported that it had not deployed less lethal munitions for crowd
control in over 30 years, nor had they engaged a crowd of the nature and magnitude of
June 3. At all levels, those that we spoke to stated that, from a training standpoint, the
officers were largely unprepared for June 3 and the scale of the demonstration and
protest activity as a whole.
We noted that crowd control training is not a regular part of the training curriculum as
listed in ICPD’s annual training curriculum and related policy. ICPD personnel reported
that the last time that ICPD officers had any training regarding crowd movement was
likely during the 2011 “Occupy” movement, and that this training was related to how to
move individuals out of tent cities, not related to skirmish lines or deployment of less
lethal munitions.
Further, while SRT members (including UIPD officers) train frequently on specialized
skills such as barricaded suspects or hostage situations and are all currently qualified in
deployment of less lethal munitions, they had not, in recent years, formally trained for
crowd control. Their own specialized SRT Tactics manual does not refer to crowd
control tactics.
ICPD also reported that it had not formally trained with Johnson County Sheriff, UIPD or
other local agencies that might provide mutual aid since a County-wide training held in
2018.
Given the nationwide political climate and the potential for future civil unrest, ICPD
should evaluate its training curriculum to include periodic, formal training on crowd
control. This may include periodic refresher training on specific tactics as appropriate.
RECOMMENDATION 25
ICPD should update its annual training curriculum and related General Order to reflect
the addition of formal crowd control training.
RECOMMENDATION 26
Metro SRT should specifically update its Tactics manual to include model policing
tactics for modern crowd control.
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RECOMMENDATION 27
Metro SRT should train regularly on crowd control tactics so that they are prepared to
respond in a command capacity when necessary, and should train with other
specialized units within ICPD and other agencies that are likely to provide mutual aid.
RECOMMENDATION 28
When practicable, ICPD should host or engage in joint training exercises on crowd
control tactics and responses with other local agencies County-wide.
RECOMMENDATION 29
ICPD should incorporate current case law related to protest activity as well as best
practices and trends in crowd management when delivering its annual use of force
training.
Use of the Incident Command System & Incident Action
Plan
According to their Standard Operating Guideline 07-01, “All Hazards Plan,” ICPD should
follow an Incident Command System (ICS) to respond to crowd management and civil
disturbances like the event on June 3.
Established in the 1970s, the ICS is a commonly used management response system
that allows for multiple agencies to collaborate in emergency situations by establishing a
unified command, maintaining clear mission objectives, and sharing logistics and
resources.
With respect to crowd control situations like June 3, the goals of an ICS are to:
Protect persons, regardless of their participation in the disturbance.
Disperse disorderly or threatening crowds in order to eliminate the immediate
risks of continued escalation and further violence and
Arrest law violators, including those responsible for property damage, and
remove or isolate persons inciting violent behavior.
The response is defined by incident using an Incident Action Plan (IAP). Creating a
comprehensive IAP can be challenging, if impossible, in the face of spontaneous events
such as June 3. In recognition of this reality, some experts recommend that agencies
may wish to establish various crowd management plan templates in advance of protest
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activity. These generic plans can cover various types and sizes of protests to provide
general strategy and working tactics. These plans can then be quickly tailored and
adjusted when Incident Commanders are responding to a spontaneous event.
An IAP, even one that is generic, provides guidelines regarding incident objectives and
response strategies by stage or period, and formally documents procedures and
logistics. The IAP also serves to identify command structure, roles and responsibilities,
and communication (e.g., radio call signs), all aspects that were missing in ICPD’s
overall response to protest activity.
Not ever clearly documenting mission objectives and, more importantly, changes in
mission objectives, left room for confusion and misinterpretation in the hours leading up
to and the weeks following the June 3 incident. While ICPD leadership and responding
officers were aware of the new mission on the evening of June 3 – to be mutual aid to
ISP to keep protestors off the I-80 highway – this shift in mission objective was not
clearly articulated for officers or documented in any way.
Indeed, not having any clearly documented plan throughout this period had an impact
all the way down the ranks to officer morale, confidence, and mission command. One
ICPD officer reported that the officers were receiving ever-changing missions and rules
of engagement every day, sometimes hour-by-hour, and often conflicting. The officers
on the ground did not always know what decisions were being made in the Command
Post, nor their mission objectives. Not having an IAP, even one that was periodized
and fluid, made deployment and planning difficult. Not having a consistent plan or
mission objectives, reported one officer, created stress for officers on the ground.
We noted that ICPD followed the ICS approach, including creation of an Operations
Plan (similar to an IAP) for the pre-planned “Say Their Names Rally” held on May 30 but
did not clearly do so as on subsequent days as protest activity increased and the
mission shifted. Specifically, ICPD did not follow the ICS recommendations of creating
a robust Command Center, a clear Incident Action Plan and effective communication,
which we detail below.
We do commend ICPD for establishing some components of the ICS on the days
following June 3 when it became clear that the protest activity would continue. As we
discuss in more detail in the following sections, on June 4 and beyond, ICPD set up a
unified command at the formal Command Post, established formal intelligence and
surveillance, set up staging areas, and shared deployment resources with other
responding agencies.
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RECOMMENDATION 30
ICPD should follow the Incident Command Structure and related components, including
establishing an Operations or Incident Action Plan when practical in future operations of
this scope and magnitude.
RECOMMENDATION 31
ICPD command staff, including all supervisors and team leads, should have initial and
refresher training on incident command.
RECOMMENDATION 32
ICPD should establish various, generic crowd management plan templates in advance
of protest activity to be adjusted when Incident Commanders are responding to a
spontaneous event. This should be completed internally and in joint training exercises
with agencies that will likely provide mutual aid.
Command & Communication
According to one ICPD official, Iowa City’s protest activity began later than in
neighboring jurisdictions and, as such, they did not set up a formal Command Post until
after June 3. In the “early days,” ICPD set up an impromptu Command Post in the
Johnson County Sheriff station in downtown Iowa City, where leadership from the City,
Sheriff, and UIPD met to discuss how to respond safely to the unfolding incidents.50 This
Command Post lacked the structure to effectuate the mission.
On the afternoon of June 3, the “impromptu” Command Post was initially staffed by
ICPD leadership, possibly Sheriff personnel, and the County Attorney. ICPD reported
that four lieutenants held logistics roles, ranging from providing food and meal breaks to
coordinating scheduling and equipment.51 In the later afternoon, personnel from ISP,
though not Command Staff, joined the Command Post.
50 The Command Post at the Sheriff’s Department was in the center of protest activity within a
building that was the target of protest activity (protestors gathered at the jail and courthouse,
housed in the same location as the Command Post). ICPD leadership acknowledged that the
Sheriff Department location was “too close” to the protest activity, yet they did not change the
Command Post location for the duration of unrest activity despite having a dedicated Command
Center facility at another location approximately five miles from downtown.
51 That ICPD lieutenants would be deployed in this manner on June 3 strikes us as a highly
questionable allocation of leadership resources, and as much as anything reflects the lack of an
integrated command or plan.
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We noted that several operational aspects missing from command may have had an
impact, albeit peripheral, on the execution of the mission on June 3:
The Command Post lacked technological and deployment capacity for
surveillance and intelligence. ICPD leadership reported that the Command Post
did not have any technology infrastructure to monitor the City and University’s
surveillance cameras, leaving a deficiency in “live” event tracking. The
Command Post also did not have any formal intelligence on or communication
with the protest leaders despite having knowledge of the leaders and ability to
contact them on the ground as the days unfolded, creating uncertainty around
the protest plans and actions.
ICPD did not establish a field Incident Command Post on Dubuque Street.
