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HomeMy WebLinkAbout1999-05-04 OrdinancePrepared by Melody Rockwell, Associate Planner, 410 E. Washington Street, Iowa City, IA 52240; 319/356/5251 ORDINANCE NO. 99-3878 AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CITY CODE SECTION 14-4B TO CHANGE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT NOTICE REQUIREMENTS AND TO INCORPORATE BOARD POWERS ' AND PROCEDURES INTO CHAPTER 14-6, "ZONING CHAPTER," BY ADDING A NEW ARTICLE W, ENTITLED "BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT POWERS AND PROCEDURES" WHEREAS, the City Council expanded the public notice requirements for the Board of Adjustment; and WHEREAS, pursuant to the Council directive, the Board now sends notification letters to the owners of property within 300 feet, instead of within 200 feet, of the request property; and WHEREAS, the Board of Adjustment submittal requirements specified in the City Code should be amended to comply with this change in the public notification policy; and WHEREAS, the Zoning Chapter currently contains sections on the administration and implementation of the zoning regulations and on the procedures and criteria for obtaining minor modifications to those regulations; and WHEREAS, the Board of Adjustment's authority pertains only to the Zoning Chapter of the City Code in that the Board only considers special exceptions, variances and appeals to Zoning Chapter requirements; and WHEREAS, when the City Code was recodified in 1994, the Board of Adjustment section was removed from the Zoning Chapter and placed in the Land Control and Development section of the Code; and WHEREAS, it is more appropriate for the Board of Adjustment powers and procedures to be set forth in the Zoning Chapter. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF IOWA CITY, IOWA: SECTION I. AMENDMENTS. A. Title 14, Chapter 4, entitled "Land Control and Development," Article B, entitled "Board of Adjustment," is hereby amended by repealing subsections 14-4B-4 through subsections 14- 4B-9 in their entirety, and adding a new subsection 14-4B-4, as follows: 4: POWERS AND PROCEDURES: The Board's powers and procedures concerning its hearings and decisions on applications for Ordinance No. 99-3878 Page 2 appeals, special exceptions and variances to the City's zoning regulations are set forth in Article 14-6W of this Title, which is entitled "Board of Adjustment Powers and Procedures." B. Title 14, Chapter 6, entitled "Zoning Chapter," is hereby amended by adding a new Article W, entitled "Board of Adjustment Powers and Procedures," as follows: CHAPTER 6 ZONING ARTICLE W. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT POWERS AND PROCEDURES SECTION: 14-6W-1: 14-6W-2: 14-6W-3: 14-6W-4: 14-6W-5: 14-6W-6 14-6W-7 Purpose Powers Procedures Generally Appeals Special Exceptions and Variances Fees Petition for Writ of Certiorari 14-6W-1: PURPOSE: These provisions are intended to: A. Set forth the authority of the Board of Adjustment and its standards of review for hearing and deciding on appeals, special exceptions and variances to the City's zoning regulations in this Chapter. B. Provide a general description of the Board's application, fees and appeal process and requirements. C. Ensure due process and equitable consideration of each application. D. Allow for the reasonable use of property/ while ensuring that the requested use or modification will not impart special privileges not enjoyed by other property in the vicinity and in identical zoning districts. E. Guide Board decisions to serve the public interest, meet the intent of the Zoning Chapter and be consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. 14-6W-2: POWERS: The Board shall have the following powers: A. Appeals: To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error in any order, requirement, decision or determination made by the City Manager or designee in the enforcement of the Ordinance No. Page 3 99-3878 Zoning Chapter or of any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto. Special Exceptions: To hear and decide applications for special exceptions to the terms of the Zoning Chapter in accordance with the general standards contained-in this Article and the specific regulations set forth in the Zoning Chapter. 1. Review: The Board shall review all applicable evidence regarding the site, existing and proposed structures, neighboring uses, parking areas, driveway locations, highway access, traffic generation and circulation, drainage, sanitary sewer and water systems, the operation of the specific proposed exception and such other evidence as deemed appropriate. 