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HomeMy WebLinkAbout1996-05-07 OrdinanceCity of iowa City MEMORANDUM Date: May 1, 1996 To: Steve Atkins, City Manager From: Joe Fowler, Director of Parking & Transit ~'"'~" Re: Transit Fares On May 7, 1996, a public hearing is scheduled regarding proposed rate changes for Iowa City Transit. Enactment of this ordinance will not affect other fares that are currently being charged for transit service. These fares are: School field trip $0.40 Elderly $0.25 Low-income elderly Free Handicapped Free Non-peak hours Non-peak hours Non-peak hours The sale of strip tickets (ten rides) will be administratively addressed. They will be offered for sale at $6.50 per strip, a discount of $1.25. At the present time we are continuing to explore the possibility of a discounted semester pass and a special program for high school and younger students. These programs are being developed and will be presented at a later time. tp3~ Prepared by: Eleanor Dilkes Assistant City Attorney, 410 E. Washington St., Iowa City, IA 52240 319-356-5030 ORDINANCE NO. ORDINANCE AMENDING TITLE 14, CHAPTER 6, ART,!CLE O, ENTITLED "SIGN REGULA- TION~{~, TO DELETE SPECIFIC REGULATION OF "ROLITICAL SIGNS", AND TO AMEND REGUlaTIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL TEMPO- RARY S!GNS, INCLUDING POLITICAL SIGNS, WHERe. AS, Section 14-60 of the City Code sets forth 'sign regulations that are intended to enhance a~d protect the phvsical appearance and safety ~f the community, promote traffic safety, pro~iide all sign users a reasonable opportunity t~ display signs without interfer- ence from ott~ signage, and to provide fair and equitable t me t for all sign users; and WHEREAS, flor 14-60-4(A)(8I, whichJ now regulates ~po~ iry signs, imposes tim.,,e' and space )ns only on political sig~is; and ba~d so ime limitations lely on content, legally calle~nto ques- tion, and should be arr)e'nded. NOW, THEREFORE IE IT Ot~I~AINED BY THE CI?~' OF IOWA CITY, T. Title 14, Chapter Regulations," of the ed by: in" in Section 14- eting said section CITY COUNCIL IOWA: SECTION I. AMENDM 6, Article O, City Code be hereby a. Amendir~g 60-2, "Definitions," and substituting the T~nporary sign: A cloth, canvas, cardboard, (ight temporary materials, 'structural frame, intended period of display, such as ya posters, and political signs. b. Deleting Section 14-60-4(A)(8', a new Section 14-60-4(A)(8) follows: constructed of [board or other or without a temporary signs, adding read as Temporary signs; Temporary signs may be displayed in residential zones, but shall not be illuminated, shall not exceed twelve (12) square feet in area, and shall not be Ordinance No. Page 2 displayed for a period exceeding ninety (90) days. In other zones, temporary signs shall conform to the applicable regulations for permitted signs in the zone. c. Repealing the definition of "construction sign" in Section 14-60-2, "Definitions," and adding a new definition of "construction sign" to read as follows: CONSTRUCTION SIGN: A sign identifying the architects, engineers, contractors and other individuals involved in the construc- tion of a building and/or announcing the future use of the building· (1978 Code §36- 61) d. Repealing the definiti?,n of "real e,s, tate sign" in Section 14-60-2, ing a new d~J~nition of "real estate sign' to,/ read as follow~ ' REAL ESTATE SI~,N,: A sign which ad/v~tis- es the sale, rental o~ease of the?femises or part of the premise§,,o,n whi~-fhe sign is located, including open~hou/se directional signs· SECTION II. REPEALER. ~,1'1 ordinances and parts of ordinances in c,o. nflict ~)t~ the provi- sions of this Or,,d, inance, a~e hereby ~'~pealed. SECTION III. oEVER,~BILITY. If any~section, provision or part,dr the Ordinance ~,~all be adjudged to be i[~valid or unconstitutionai'x~uch adjudication s,.hall not affect the validity or, he Ordinance e~s a whole or any section, provisto~n or part th,e¢~of not adjudged invalid or unconst~. tutiona, V' SECTION IV. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Ordi- na/nC4e shall be in effect after its final passage, a.~proval and publication, as provided by law. // Passcd and approved this day of ,19 MAYOR ATTEST: CITY CLERK City Attorney's Office City of Iowa City MEMORANDUM Date: May 2, 1996 From: Linda Newman Woito Eleanor M. Dilkes Re: Proposed Amendment to the Political Sign Ordinance The proposed amendment to the political sign ordinance set forth in Julie Tallman's memo to you of November 22, 1995 eliminates all time requirements, stating: "A political sign may be installed at any time prior to an election and removed at any time after an election." This amendment was proposed in response to the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Whitton v. Citv of Gladstone~ 54 F.3d 1400 (8th Cir. 1995). Anne Burnside reviewed the Whitton case in her memo to you of September 24, 1995. In Whitton, the time requirements were found to be unconstitutional because they were content- based, i.e. the regulations only applied to political signs. Clearly, if the City chooses to regulate "political signs," there can be no time requirements. However, it appears that the City has regulated "political signs" because political signs, i.e. election signs, are temporary. Indeed, Iowa City Code §14-60-2 defines "political sign" as follows: "^ temporary sign announcing candidates seeking public office, a political issue, or containing other election information, such as vote today. 