Despite having a large contingency of officers on scene and being at the forefront
of a major incident, ICPD did not establish a field command post to manage the
operation. Further, the Department’s senior command staff were occupied with
management roles, leaving a sergeant in charge of operations at the scene.
Incident command on the scene attempted to communicate tactics and strategy
to officers on the skirmish line face-to-face, verbally, in a loud and chaotic
situation. At some points, we observed officers seemingly play a game of
“telephone” with the tactical plan, leaving out information as the message
traveled down the line. 52
Officers on the skirmish line seemingly lacked information about the tactics and
overall mission and scope of the operation. One ICPD officer stated that they
chose one-to-one verbal communication because they did not have a dedicated
tactical channel and did not want to clog radio communication from the
Command Post or other important agencies (e.g., the Fire Department) with on
the ground tactics communication. In reviewing the BWC from officers on the
line, we noted that on-scene communication between incident command and
officers on the skirmish line was, at times, ineffective.
The ineffective communication extended to on-scene command coordinating with
the Command Post. While some communications occurred over the radio via
dispatch, other communication, even of crucial information such as intelligence
on protestors, mission, and tactics, occurred via one-to-one cell phone calls
52 This phenomenon was also identified as a shortcoming in the after-action memo prepared by
the ICPD on-site incident commander.
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between command staff in the Command Post and ICPD incident command on
the ground. This meant that not all involved personnel were apprised of
significant intelligence, planning, and tactics.
As detailed above, the (mis)communication failures also affected other
responding agencies, such as Johnson County Ambulance, to receive clear
instructions regarding their clearance to enter the scene.
We have acknowledged that that the Command Post became more robust as the days
progressed. However, the Command Post remained at the same location, which, as we
noted above, was not ideal.
RECOMMENDATION 33
In future events requiring centralized incident command, ICPD should set up a robust
Command Post at the onset of the incident in their dedicated facility, which, they report,
has the technological capacity for communication and surveillance.
RECOMMENDATION 34
In future events requiring field command, ICPD should set up a field Incident Command
Post with appropriate leadership capacity.
RECOMMENDATION 35
ICPD should provide a dedicated tactical channel for communication between ICPD’s
specialized units and among officers on the ground.
RECOMMENDATION 36
ICPD should include training on effective verbal communication specifically when
training on crowd control tactics generally. Specifically, this training might include a
preference for squad leaders to command one-on-one to line officers, when practicable,
rather than officers playing “telephone” with commands down the line.
RECOMMENDATION 37
ICPD should explore alternative communication methods that reduce or eliminate the
need for personal cell phone calls as a means of tactical communications.
RECOMMENDATION 38
ICPD should request that in large protest scenarios that the Joint Emergency
Communications Center provide a dedicated channel for other agencies, such as
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Johnson County Ambulance and Iowa City Fire Department, to communicate with ICPD
directly.
Public Information Officer
Throughout the days of unrest in Iowa City, the Department did not have a uniquely
assigned Public Information Officer to communicate with the public at large. On June 3,
the role of PIO was assigned to the sergeant who was also one of the SRT Leaders.
He was, therefore, unable to act in his capacity as PIO. The Department eventually
assigned this position to another sergeant, but it reported that there were restrictions
placed on what they were able to report.
Accordingly, the community had little insight into police responses, and this contributed
in part to the momentum of criticism and disapproval that built over the subsequent
days.53 By not being more responsive and prioritizing its public information function, the
Department missed a potentially valuable opportunity to create transparency and to
dialogue with the community at a time of genuine tension. This was also in apparent
contravention of “Standard Operating Guidelines” for crowd control and civil
disturbances: “Since these types of events are often covered by the media, the
departmental Public Information Officer or officer designated as PIO for the incident
should be briefed in advance of the event. A pre-determined location should be used
for meeting with the media. All media contact should be through the PIO or the Incident
Commander.”
Our understanding is that the City is in the process of re-organizing this function, to
civilianize it and bring it under the umbrella of the City Manager's Office. We support
the notion of a police agency that is fully integrated with the mission, vision, and policy
initiatives of the community as a whole, and have no reason to believe this concept
won’t work. At the same time, recognition of law enforcement’s distinctive expertise and
responsibilities means that internal collaboration and communication will be essential to
the effectiveness of this model.
53 It is clear that – beyond the particular actions of ICPD – the prevailing momentum in Iowa City
was a backlash against police-centered injustice, and the Department’s explanations may well
have been dismissed amidst the larger tide of frustration. But months later, ICPD’s
representatives expressed their regret over not receiving what they considered to be an
objective airing of their perspective on what occurred. This is a point worth considering, insofar
as healthy police-community relations take place on what is of course a two-way street.
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RECOMMENDATION 39
The new Public Information Officer concept should revolve around a constructive,
mutually respectful relationship between City officials and ICPD leadership in providing
timely, accurate, and candid information to the community about its policing services.
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Conclusion
For several days in June of 2020, public reaction to the death of George Floyd
blossomed into large-scale demonstrations, unrest – and concrete calls for change.
The above report, which of course focuses primarily on June 3, talks about those first
two components at length: the protests (as complicated by peripheral acts of vandalism
and safety concerns) obviously presented local law enforcement agencies with a
significant challenge. Like their cohorts around the country – even in jurisdictions with
much more resources and experience – ICPD found itself strained to capacity in its
efforts to respond to unfolding events. If these efforts were flawed at times, they were
also accompanied by long shifts of dedicated, well-intentioned service from officers who
sought to meet community expectations and comport with direction from City leaders.
We end by turning some attention to the prompt and very specific reform initiatives that
arose from the protest, as galvanized by the Iowa Freedom Riders and other activists
and as actualized by the Mayor and City Council. Turning protest and strong public
sentiment into meaningful policy is, of course, the phase that in some ways matters
most. And it is to the credit of the City and its residents that subsequent months have
seen progress in this regard. 54
One notable development is the October selection of a new Chief of Police to replace
the Department’s prior head, who retired in February of 2020. Coming from an out of
state agency, the Chief was chosen in the immediate context of the summer’s
developments and aftermath; ideally his leadership with help effectuate the progressive
vision that continues to emerge.55
As referenced above, on June 16, 2020, the City Council passed a 17-point resolution,
Resolution 20-159, calling for a “restructuring” of ICPD with more focus on community
policing. On December 15, 2020, pursuant to the resolution, the City Manager’s Office
54 We note also that this positive arc has not advanced in an unbroken line, and that
controversies and additional periods of protest emerged in the second half of 2020. But the
continued engagement and ongoing focus on the central issues of concern are themselves
distinguishing features of the Iowa City response.
55 The fact that ICPD was acting under the authority of an Interim Chief– albeit a very
experienced supervisor – during the summer’s unrest was perhaps an additional factor in some
of the dynamics related to the Department’s preparation and response. We spoke often with
this person in preparing this report, and we appreciate his insights and full cooperation. But
supervisors serving in this temporary capacity are presumably constrained in ways that would
not ordinarily apply to a permanent Chief.
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presented the Department’s Preliminary Plan to Accelerate Community Policing. In this
plan, the Department committed to three main areas of change: 1) create a Continuum
of Response that directs calls for service to the agency most suited to handle the calls,
partners law enforcement with these agencies, and increases officer training
opportunities; 2) a commitment to unbiased policing by increasing diversity and bias
training, incorporating more civilian and community-based oversight, and review of
policies through the equity lens, among other changes; and 3) recruitment and training
focused on increasing diversity in the Department through a “Policing Forward” model.
The Department’s constructive participation in the process merits attention for a couple
of reasons. The first is for the impression it makes. Incidents that strain the trust
between the police and the community are difficult for both sides, and it can be hard for
law enforcement not to respond to criticism with defensiveness, or to reform ideas with
resistance. ICPD’s active engagement (in spite of whatever frustration or
discouragement the summer may have engendered) is accordingly to its credit – and to
the credit of a City structure that expects and facilitates responsiveness.