2. Standards: In order to permit a special exception, the Board must find that the applicant meets the standards set forth in the Zoning Chapter with respect to the specific proposed exception. The Board must also find that the applicant meets the following general standards or that the following standards do not apply: a. The specific proposed exception will not be detrimental to or endanger the public health, safety, comfort or general welfare. b. The specific proposed exception will not be injurious to the use and enjoyment of other property in the immediate vicinity and will not substantially diminish or impair property values in the neighborhood. c. Establishment of the specific proposed exception will not impede the normal and orderly development and improvement of the surrounding property for uses permitted in the zone in which such property is located. d. Adequate utilities, access roads, drainage and/or necessary facilities have been or are being provided. e. Adequate measures have been or will be taken to provide ingress or egress designed so as to minimize traffic congestion on public streets. f. Except for the specific regulations and standards applicable to the exception being considered, the specific proposed exception, in all other respects, conforms to the Ordinance No. 99-3878 Page 4 applicable regulations or standards of the zone in which it is to be located. g. The proposed use will be consistent with the Comprehensive Plan of the City. 3. Conditions: In permitting a special exception, the Board may impose appropriate conditions and safeguards, including but not limited to planting screens, fencing, construction commencement and completion deadlines, lighting, operational controls, improved traffic circulation requirements, highway access restrictions, increased minimum yard requirements, parking requirements, limitations on the duration of a use or ownership or any other requirement which the Board deems appropriate under the circumstances upon a finding that the conditions are necessary to fulfill the purpose and intent of the Zoning Chapter. Variances: To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variances from the terms of the Zoning Chapter as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to special conditions a litera~ enforcement of the provisions of the Zoning Chapter will result in unnecessary hardship and so the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done. No variance to the strict application of any provision of the Zoning Chapter shall be granted by the Board unless the applicant demonstrates that all of the following elements are present: 1. Not contrary to the public interest. a. The proposed variance will not threaten neighborhood integrity, nor have a substantially adverse effect on the use or value of other properties in the area adjacent to the property included in the variance; and b. The proposed Variance will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the Zoning Chapter and will not contravene the objectives of the Comprehensive Plan. 2. Unnecessary hardship. a. The property in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed in the zone where the property is located; and b. The owner's situation is unique or peculiar to the property in question, Ordinance No. Page 5 99-3878 and the situation is not shared with other landowners in the area nor due to general conditions in the neighborhood; and c, The hardship is not of the landowner's or applicant's own making or that of a predecessor in title. 3. Conditions: In permitting a variance, the Board may impose appropriate conditions and safeguards, including but not limited to planting screens, fencing, construction commencement and completion deadlines, lighting, operational controls, improved traffic circulation requirements, highway access restrictions, increased minimum yard requirements, parking requirements, limitation on the duration of a use or ownership or any other requirement which the Board deems appropriate under the circumstances, upon a finding that the conditions are necessary to fulfill the purpose and intent of the Zoning Chapter. D. Interpretation of Zoning Provisions: To interpret the Zoning Chapter in any case where it is alleged there is an error in any decision, determination or interDretation made by the Zoning Code Interpretation Panel or by the City Manager in cases where the Panel was unable to reach a unanimous decision regarding the meaning of Zoning Code provisions. Interpretations rendered by the Board under this Section shall be binding upon the City Manager or designee in the enforcement of the Zoning Chapter. (1978 Code §36-91; 1994 Code) 14-6W-3: PROCEDURES GENERALLY: The Board shall conduct hearings and make decisions in accordance with the following requirements. A. Public Meetings: All meetings shall be open to the public. B. Public Notice: Notice of the time and place of hearings shall be published in a paper of general circulation not more than twenty (20) nor less than seven (7) days prior to the hearing. It shall contain the street address or location of the property and a brief description of the nature of the appeal. C. Record of Proceedings: The Board shall keep minutes of its proceedings, showing Ordinance No. Page 6 99-3878 the vote of each member upon each question or if absent or failing to vote, indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations and other official actions, all of which shall be immediately filed in the office of .the secretary of the Board and shall be a public record. Written Decisions: The Board shall render written decisions, including findings 0f fact and conclusions of law, which shall be filed with the City Clerk and recorded in the Johnson County Recorder's office. E o Orders: Unless otherwise determined by the Board, all orders of the Board shall expire six (6) months from the date the written