'Political signs' shall not be considered off-premises signs." (emphasis added) In addition, the code section regulating "political signs" is a subpart to a provision regulating "temporary signs". Iowa City Code §14-60-4(8) states: Temporary signs: The signs listed below are temporary signs, the use of which is limited to a maximum of thirty (30) days. Such signs are subject only to the following regulations: Political signs: Political signs shall be subject to the following requirements: (1) In residentia zones, non-illuminated political signs may be displayed on each premises. A political sign may not exceed twelve (12) square feet in area. Such signs shall not be installed prior to thirty (30) days before the election of the candidate or issue indicated on the sign. All such signs shall be removed no later than seven (7) days after the election date. (2) In other zones, political signs shall conform to the applicable regulations for permitted signs in the zone." In Whitton the court noted the City's interest in regulating political signs because they are "usually inexpensively constructed and intended to be temporary in nature and due to the susceptibility to the elements and vandalism, can leave an unsightly mess if they are posted too long." However, because in Whitton. the regulation was content-based, i.e. it applied to political signs only, this non-compelling state interest was not sufficient. The key is to regulate temporary signs not political signs. In Whitton the court noted: We agree with the district court's assessment that "regarding both traffic safety and aesthetics, the city could regulate the construction of the signs, amount of signage and the duration of time a temporaw political sign can remain before the candidate or committee must remove or replace the sign," measures which adequately address the ill sought to be suppressed and are less restrictive means of doing so. 54 F.3d at 1409. In a footnote, the Whitton court stated that Gladstone could require that any political sign be posted for a maximum period of 90 days before it is removed or replaced. 54 F.3d at 1409 fn.13. In this footnote the court cited with approval the case of City of Waterloo v. Markham, 234 III. App.3d 744, 175 Ill. Dec. 862, 865, 600 N.E.2d 1320, 1323 (1992). I have attached a copy of the City of Waterloo v. Markham decision. In that decision, the court held that a city ordinance which prohibited temporary signs from being maintained for a period in excess of 90 days and allowed time extensions to be granted by the Zoning Board of Appeals, was constitutional. The ordinance in the Markham case read as follows: Temporary signs, such as election si.qns, may be allowed for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days and shall not exceed ten (10) square feet of sign area. Time extensions may be granted by the Board of Appeals. (emphasis added) The ordinance defined temporary signs as follows: A sign, banner, or other advertising device or display constructed of cloth, canvas, cardboard, wallboard, or other light temporary materials, with or without a structural frame, intended for a temporary period of display, such as decorative displays for holidays or public demonstrations. The Markham court determined that this ordinance was content-neutral. The court rejected the argument that the reference to "election signs" in the ordinance was something more than an example. The court found that the City's purpose was "to discourage and prevent the unsightly clutter and inevitable deterioration intrinsic to temporary signs." The court found that the ordinance accomplished this purpose with "clear specificity, workable efficiency, and complete content tolerance," and therefore, the means chosen were not substantially broader than necessary. The court noted that nothing in the ordinance prohibited the defendants from erecting a different temporary sign one day after dismantling their first temporary sign. If the City of Iowa City wishes to regulate political/election signs because they are temporary in nature, I would suggest amending the City ordinance to regulate temporary signs in the manner that is done in the Markham case. This would involve amending the definition of "temporary sign", to include the language of the ordinance involved in the Markham case or similar language, and then placing time restrictions (and size restrictions) on all temporary signs. Attachment le ga [teleano~lg~ord,m m o PAGE 1 Citation Database Mode 600 N.E.2d 1320 FOUND DOCUMENT NE Page (CITE AS: 234 ILL.APP.3D 744, 600 N.E.2D 1320, 175 ILL.DEC. 862) CITY OF WATERLOO, Plaintiff-Appellant, Dennis MARKHAM and Barbara Markham, Defendants-Appellees. No. 5-91-0222. Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District. Oct. 5, 1992. City brought action against landowners for violation of zoning ordinance by allegedly maintaining temporary sign on property beyond 90-day limit. The Circuit Court, Monroe County, William A. Schuwerk, Jr., J., granted landowners' motions to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. City appealed. The Appellate Court, Chapman, J., held that: (1) language of the zoning ordinance rendered it content neutral by requiring all temporary signs be removed after 90 days regardless of message; (2) maintaining aesthetics of city was significant governmental interest served by zoning ordinance; (3) zoning ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve city's legitimate interest of maintaining aesthetics; and (4) zoning ordinance left open ample alternative channels for communication of political information by allowing landowners to erect a new temporary sign after removing the old sign. Reversed and remanded. [1] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k90.3 92k90.3 Language of zoning ordinance rendered it content neutral by requiring any temporary sign be removed after 90 days regardless of sign's message in order to maintain aesthetics of city, despite homeowner's claim that ordinance only regulated temporary election signs and that ordinance did not apply equally to commercial and noncommercial signs. UJS.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 14. [~] ZONING AND PLANNING k81 414k81 Language of zoning ordinance rendered it content neutral by requiring any temporary sign be removed after 90 days regardless of sign's message in order to maintain aesthetics of city, despite homeowner's claim that ordinance only z~gu~u~u u~,,,F~y election signs and that ordinance did not apply equally to commercial and noncommercial signs. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 14. [21 ZONING kND PLANNING k81 414k81 Maintaining aesthetics of city was significant governmental interest served by zoning ordinance which required all temporary signs be removed after 90 days. [3] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k90(3) 92k90(3) Regulation of time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve government's legitimate content neutral interest and, if means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve government's interest, then regulation is valid. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. Copr. (C) West 1996 No claim to orig. U.S. govt. work 600 N.E.2d 1320 (CITE AS: 234 ILL.APPo3D 744, 600 N.E.2D 1320, 175 ILL.DEC. 862) PAGE 2 [4] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k90.3 92k90.3 Zoning ordinance prohibiting display of temporary signs for more than 90 days was narrowly tailored to serve city's legitimate interest of discouraging and preventing unsightly clutter and inevitable deterioration intrinsic to temporary signs; means chosen to maintain aesthetics were not substantially broader than necessary and operated with clear specificity, workable efficiency, and complete content tolerance. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. [4] ZONING AND PLANNING k81 414k81 Zoning ordinance prohibiting display of temporary signs for more than 90 days was narrowly tailored to serve city's legitimate interest of discouraging and preventing unsightly clutter and inevitable deterioration intrinsic to temporary signs; means chosen to maintain aesthetics were not substantially broader than necessary and operated with clear specificity, workable efficiency, and complete content tolerance. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. [5] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW k90.3 92k90.3 Zoning ordinance requiring removal of temporary signs after 90 days left open ample alternative channels for communication of political information by allowing homeowners to erect new temporary sign after removing old sign, and by allowing communication through handbills, radio, newspaper, bumper stickers, and window signs. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. [5] ZONING AND PLYING k81 414k81 Zoning ordinance requiring removal of temporary signs after 90 days left open ample alternative channels for communication of political information by allowing homeowners to erect new temporary sign after removing old sign, and by allowing communication through handbills, radio, newspaper, bumper stickers, and window signs. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. *'1321 *745 ***863 Crowder & Scoggins, Ltd., Columbia (Mark S. Rohr, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant. Strellis, Nester, Fau!baum & Field, Waterloo (Dennis M. Field, of counsel), for defendants-appellees. Justice CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff, City of Waterloo, brought this action against the defendants, Dennis Markham and Barbara Markham, for violation of the city's zoning ordinances dealing with the posting of free-standing and temporary signs within the city's limits. The trial court allowed the defendants' motions to dismiss on first amendment grounds. We reverse. On January 30, 1990, the City of Waterloo filed suit in Monroe County, Illinois, against defendants, Dennis Markham and Barbara Markham, seeking to impose a fine for violation of a Waterloo zoning ordinance. The defendants maintained a temporary sign on their private premises which read "No 3 on 3." This sign reflected the Markham's opposition to a proposed widening of Illinois Copr. (C) West 1996 No claim to orig. U.S. govt. works 600 N.E.2d 1320 PAGE 3 (CITE AS: 234 ILL.APP.3D 744,*745, 600 N.E.2D1320,**i321, 1751LL.DEC.862,***863) State Route 3 from two lanes to three lanes through the City of Waterloo. The complaints alleged that as of December 6, 1989, and each day thereafter, ~..e Markhams maintained a temporary sign at their home in Waterloo, Illinois, in excess of the period permitted by section 4.17(n) of Waterloo's zoning ordinance. Section 4.17(n) prohibits tem~grary signs from being maintained for a per.~pd_ i~ exc_~_e~s 6~-~6~a_~-a-/t~'6~i~_-~-te-_~_sjgn~-~y~ grante~[-~y-~h~ Zoq~ng .~9~d ~_~Appaals. On March 13, 1990, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaints and asserted that section 4.!7(n) violates the United States Constitution (a) by according disparate treatment to commercial and noncommercial speech in violation of tke equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, (b) by imposing unnecessary restrictions on political speech in violation of the first amendment, and (c) by being vague in violation of both the first amendment and *'1322 ***864 the equal protection *746 clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court allowed the motion on first amendment grounds. Tke Waterloo zoning ordinance, section 4.17(n), reads as follows: "Temporary signs, such as election signs, shall be allowed for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days, and shall not exceed ten (10) square feet of sign area. Time extensions may be granted by the Board of Appeals." Temporary signs are defined in section 1.09(b) as: i "A sign, banner, or other advertising device or display constructed of cloth, anyas, cardboard, wallboard, or other light temporary materials, with or ithout a structural frame, intended for a temporary period of display, such as ecorative displays for holidays or public demonstrations." ~ Plaintiff contends that the trial court's findings that section 4.17(n) violated the free speech aspect of the first amendment were in error. The United States Supreme Court has held that government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989), 491 U.S. 781, 789, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661. [1] We first address the content restrictions involved. The principle inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. (Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2754, 105 L.Ed.2d at 675.) The controlling consideration is the government's purpose. The government, in tkis case the City of Waterloo, contends that the purpose of these ordinances ~s~r~_y_a matter of aesthetics con~rol.linq the a~ppearance of the city-~y ~q'~r~ing ge~pora~i__q_ns tQ_~e__remov~_afte~__9~_day~ .r_e~a~l~s-~h~r content or mess_~. The defendants allege that section 4.17(n) is not content neutral in that it regulates only temporary election signs as opposed to holiday displays, public demonstrations, or signs advertising the sale of homes. Unfortunately, the defendants ~av~ misinterpreted the term "such as election signs" ill $~ct~on 4.~717(n) as limiting the ordinance to election and~[ical messages. Such an ih~erpretation, however, is contrary to the plan meaning__6f the ordinance as a who~. The*74~ad_~were clearly-~ns~r-~(~r il._Lus~z~t_~ve Copt. (C) West 1996 No claim to orig. U.S. govt. works 600 N.E.2d 1320 PAGE 4 (CITE AS: 234 ILL.APP.3D 744,'747, 600 N.E.2D1320,**1322, 175ILL.DEC.862,***864) p~Upose.s ra_~her than as a limitation_~D_alac~io~l_$igns only. This is made all the more apparent by section 1.09 where a temporary sign (which would thus be subject to section 4.17(n)) is defined as "[a] sign, banner, or other advertising device or display * * * such as decorative displays for holidays or public demonstrations." (Emphasis added.) ' Contrary to their claims, defendants have failed to demonstrate that the ordinances do not apply equally to commercial as well as to noncommercial signs, and given the ordinance's plain meanin§, no such interpretation is warranted. The government's aesthetic purpose has nothing to do with content, -and we find the ordinance to be content neutral. [2] We next determine if Section 4.17(n) serves a significant governmental interest. In Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984), 466 U.S. 789, 805, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2129, 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 787, the Supreme Court held that the State may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance aesthetic values. Aesthetics have been recognized as a significant interest warranting governmental regulation of signs. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 805-07, 104 S.Ct. at 2129-30, 80 L.Ed.2d at 787-89; Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1981), 453 U.S. 490, 101S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800; see also Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Form Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic State Interest, the *'1323 ***865 Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 Hastin§s L.J. 439 (1986). [3][4] The next question is whether section 4.17(n) is sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest. A regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate content-neutral interest. So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, the regulation is not invalid. (Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. at 2758, 105 L.Ed.2d at 680.) The City of Wa~oo seeks to discourage ~nd prevent the unsightly clutte/L_And inevitable deterioration intrinsic to t~-~porary signs. Section 4.17(n) does this with clear sDecificitv, workable ~t~clency and complete content tolerance. Thus, the means chosen are not ~u~stantially broader than necessary. ~5~ally, we determine if the ordinance leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Section 4.17(n) easily meets the requirement. As plaintiff points out, numerous methods of communi'cation remain available to the defendants, and other citizens as well, including handbills, radio, newspaper, bumper stickers, and window signs. But what is most important is section 4.17(n)'s *748 liberal provision for temporary signs themselves. Nothin§ in the ordinance prohibits the defendants fromm erecting a different te~lporar¥ siqn one day after dismantling their first temporary si~qn. The city's ordinance leaves open an ample and identical c an~ of communication. As one commentator has noted, "This is not to say that every content-neutral law that restricts the opportunities for free expression is unconstitutional. Rather, in recognition that some limitations may be justified by countervailing governmental interests, the Court generally tests content-neutral restrictions with an implicit balancing approach: the greater the interference with the marketplace of ideas, the greater the burden on government to justify the restriction." (Emphasis added.) (Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 46 Copr. (C) West 1996 No claim to orig. U.S. govt. works 600 N.E.2d 1320 PAGE 5 (CITE AS: 234 ILL.APP.3D 744,*748, 600 N.E.2D1320,**1323, 175ILL.DEC.862,***865) at 58 (1987).) Since the defendants, and others, can abide by the requirements of section 417(n) and still communicate their ideas by simply erecting a new temporary sign after the 90 days expire, there is very little, if any, interference with the marketplace of ideas. Therefore, we conclude that section 417(n) is valid and reverse the trial court. Reversed and remanded. GOLDEN}{ERSH, P.J., END OF DOCUMENT and WELCH, Copr. J., concur. (C) West 1996 No claim to orig. U.S. govt. works City of Iowa City MEMORANDUM Date: May 2, 1996 To: The Honorable Mayor Naomi J. Novick and Members of the Cily Council From: Linda Newman Woito, City Attorney ~ Re: Amendments to Political Sign Ordinance; Explanatory Memorandum of Law As you can see from your City Council agenda scheduled for May 7, 1996, the City Attorney's Office has placed before you an amendment to the "political sign ordinance," in order to conform with constitutional law. The attached memorandum from Assistant City Attorney Eleanor M. Dilkes is self-explanatory, and I concur with her analysis in its entirety. While a sign ordinance ordinarily would be reviewed by the Planning and Zoning Commission, the Commission has little discretion to determine the length of time periods whereby a political sign may be placed -- since the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals found a 30-day durational limitation identical to Iowa City's to be a violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, because "content-based." We have styled the sign ordinance amendments along the lines of a neighboring state court's review of a local ordinance, found to be constitutional. I will be available for discussion, as needed. Otherwise, please feel free to call Eleanor or me at X5030. Attachment CC: Marian K. Karr, City Clerk Stephen J. Atkins, City Manager Dale E. Helling, Assistant City Manager Karin Franklin, Director, PCD Doug Boothroy, Director, H&IS