The second is substantive. The reform movement is a powerful force that is very much
in the process of changing the justice system. Many of these changes are long overdue
and transcend the role or fault of current participants. At any rate, the lasting
effectiveness of those changes will depend in part on the positive contributions of all key
stakeholders – including the law enforcement personnel whose specialized training and
expertise merit an active seat at the table when fundamental shifts are being
considered.
Our hope, for ICPD and the City, is that the painful chapters of 2020 will be understood
in the future as a turning point that redounds to the benefit of all concerned. We offer
this report as an element in that ongoing process, appreciate the opportunity to be part
of it, and intend to track future developments with optimism.
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Appendix A: Lead Up Timeline
Monday, May 25
George Floyd is killed by Minneapolis Police Department Officer Derek Chauvin
Tuesday, May 26
Protests against police brutality begin in several major cities around the United States
Friday, May 29
In a prepared statement, ICPD Interim Chief Bill Campbell condemns the killing of
George Floyd, stating, “The manner in which these officers treated Mr. Floyd is
inconsistent with how we train police officers to conduct their interactions with the
public.”
First night of protests in Des Moines
o The Rally for George Floyd, 1,000+ people, ends peacefully
o A group of approximately 200 protestors move to Court, where Des Moines
Police Department was blocking streets
o Protestors surrounded police vehicle, break out windows, throw water
bottles. Officers respond with OC spray
o Organizers meet with Des Moines police to unsuccessfully diffuse the
conflict
o As crowd grows, officers deploy tear gas to disperse as protestors break
windows
o Polk County Sheriff and Iowa State Patrol arrive for mutual aid
o 12 arrests made
Saturday, May 30
First planned rally held in Iowa City: “Say Their Names” Rally
o Speakers included Iowa City Mayor Bruce Teague, Mayor Pro-Tem Mazahir
Salih, Johnson County Supervisor Royceann Porter, and North Liberty City
Councilor RaQuishia Harrington
o Agencies responding none. Organizers requested that ICPD not attend or
patrol the event
o Organizers: sisters Lujayn and Raneem Hamad
o Location: Pentacrest (downtown Iowa City)
o Roadblocks were used to close sections of Clinton Street and Iowa Avenue
for safety
o Rally was peaceful
Protests continue in Des Moines
o Organizers: Mothers Against Violence and Des Moines Stop the Violence
Crew
o Crowd estimate of 1,000+
o Separate protest branched off, approximately 300 people, moving to:
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. At the Polk County Courthouse crowd threw rocks at police
skirmish line and broke windows
. Crowd then moved to the Capital building, where police line was
deployed, dispersal order issued
. Crowd moved up the steps to the police line, police used OC
spray on individual protestors
. Police deployed tear gas to disperse the crowd
. Crowd moved to Court Avenue (“entertainment district”), where
the crowd began fighting
. At approximately 12:30am, police deployed to Court Avenue
. At 2:30am (May 31) crowd broke into the Court Avenue Hy-Vee
. Police deployed tear gas and other methods to disperse the
crowd at various downtown locations
.
o 25 - 47 arrests reported
. Charges: Rioting, Failure to Disperse, 2nd Degree Criminal
Mischief
. Two handguns recovered
Polk County (Des Moines) issues curfew of 9pm – 5am
Sunday, May 31
Protest in Coralville (25th Avenue entrance of Coral Ridge Mall)
o Location: 25th Avenue entrance of Coral Ridge Mall
o Crowd approximately 50 individuals
o Agencies responding Coralville Police, Coralville Fire Department, North
Liberty Police, Iowa City Police, Johnson County Sheriff’s Office and Iowa
State Patrol
o Social media posts (Twitter and Facebook) state, “Coral Ridge mall hit loot.”
Vandalism and looting occured
o Protesters state that they were separate from the mall looting
o At approximately 11pm – midnight:
. Officers detain two individuals
. A third individual rushes the police line
. Officers from other agencies deploy chemical munitions and
flash bangs to disperse the protestors
Protests continue in Des Moines
o Davis Park March and Vigil in Union Park in the afternoon/early evening are
peaceful
o Des Moines Police Department (Historic East Village), approximately 150
people
. Police barricade the Department
. At 9pm, the curfew hour, protestors take a knee
. Protestors tell officers that, if they take a knee, everyone can go
home
. Officers kneel for a prayer
. The crowd disperses
o Target/Merle Hall Mall, approximately 75 people at start, grows to 200
. Protestors riot/looting mall area, break windows
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. Some officers kneel with protestors
. At some point, officers deploy tear gas and protestors respond
with fireworks
. Discussion of starting Iowa Youth Power Movement
Davenport Protests, Shooting, Officer Ambush
o Approximately 100 people and vehicles protested at the North Park
Mall/Walmart parking lot
o Davenport Police Department responded to 45 “serious disturbance” calls
o Davenport Police Department responded to “shots fired” calls
. Four civilians shot
. Two of the four died
o At approximately 3:00AM (June 1), three officers were ambushed in their
patrol vehicle
. One officer shot
. Two officers returned fire, shooting perpetrator’s vehicle
Monday, June 1
Protests begin in Iowa City
o Old Capital
. Crowd of approximately 200 people gather
. Focus is “Black Lives Matter” movement
o Johnson County Jail
. Approximately 20 Johnson County Sheriff officers surround jail
. Crowd chants “take a knee” and officers kneel
. Johnson County Sheriff’s Sgt. Jeff Gingerich addresses the
crowd using a megaphone and sates that he “felt sick” watching
the Floyd video
o Iowa City City Hall
. Crowd moves to City Hall
. Organizer announces that “the night was about to turn violent” “
. Some individuals threw rocks, shattering glass in one front door
o Johnson County Courthouse
. Crowd moves to Courthouse
. Individuals spray paint street and Courthouse
. Agencies responding: ICPD, Sheriff
. Agency unknown issues a dispersal order
. White protestors move to front of crowd, link arms as if to
“protect” others, then move back to Old Capital and disperse
City Manager emails ICPD to show support/increase morale
o Email to officers to let them know they had the City support.
o Instructs that police do not intervene in situations that can’t be safe (e.g.,
“windows can be replaced, but people cannot”)
Protests continue in Des Moines
o What started as a peaceful protest at Statehouse and Police Department
turns violent around 11:30pm
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. Prior to this, officers had knelt with protestors, negotiated,
removed riot gear
o Police issued a dispersal order at Statehouse in attempts to enforce the
9pm curfew
o Police deployed tear gas, flashbangs, to disperse the crowd
o 60+ arrests made throughout the evening
Coralville, Scott County and Davenport impose a curfew of 8pm to 6am and 9pm to
5am, respectively, “until further notice”
Tuesday, June 2
Vandalism in downtown Iowa City
o Johnson County Sheriff deploy pepper spray at protestors
o “Rocks and bottles” thrown at officers
o Windows broken at County Building
o Extensive vandalism to public and private property throughout Iowa City, including
broken windows, graffiti, damage to vehicles and other vandalism
o Damage to City Hall, including several broken window panes
Iowa City Council meeting held with two members, including the Mayor, and several staff
persons present in City Hall
Des Moines protest continue, but are peaceful
o March of 1,000+ to Gov. Mansion remained peaceful, no less lethal munitions
deployed
o Mayor issues mandatory Stay at Home order for City of West Des Moines
Wednesday, June 3
Iowa City Mayor hosts first “Speak Up, Speak Out” event
See June 3 Timeline
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Appendix B: Recommendation Summary
RECOMMENDATION 1
ICPD should re-visit its existing mutual aid/joint law enforcement agreements with
outside agencies and should develop or refine as needed any written protocols that set
out limitations on deployment of munitions or enforcement activity with which the Police
Department will not assist.
RECOMMENDATION 2
ICPD should endeavor to reach a mutual aid/joint law enforcement agreement with ISP
regarding its limitations on deployment of munitions or enforcement activity and if one
cannot be struck advise ISP in writing of these limitations.
RECOMMENDATION 3
ICPD, with input from the City, should evaluate its protocols for responding to
pedestrian activity on the interstate, both on its own and in a mutual aid context with
ISP, to provide more specific guidance as to enforcement strategies and priorities.
RECOMMENDATION 4
ICPD should dedicate resources to strengthening its ability to gather useful information
from social media and other sources about community sentiment, activism, and
potential protest activity.
RECOMMENDATION 5
When circumstances allow, ICPD should pursue a strategy of more pro-active
identification of and outreach toward protest leadership in an effort to achieve beneficial
clarity on both sides.
RECOMMENDATION 6
ICPD should consider using personnel specially trained in crisis negotiation techniques
to de-escalate potentially tense confrontations with protestors prior to resorting to
deployment of force.
RECOMMENDATION 7
ICPD should develop a crowd control policy that requires, when feasible, attempts at
de-escalation with protestors through negotiation, pace, and other de-escalation
strategies and documentation of all efforts to de-escalate the situation.
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RECOMMENDATION 8
ICPD should assess its internal capabilities (in terms of training and expertise) with
regard to effective communication with protestors or adversarial groups, and devote
resources as needed to increase its options for dialogue and negotiation in future
events.
RECOMMENDATION 9
When possible, ICPD should utilize physical barriers or other methods to maintain
distance in crowd control contexts, so as to improve potential for communication and
increase time for evaluation of potential threats.
RECOMMENDATION 10
The City should consider what specific manner of statement or acts constitute “acting in
a violent manner” in a protest situation and would be requisite prior to the initiation of
Iowa’s Unlawful Assembly Statute, so as to better equip ICPD in making these
assessments.
RECOMMENDATION 11
ICPD should ensure that any future declarations of unlawful assembly and orders to
disperse in a protest situation are audible and include directions for crowd departure.
RECOMMENDATION 12
ICPD should include specific language in its crowd control policy, which we discuss in
greater detail below, to provide more specific guidance than the current direction to
“issue warnings.”
RECOMMENDATION 13
ICPD should invest in equipment and study alternative techniques that would help
ensure that orders and warnings were comprehensively clear and audible in the large
crowd context.
RECOMMENDATION 14
ICPD should explore innovative approaches to crowd notification – such as real-time
social media broadcasting– that could facilitate enhanced communications with the
public.
RECOMMENDATION 15
ICPD should review body camera footage after critical incidents, identify any remarks
that are inconsistent with Department expectations, and ensure accountability and
remediation as appropriate.
78 | P a g e
RECOMMENDATION 16
ICPD should assess the individual uses of force by its personnel on June 3 in keeping
with its standard protocol, and should respond with accountability measures, additional
training, or other feedback as appropriate.
RECOMMENDATION 17
The City, in collaboration with ICPD, Johnson County Ambulance, the Joint Emergency
Communications Center, and the Iowa City Fire Department, should review the
miscommunication that occurred and work to develop protocols intended to improve
coordination for police and rescue response for future incidents.
RECOMMENDATION 18
ICPD should revise its uniform regulations to ensure that officers in tactical gear can be
clearly identified during their operations, both internally and for purposes of public
accountability.
RECOMMENDATION 19
Iowa City should engage in dialogue with its police department on how best to address
protestors involved in disorderly conduct and use the tools available within the criminal
justice system.
RECOMMENDATION 20
Iowa City leadership should seek community input and feedback from ICPD experts in
crafting policy parameters for use of force and deployment of munitions in the context of
protest activity.
RECOMMENDATION 21
ICPD should review, consolidate, and update its different crowd control policies to
eliminate gaps, increase clarity, and reflect current community standards and
expectations, in consideration of the principles articulated herein.
RECOMMENDATION 22
ICPD should re-evaluate and codify its approach to the use of less lethal munitions for
crowd control in a manner that, by creating narrow, particularized standards for
deployment, emphasizes the wide latitude that should be given to speech activities and
recognizes the public’s right to peaceably demonstrate.
79 | P a g e
RECOMMENDATION 23
ICPD should modify policy related to use of pepper ball rounds in crowd control
situations to limit use only against physically aggressive or combative individuals, rather
than as a general tool for dispersal of an “unruly or rioting” crowd.
RECOMMENDATION 24
ICPD should post its policy manual on its website with a searchable function.
RECOMMENDATION 25
ICPD should update its annual training curriculum and related General Order to reflect
the addition of formal crowd control training.
RECOMMENDATION 26
Metro SRT should specifically update its Tactics manual to include model policing
tactics for modern crowd control.
RECOMMENDATION 27
Metro SRT should train regularly on crowd control tactics so that they are prepared to
respond in a command capacity when necessary, and should train with other
specialized units within ICPD and other agencies that are likely to provide mutual aid.
RECOMMENDATION 28
When practicable, ICPD should host or engage in joint training exercises on crowd
control tactics and responses with other local agencies County-wide.
RECOMMENDATION 29
ICPD should incorporate current case law related to protest activity as well as best
practices and trends in crowd management when delivering its annual use of force
training.
RECOMMENDATION 30
ICPD should follow the Incident Command Structure and related components, including
establishing an Operations or Incident Action Plan when practical in future operations of
this scope and magnitude.
RECOMMENDATION 31
ICPD command staff, including all supervisors and team leads, should have initial and
refresher training on incident command.
80 | P a g e
RECOMMENDATION 32
ICPD should establish various, generic crowd management plan templates in advance
of protest activity to be adjusted when Incident Commanders are responding to a
spontaneous event. This should be completed internally and in joint training exercises
with agencies that will likely provide mutual aid.
RECOMMENDATION 33
In future events requiring centralized incident command, ICPD should set up a robust
Command Post at the onset of the incident in their dedicated facility, which, they report,
has the technological capacity for communication and surveillance.
RECOMMENDATION 34
In future events requiring field command, ICPD should set up a field Incident Command
Post with appropriate leadership capacity.
RECOMMENDATION 35
ICPD should provide a dedicated tactical channel for communication between ICPD’s
specialized units and among officers on the ground.
RECOMMENDATION 36
ICPD should include training on effective verbal communication specifically when
training on crowd control tactics generally. Specifically, this training might include a
preference for squad leaders to command one-on-one to line officers, when practicable,
rather than officers playing “telephone” with commands down the line.
RECOMMENDATION 37
ICPD should explore alternative communication methods that reduce or eliminate the
need for personal cell phone calls as a means of tactical communications.
RECOMMENDATION 38
ICPD should request that in large protest scenarios that the Joint Emergency
Communications Center provide a dedicated channel for other agencies, such as
Johnson County Ambulance and Iowa City Fire Department, to communicate with ICPD
directly.
RECOMMENDATION 39
The new Public Information Officer concept should revolve around a constructive,
mutually respectful relationship between City officials and ICPD leadership in providing
timely, accurate, and candid information to the community about its policing services.
Item Number: 4.
F ebruary 11, 2021
Pen d ing City Cou n cil Work Session Topics
AT TAC HM E NT S :
Description
Pending City Council Work S ession Topics
Item Number: 5.
F ebruary 11, 2021
Memo from City Attorney: Retirement
AT TAC HM E NT S :
Description
Memo from City Attorney: Retirement
Item Number: 6.
F ebruary 11, 2021
B L M & Systemic Racism Detailed Status Report
AT TAC HM E NT S :
Description
B L M & S ystemic Racism Detailed S tatus Report
1
City of Iowa City
COMMITMENT TO ADDRESSING BLACK
LIVES MATTER & SYSTEMIC RACISM
Resolution No. 20-159
Status Report
February 11, 2021
2
SUMMARY OF COMMITMENTS
The City of Iowa City is committed to embracing the Black Lives Matter Movement and addressing
Systemic Racism. The City Council unanimously passed Resolution No. 20-159 on Tuesday, June
16, 2020 which outlined seventeen initial actions. A copy of that signed resolution, along with
other related resources, is available at www.icgov.org/BLM.
The seventeen actions have been identified in this initial commitment and are summarized below.
Click on an action to be taken to the status report page for that item:
Policing & the Future of Public Safety
• Develop a preliminary plan to restructure Iowa City Police Department (ICPD) towards
community policing.
• Receive a report of ICPD involvement in use of gas and flash-bang devices during a June
2020 Black Lives Matter protest in Iowa City.
• Increase accountability and oversight authority of CPRB, where legally possible.
• Improve transparency and accessibility of detailed ICPD budget expenditures.
• Review inventory of military grade equipment in ICPD, evaluate federal contracts with the
ICPD and express support for divestment of the Johnson County Sherriff’s Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle.
• Enact ICPD General Order to expressly ban the use of chokeholds & any maneuver that
cuts off oxygen or blood flow.
• Continue ICPD policy and practice to be consistent with IA H.F. 2647, ensuring police
officers in Iowa have not committed serious misconduct.
• Investigate compliance and evaluate disciplinary action related to proper use of body
cameras and vehicle recording devices.
• Ensure the duty to intervene and stop excessive force, in both ICPD General Order and an
MOU with area law enforcement agencies.
• Prohibit use of tear gas, rubber bullets, and flash bangs against peaceful protestors.
• Adopt 2021 state legislative priorities related to criminal justice reform, enhanced
authority of the Community Police Review Board (CPRB), and decriminalization of small
amounts of marijuana.
Truth & Reconciliation
• Create an ad hoc Truth & Reconciliation Commission to carry out restorative justice.
Diversity, Equity & Inclusion
• Commit $1,000,000 to local efforts promoting racial equity + social justice, including
development of a new Affordable Housing Plan.
• Increase opportunities for artistic expression by communities of color.
• Establish Juneteenth as an official city holiday beginning in 2021.
• Increase diversity of City employees, expand equitable recruitment efforts, and elevate
organizational equity training, policies, and procedures.
• Continue use of a racial equity toolkit use in all city departments, expand training to the
City Council, and educate and train the local business community
3
PROGRESS SUMMARY
Policing & the Future of Public Safety
Truth & Reconciliation
Diversity, Equity & Inclusion
*Note: Actions showing multiple icons have some council directives accomplished and others ongoing; details are provided on each action’s page.
$1m. committed to SJRE efforts + Affordable Housing Plan
Equitable recruitment, hiring, staff training
2021 legislative priorities supporting racial/social justice
Develop Truth & Reconciliation Commission
Preliminary plan to restructure the police
Report on gas/flash bang use on protestors
CPRB Report on Recommended Changes
Transparent and accessible ICPD budget details
Military-grade equipment inventory review, MRAP Letter
ICPD G.O.: Chokeholds and airway restricting maneuvers
ICPD G.O.: Police misconduct related to IA H.F. 2647
ICPD G.O.: Body camera + car recorder compliance
ICPD G.O.: Duty to Intervene & stop excessive use of force
ICPD G.O.: Tear gas, rubber bullets, flash bangs in protests
Racial & Equity Toolkit expansion of use + education
Increase art + celebrations of communities of color
Establish Juneteenth as official City holiday
Awaiting City
Council action Planning or action
currently underway
Some or all actions
accomplished
Action(s) completed Action(s) in progress Awaiting City
Council action
Last Updated: February 11, 2021
4
Resolution
“By December 15, 2020, develop a preliminary plan to restructure the Iowa City Police Department (ICPD)
towards community policing, including, but not limited to, reduction of the public’s reliance on police in non-
violent situations through use of unarmed professionals, and consideration of community policing initiatives in
other cities, including, but not limited to, Minneapolis, MN, Camden, NJ, Los Angeles, CA and San Francisco,
CA.” (Res. 20-159, p. 1, #1)
Status Summary
The City Manager’s Office has initiated the translation of the Preliminary Plan recommendations into
Spanish, French, and Arabic. The English-Arabic translated document is available now, and the English-
French and English-Spanish translations are forthcoming.
Staff will also work with Mayor Pro Tem Salih, Councilor Bergus, and Councilor Weiner to develop an
outreach plan that involves contracting with an independent party to solicit feedback on the plan,
focusing on BIPOC populations who often face barriers to providing input.
Residents can visit www.icgov.org/preliminaryplan to read the plan and a summary of recommendations
and view the City Manager’s presentation of the preliminary plan. The community is encouraged to
provide feedback on the preliminary plan by e-mailing PolicePlan@iowa-city.org or take a survey on
the recommendations.
Next Steps
Target Date Milestone Action Group(s)
Ongoing Visit www.icgov.org/preliminaryplan to provide comments. Public
Accomplishments
• Sept. 1, 2020: City Council approved the replacement of a vacant, full-time police officer
position with a civilian Victim Support Specialist position. More information is available here.
• Sept. 16 – Oct. 8, 2020: Six separate Listening Posts held on community policing with focus areas
including homelessness, crisis intervention/mental health/substance abuse, victims of abuse, youth
engagement, the special needs population, and UI students.
• Aug. 25 – Oct. 15, 2020: Comments welcomed through an online public input form.
• Oct. 15, 2020: Staff delivered a report to City Council which summarized the comments received
via the listening posts and online form during the initial public input phase.
• Oct. 29, 2020: ICPD issued a special order to no longer initiate stops based on non-public safety
secondary violations. Public safety data concerning this guideline will be reviewed after 60 days.
• Dec. 15, 2020: City Council adopted an unbiased policing ordinance
• Dec. 15, 2020: A preliminary plan to accelerate community policing was released.
ACTION 1: PRELIMINARY PLAN TO RESTRUCTURE ICPD
TOWARDS COMMUNITY POLICING
5
Resolution
“Allocate City funds in the amount of $1,000,000 during Fiscal Year starting July 1, 2020 for efforts to
promote racial equity and social justice, including expansion of the Special Populations Involvement (SPI)
program, creation of a new robust affordable housing plan, including, but not limited to, housing in the
downtown and core neighborhoods, support of the to be determined efforts of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, and hold a Council work session on or before August 1, 2020 to address specific allocations.”
(Res. 20-159, p. 1, #2)
Status Summary
Allocation plans for these funds are pending further City Council discussion.
The process for developing a new Affordable Housing Action Plan is underway, with an emphasis on
engaging more voices in the community.
Next Steps
Target Date Milestone Action Group(s)
TBD Hold City Council work session to address specific allocations City Council
Accomplishments
• August 18, 2020: City Council agreed to contribute $25,000 in funding to assist the Iowa City
BIPOC and Immigrant-Owned Businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, in collaboration
with ThinkIowaCity and Project Better Together’s Holding Our Own program. This funding is
separate from the $1 million commitment. View a list of funding recipients.
ACTION 2: COMMIT $1,000,000 TO LOCAL EFFORTS
PROMOTING RACIAL EQUITY + SOCIAL JUSTICE
6
Resolution
“Elevate the City’s commitment to racial equity and social justice, including expanding efforts to increase the
number of minorities employed by the City including eliminating barriers to applications, increase resources
devoted to those efforts as needed to better train all city employees and coordinate and report on the use of
funds dedicated for racial equity and social justice.” (Res. 20-159, p. 2, #3)
Status Summary
Staff have implemented several improvements for more equitable hiring and recruitment and continue to
actively explore additional opportunities, such as those ideas outlined in the staff report.
In early December, Iowa City was one of 20 local governments across the nation to join in an amicus
curiae brief in support of a lawsuit challenging President Trump’s Executive Order 13950, which attempts
to ban the use of comprehensive diversity trainings by federal contractors.
Next Steps
Target Date Milestone Action Group(s)
Ongoing, Monthly Staff Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) Committee
meetings and efforts
Staff
Ongoing Diversity and equity improvements to hiring and
recruitment policy and practices.
All
Accomplishments
• July 29, 2020: Approximately 60 City and County staff participated in a virtual Cultural
Proficiency pilot training.
• August 2020: New staff DEI Committee was formed, with a mission to discuss opportunities and
plan for improving workplace culture related to diversity, equity, and inclusion. This committee will
continue to meet monthly and seek progress in these areas.
• August 20, 2020: Staff completed a report on Iowa City employee demographics, recruitment
efforts, and staff diversity, equity, and inclusion trainings.
• October 2020: A new employment opportunities flyer (available in English, Spanish, French
(Africa), Arabic, and Swahili) was created and distributed to approximately 300 community
organizations and local contacts who reach diverse populations.
• Human Resources has been working with hiring to staff to implement changes since this report was
published, including:
o Requiring all interviews to include at least one question on diversity, equity, and inclusion.
o More consistent data collection on how candidates learn about positions.
o Providing hiring managers with current employee demographics at the beginning of the
hiring process as well as post-hire recruitment analysis reports.
o Providing candidates with interview prep time prior to the start of an interview.
o Providing candidates with “Interview Tips for Success” when scheduling interviews.
ACTION 3: INCREASE DIVERSITY OF EMPLOYEES, EQUITABLE
RECRUITMENT EFFORTS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL EQUITY TRAINING
7
Resolution
“By August 1, 2020, receive a report from the City Manager on the ICPD’s involvement in the use of gas
and flash-bang devices during the protest in Iowa City on June 3, 2020.” (Res. 20-159, p. 2, #4)
Status Summary
The OIR Group completed their independent review of the June 3, 2020 protest event, which is available to be
viewed online.
The February 16, 2021 work session agenda will include discussion of the OIR Report.
Next Steps
Target Date Milestone Action Group(s)
Feb. 16, 2021 City Council work session to include discussion of report City Council
Accomplishments
• September 1, 2020: Councilors approved a contract with OIR Group (based in Playa del Ray,
CA) to conduct an independent investigation of the June 3, 2020 BLM protest incident that took
place near the Interstate 80 interchange and Dubuque Street.
• September 3, 2020: Per City Council direction, the City released a statement and video footage
related to the June 3, 2020 BLM protest incident.
• January 28, 2020: Completed report from the OIR Group’s independent review delivered to City
Council.
ACTION 4: RECEIVE REPORT ON ICPD INVOLVEMENT IN USE
OF GAS AND FLASH BANGS DURING JUNE 2020 BLM
8
Resolution
“By October 1, 2020, create an ad hoc Truth and Reconciliation Commission to bear witness to the truth of
racial injustice in Iowa City and to carry out restorative justice, through the collection of testimony and public
hearings, with such work to include a recommendation to the Council of a plan for dedicating and/or
renaming public spaces and/or rights of way in honor of the Black Lives Matter movement.” (Res. 20-159, p.
2, #5)
Status Summary
The Ad Hoc Truth & Reconciliation Commission (TRC) meets bi-weekly. Learn more and stay up-to-date on
meeting schedules and agendas here.
Next Steps
Target Date Milestone Action Group(s)
Every other
Thursday, 7 p.m.
Regular TRC meetings will be held bi-weekly on Thursdays at
7 p.m. until further notice
TRC, Staff
Accomplishments
• July – September 2020: Continued collaborative efforts to collect ideas and input from members
of the public, including councilor meetings and sustained communication with members of the Iowa
Freedom Riders (IFR), input from other community groups, and individual input collected via e-mail,
phone, and in-person at City Council meetings.
• July 21, 2020 – Public input opportunity at the regular, formal City Council meeting.
• August 18, 2020: Councilors Bergus and Weiner introduced a draft resolution.
• September 1, 2020: Councilors received public input and made plans to discuss further at the
next City Council meeting.
• September 15, 2020: City Council adopted a resolution forming a Truth & Reconciliation
Commission.
• November 17, 2020: City Council appointed nine board members to serve two-year terms on the
TRC, including: : Amel Ali, Anthony Currin, Raneem Hamad, T’Shaliyn Harrington (vice chair), Eric
Harris, Layana Navarre-Jackson, Royceann Porter (chair), Kevin John Rivera, and Mohamed
Traore.
• December 21, 2020: First TRC meeting held.
ACTION 5: CREATE AD HOC TRUTH & RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
9
Resolution
“Make it a 2021 City Council legislative priority to advocate for and support our state delegation in
enacting criminal justice reform, eliminating the war on drugs and making changes to state law that enable
the City’s plan to restructure the police department, enhance the authority of the Community Police Review
Board (CPRB) and reduce disproportionate minority contact, including support of state legislation
decriminalizing small amounts of marijuana.” (Res. 20-159, p. 2, #6)
Status Summary
Staff will work with state legislators, advocacy groups, and the City’s contracted lobbyists to advance the
City’s 2021 State legislative priorities, which include support for reform measures to reduce racial
disparity in the criminal justice system and address systemic racism and support for crisis services.
In January, the City worked with their contracted lobbyists to register in support of two bills that address
decriminalization of small amounts of marijuana; an offense which contributes to racial disparity in the
criminal justice system.
Next Steps
Target Date Milestone Action Group(s)
2021 State of Iowa
Legislative Session
Staff will work with state legislators, and City’s
contracted lobbyists on these issues during the 2021
session.
Staff, state legislative
delegation, contracted
lobbyists
Accomplishments
• June 19, 2020: Participated in joint work session between the NAACP and local, state and
federal law enforcement agencies.
• November 17, 2020: City Council adopted 2021 state legislative priorities, including support for
Policy changes recommended by the Governor’s FOCUS Committee on Criminal Justice Reform.
• November 23, 2020: City Council held a special work session to discuss the adopted priorities
with the legislators and contracted lobbyists.
ACTION 6: ADOPT STATE LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES RELATED TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM, CPRB AUTHORITY & DECRIMINALIZATION OF SMALL AMOUNTS OF MARIJUANA
10
Resolution
“Continue use of the racial equity toolkit by city departments and expand such training to the City Council, and
work with our local business partners to educate and train the business community on use of a racial equity
toolkit.” (Res. 20-159, p. 2, #7)
Status Summary
City staff will continue to expand knowledge and use of the toolkit and update City Council as
appropriate. The City is sponsoring additional training opportunities for local businesses and
organizations in February, covering topics including diversity, leadership, and effective listening and
diversity, bias, and microaggressions.
Several other trainings and education and engagement events are scheduled to be hosted or sponsored
by the City of Iowa City in the coming months. For a list of upcoming events, please visit
www.icgov.org/blm and check under the “Upcoming Education + Engagement Events” section.
To stay up-to-date on City events, follow @CityofIowaCity on social media, and sign-up for e-mail or
SMS/text message notifications (visit www.icgov.org/e-subscriptions, enter your preferred method of
contact, and select “Equity and Human Rights” under “News and Events”).
Accomplishments
• July 22, 2020: Culturally Responsive Communication training delivered to 100+ members of the
local business community.
• July 23, 2020: Staff presented a memo on the City’s use of the racial equity toolkit to Council.
• July 29, 2020: Approximately 60 City and County staff participated in a virtual Cultural
Proficiency pilot training.
• August 2020: New staff DEI Committee was formed, with a mission to discuss opportunities and
plan for improving workplace culture related to diversity, equity, and inclusion. This committee will
continue to meet monthly and seek progress in these areas.
• August 26, 2020: Staff, in collaboration with the ACLU, conducted a Know Your Rights
presentation with area youth through the Neighborhood Centers of Johnson County.
• September 9, 2020: Culturally Responsive Communication training delivered to area property
managers and businesses. Approximately 45 individuals participated.
• October 13, 2020: The Office of Equity and Human Rights released an online fair housing
training, available on-demand at www.icgov.org/FairHousingTraining.
• October 22, 2020: Culturally Responsive Communication training delivered to area property
managers and businesses. Approximately 50 individuals participated.
• December 2, 2020: Implicit bias training was provided to City board & commission members
(approximately 21 people attended).
ACTION 7: CONTINUE USE OF RACIAL EQUITY TOOLKIT USE AND
EXPAND TRAINING TO CITY COUNCIL AND LOCAL BUSINESSES
11
Resolution
“Request and receive, by January 1, 2021, a report and recommendation from the CPRB, in consultation
with an attorney of its choice, regarding changes to the CPRB ordinance that enhance its ability to provide
effective civilian oversight of the ICPD, including but not limited to those that address compelling the
testimony of officers, with the report to include a summary of measures considered and rejected by the CPRB,
whether it be for policy or legal reasons.” (Res. 20-159, p. 2, #8)
Status Summary
At their December 22 meeting, the Community Police Review Board approved a report to City Council of
proposed changes to the Board. At their January 19, 2021 meeting, the City Council requested a legal
analysis of the CPRB’s recommendations, including analysis of whether any of the recommendations would
require changes to State law before being implemented locally.
Accomplishments
• September 2020: Complaints can be now be filed with the CPRB using a new, online web form.
The option to submit a hard copy form remains.
• September 21, 2020: Virtual Community Forum held by the CPRB to collect public input on the
Board’s role and ICPD policies, practices, and procedures.
• October 9, 2020: An informational report summarizing the 27-year history of the CPRB ordinance
and a history of complaints filed with the Board was included in the CPRB agenda packet.
• December 22, 2020: CPRB delivered a report to City Council on proposed changes to the Board.
ACTION 8: INCREASE ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT
AUTHORITY OF CPRB, WHERE LEGALLY POSSIBLE
12
Resolution
“Direct staff to provide a detailed expenditure summary of the police budget on the City’s website.” (Res.
20-159, p. 2, #9)
Status Summary
Staff will continue to increase transparency about the Police Department operations through revised web
content.
The preliminary plan to accelerate community policing released on Dec. 15, 2020 includes more
information about the Police Department’s operations and budget.
Accomplishments
• View additional fiscal year 2021 police department budget information (published June 2020).
• View additional fiscal year 2015 – 2019 Calls for Service + Crime Information
ACTION 9: IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY + ACCESSIBILITY OF
DETAILED ICPD BUDGET EXPENDITURES
13
Resolution
“Send the letter attached as Exhibit “A” to the Johnson County Sheriff supporting divestment of the MRAP
(Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicle and obtain a report from city staff on the military grade
equipment in the ICPD’s inventory and the federal contracts that provide support to the police department.”
(Res. 20-159, p. 2, #10)
Accomplishments
• June 17, 2020: Mayor Teague submitted a letter to the Johnson County Sheriff supporting
divestment of the MRAP vehicle. A copy of the letter can be viewed here.
• August 20, 2020: City staff prepared a memo outlining federal contracts from 2017 to the
present, that provide support to the Iowa City Police Department.
• Staff delivered a memo on ICPD military grade equipment to City Council on September 10,
2020.
ACTION 10: REVIEW ICPD INVENTORY OF MILITARY-GRADE
EQUIPMENT + SUPPORT COUNTY DIVESTMENT OF MRAP
14
Resolution
“Direct the City Manager to expressly ban, in the ICPD’s general orders, any use of chokeholds or any other
maneuver that cuts off oxygen or blood flow.” (Res. 20-159, p. 2, #11)
Accomplishments
• CPRB last reviewed the Iowa City Police Department’s General Order on Use of Force at their
October 8, 2019 meeting. The board recommended changes and those were incorporated by the
Iowa City Police Department. The General Order was re-issued by the Police Department on
October 23, 2019.
• The Community Police Review Board approved an updated Use of Force General Order (G.O.)
at their August 19, 2020 meeting. The G.O. was re-issued by the ICPD on August 20, 2020.
ACTION 11: ADOPT ICPD GENERAL ORDER (G.O.) TO EXPRESSLY BAN
CHOKEHOLDS & ANY MANEUVER THAT CUTS OFF OXYGEN OR BLOODFLOW
15
Resolution
“Direct the City Manager to ensure the ICPD’s policy and practices regarding employment of officers is
consistent with the goals of recently enacted Iowa House File 2647 to ensure that officers working in Iowa
have not committed serious misconduct, as defined therein.” (Res. 20-159, p. 2, #12)
Status Summary
The Iowa City Police Department recruitment process already contains a robust background check process
that includes a review of past employment history. Candidates with a history of serious misconduct are not
considered for employment with the Iowa City Police Department. As the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy
develops rules for the implementation of House File 2647, staff will adjust policies accordingly to ensure
complete compliance with the new law.
Next Steps
Target Date Milestone Action Group(s)
TBD – Dependent
upon when the State
of Iowa releases rules
Update Human Resource policies as needed to ensure
compliance with HF 2647
Staff
Accomplishments
ACTION 12: CONTINUE ICPD POLICY + PRACTICES REFLECT IA H.F. 2647,
ENSURING OFFICERS HAVE NOT COMMITTED SERIOUS MISCONDUCT
16
Resolution
“Direct the City Manager to review the systems and reporting mechanisms in place at the ICPD for evaluating
compliance with the ICPD’s Body Worn Cameras and In-Car Recorders general order, ensure that such
systems result in consistent compliance with the general order, revise as necessary to achieve that goal,
include real consequences for non-compliance, and report back to the Council upon completion of the
review.” (Res. 20-159, p. 3, #13)
Accomplishments
• The Community Police Review Board reviewed and approved the General Order on Body
Cameras and In-Car Recorders at their February 11, 2020 meeting.
• The Community Police Review Board reviewed and approved an updated General Order on
Body Cameras and In-Car Recorders at their September 8, 2020 meeting.
• Staff delivered a report on the revised General Order related to body worn cameras and in-car
recorders, to City Council on September 10, 2020.
• Staff updated monthly Use of Force reports provided to the CPRB to indicate body camera and
in-car recording compliance on all Use of Force incidents.
ACTION 13: EVALUATE COMPLIANCE + DISCIPLINARY ACTION
RELATED TO PROPER USE OF BODY CAMS AND CAR RECORDERS
17
Resolution
“Direct the City Manager to revise the ICPD’s general orders to require officers to intervene and stop
excessive force used by other officers and report the incident directly to a supervisor, and enter into a
memorandum of understanding with other law enforcement agencies regarding such intervention when the
excessive force is being used by an officer of another agency such as that currently being discussed and
circulated among area law enforcement attached as Exhibit “B”” (Res. 20-159, p. 3, #14)
Accomplishments
• June 19, 2020: ICPD staff participated in joint work session between the NAACP and local, state,
and federal law enforcement agencies. At the joint work session, Iowa City joined five area law
enforcement agencies in signing a Duty to Intercede MOU.
• On July 14, 2020, the Community Police Review Board (CPRB) approved, with no changes, the
new Duty to Intervene and Report General Order provided by staff. An executed copy of that
General Order can be viewed online and has been issued to ICPD staff/officers.
ACTION 14: ENSURE DUTY TO INTERVENE & STOP EXCESSIVE
FORCE, BOTH IN ICPD AND MOU WITH AREA LAW ENFORCEMENT
18
Resolution
“Request and receive a report and recommendation from the City’s Public Art Advisory Committee, after
input from and consultation with local Black artists, on measures Council should consider to provide
opportunities for artistic expression by the Black Lives Matter movement and communities of color, including
but not limited to visual arts as well as a public festival dedicated to the celebration of Black culture.” (Res.
20-159, p. 3, #15)
Status Summary
The Public Art Advisory Committee continues to collaborate
with Public Space One and the Center for Afrofuturist
Studies on a comprehensive public art and public
engagement project.
At their January 13 meeting, the Parks & Recreation
Commission agreed to move forward with a recommendation
to City Council for renaming Creekside Park in honor of
James Alan McPherson, an influential leader in the Iowa
Writer’s Workshop and the first African-American to win the
Pulitzer Prize for Fiction.
The City again helped sponsor the 2021 MLK Celebration
of Human Rights. With City funds, Rodney’s Jamaican Jerk
Chicken served 205 people who participated in the day of celebration and the Iowa City Public Library
hosted “We the People: Protest and Peace” in partnership with other community groups.
The Truth & Reconciliation Commission will also prepare recommendations for City Council related to
public art and/or public festivals dedicated to the celebration of Black culture.
Next Steps
Target Date Milestone Action Group(s)
TBD City Council to consider a recommendation to rename
Creekside Park after James Alan McPherson. City Council, Parks and
Recreation Commission
TBD Capitol Street Parking Ramp public art project, to include
community involvement
PAAC, public, Public
Space One, Center for
Afrofuturist Studies
Accomplishments
• August 18, 2020: City Council approved a resolution to proceed with a project in partnership with the
Center for Afrofuturist Studies.
• December 3, 2020: The Public Art Advisory Committee received a public art project concept and
approved a motion to move forward with the project with additional public input.
ACTION 15: INCREASE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ARTISTIC
EXPRESSION BY COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
The mural is proposed to be located on the stair towers of
the Capitol Street Parking Ramp along Burlington Street.
19
Resolution
“Prohibit the use of tear gas, rubber bullets, and flashbangs against peaceful protestors.” (Res. 20-159, p.
3, #16)
Status Summary
Immediate direction has been provided to the Iowa City Police Department. Any policy update on this
item is on hold until the completion of the investigation in action item #4 of this resolution. Staff will use
the report of the June 3, 2020 events and City Council’s related discussion of these reports, to inform
their review of all policies and ensure any relevant updates to policies are completed.
Next Steps
Target Date Milestone Action Group(s)
TBD Receive and discuss report on June 3, 2020 protest
response
City Council
Accomplishments
ACTION 16: PROHIBIT THE USE OF TEAR GAS, RUBBER
BULLETS, AND FLASHBANGS AGAINST PEACEFUL PROTESTORS
20
Resolution
“Beginning in calendar year 2021, Juneteenth, June 19, shall be a city holiday and shall replace an existing
city holiday.” (Res. 20-159, p. 3, #17)
Accomplishments
Holidays are negotiated in the collective bargaining agreements with the City’s labor unions. The City
reached an agreement with the Police, Fire, and AFSCME unions to officially replace President’s Day (or
Washington’s Birthday) with the Juneteenth holiday. The City will also make the change for supervisory
and other non-bargaining unit staff.
The City will observe Juneteenth on June 19th annually as a City holiday. If June 19th falls on a weekend,
the City will observe it on the Friday preceding or the Monday following the June 19th date. The first
official recognition of Juneteenth as a formal City holiday will be Friday, June 18, 2021.
ACTION 17: ESTABLISH JUNETEENTH AS AN OFFICIAL CITY
HOLIDAY BEGINNING IN 2021
Item Number: 7.
F ebruary 11, 2021
Press Rel ease: O ffice of Eq u ity & Hu man Rights an n ounces free virtu al
trainin g on microag g ressions
AT TAC HM E NT S :
Description
Press Release: Office of Equity & Human Rights announces free virtual training on
microaggressions
1
Ashley Platz
From:City of Iowa City <CityofIowaCity@public.govdelivery.com>
Sent:Friday, February 5, 2021 2:51 PM
To:Ashley Platz
Subject:Office of Equity & Human Rights announces free virtual training on microagressions
Having trouble viewing this email? View it as a Web page.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Date: 02/05/2021
Contact: Stefanie Bowers, Equity Director and Human Rights Coordinator
Phone: 319-356-5022
Office of Equity & Human Rights announces free virtual
training on microagressions
The City's Office of Equity & Human Rights is offering an online training opportunity for area
businesses and organizations. There is no charge to participate in this virtual event.
2
The program will begin at 1 p.m. on Thursday, Feb. 18, 2021, and is scheduled to end at 4 p.m.
Awareness of diversity and bias
This interactive, informational, challenging, and energetic session examines and explores issues of
diversity, bias, and oppression in the workplace. The session will also introduce findings from key
research studies on unconscious bias, including the potential impact of unchecked bias on
professional interactions, employment practices, and everyday interactions. We all have an
excellent opportunity to be positive role models, powerful decision makers, leaders and effective
agents of change, if we have the tools. Are we making any progress?
About the speakers
The training will be facilitated by Dr. Carmen Iannarelli and Dr. Eddie Moore, Jr.
Dr. Carmen Iannarelli is the Chair of the Humanities, Behavioral and Social Sciences department at
Chippewa Valley Technical College, with nearly 16 years of experience in higher education and
human services. In addition to presenting at multiple colleges and educational institutions, she has
trained over 400 staff, faculty, and administrators on the impact of microaggressions and how to
prevent and mitigate these aggressions.
Dr. Eddie Moore, Jr. has achieved success in academia, business, diversity, leadership and
community service. In 1996, he started America & MOORE, LLC to provide comprehensive
diversity, privilege and leadership training/workshops. Dr. Moore is the Founder/Program Director
for the White Privilege Conference (WPC). In 2014 Dr. Moore founded The Privilege Institute (TPI)
which engages people in research, education, action and leadership through workshops,
conferences, publications and strategic partnerships and relationships.
How to register
The training will hold up to 95 participants, so please sign up early to reserve your spot in this event.
Duplicate registrations will be deleted to afford this opportunity to as many participants as possible.
Those interested can register
here https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJ0vdO2gqjsjHNFo1P8NF3fbvrGD68yIW9Wg
Accommodations
If you will need disability-related accommodations in order to participate in this event, please contact
Equity Director Stefanie Bowers at 319-356-5022 or stefanie-bowers@iowa-city.org. Early requests
are strongly encouraged to allow sufficient time to meet your access needs.
Questions?
Contact Us
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City of Iowa City ꞏ410 E Washington Street ꞏ Iowa City, IA 52240
Item Number: 8.
F ebruary 11, 2021
Civil Service Examin ation : Cl imate Action Anal yst
AT TAC HM E NT S :
Description
Civil S ervice E xamination: Climate A ction A nalyst
Item Number: 9.
F ebruary 11, 2021
Civil Service Examin ation : Constru ction Inspector II
AT TAC HM E NT S :
Description
Civil S ervice E xamination: Construction I nspector I I
Item Number: 10.
F ebruary 11, 2021
Historic Preservation Commission : Jan u ary 14
AT TAC HM E NT S :
Description
Historic P reservation Commission: J anuary 14