decision is filed with the City Clerk unless the applicant shall have taken action within the six (6) month period to establish the use or construct the building permitted under the terms of the Board's decision, such as obtaining a building permit and proceeding to completion in accordance with the terms of the permit. Upon written request and for good cause shown, the Board may extend the expiration date of any order without further public hearing on the merits of the original appeal or application. (1978 Code §36-91; 1994 Code) 14-6W-4: APPEALS: A. Initiation of Appeal: Appeals to the Board may be taken by any person aggrieved or by any officer, department or board of the City affected by any decision of the City Manager or designee or by a decision of the Zoning Code Interpretation Panel or of the City Manager when the Panel cannot reach a unanimous decision. Such appeal shall be taken within a reasonable time as provided by the rules of the Board by filing with the City Clerk a notice of appeal specifying the grounds of the appeal. A duplicate copy of such notice shall be filed with the Board secretary. The City Manager or designee shall forthwith transmit to the Board all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken. B. Stay of Proceedings: An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action appealed from, including without limitation a permittee's right to proceed with development or other activities authorized under a building permit, the issuance of which is a subject of the appeal, unless Ordinance No. 99-3878 Page 7 the City Manager or designee certifies to the Board after the notice of appeal has been filed that, by reason of facts stated in the certificate, a stay would in the City Manager's or designee's opinion, cause imminent peril to life or property. In such case, proceedings or development shall not be stayed otherwise than by a restraining order, which may be granted by the Board or by a court of record and on notice to the City Manager or designee for due cause shown. (1978 Code §36- 91; 1994 Code) 14-6W-5: SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS AND VARIANCES: Applications for special exceptions and variances s.hall be filed with the City Clerk. At a minimum, the application shall include the following: A. The name and address of each applicant. B. The names and addresses of the owner of the property in question and of the architect, professional engineer and contractor, if any. C. The names and addresses of the record owners of all property located within three hundred feet (300') of the property in question. D. A map or plat showing the location and record owner of each property opposite or abutting the property in question. E. A narrative statement of the grounds offered as support for the special exception or variance. F. A map or plot plan, drawn to scale, of the property in question. (1978 Code §36-91 ) 14-6W-6.' FEES: A filing fee shall be paid at the time any appeal or application is filed. Filing fees shall be established by resolution of the City Council. No fee shall be charged for an appeal or application filed by any officer, department or board of the City. (1978 Code §36-91 ) 14-6W-7: PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI: Any person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any decision of the Board under the provisions of the Zoning Chapter or any taxpayer or any officer, department or board of the City may present to a court of record a petition for writ of certiorari, duly verified, setting forth that such Board decision is illegal, in whole or in part, and specifying the grounds of the illegality. (1978 Code §36-91; 1994 Code) SECTION II. REPEALER. All ordinances and parts of ordinances in conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed. Ordinance No. 99-3878 Page 8 SECTION III. SEVERABILITY. If any section, provision or part of the Ordinance shall be adjudged to be invalid or unconstitutional, such adjudication shall not affect the validity of the Ordinance as a whole or any section, provision or part thereof not adjudged invalid .-or unconstitutional. SECTION IV. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Ordinance shall be in effect after its final passage, approval and publication, as provided by law. Passed and approved this 4th day ~~_~,. ,1999~~, AYOR ATTEST, ~8mend.doc of Ordinance No. 99-3878 Page 9 It was moved by Kubby and seconded by Ordinance as read be adopted, and upon roll call there were: AYES: NAYS: ABSENT: Champion Kubby Lehman Norton O'Donnell Thornberry Vanderhoef Vanderhoef that the First Consideration 4/6/99 Vote for passage:AYES: Norton, 0'Donnell, Champion, Kubby, Lehman. NAYS: None. ABSENT: Thornberry, Vanderhoef, NOne. Second Consideration 4/20/99 Voter or passage: AYES: 0'Donnell, Lehman, Norton. NAYS: None. ABSENT: Date published 5/12/99 Vanderhoef, Champion, Thornberry Kubby, City of Iowa City MEMORANDUM /l Date: To: From: Re: April 29, 1999 City Council Eleanor M. Dilkes, City Attorne Campaign Contribution Limit The City Clerk's office is in the process of preparing the candidate material for the upcoming election. As part of that preparation, I have reviewed Section 1-9-2 of the City Code, which limits individual campaign contributions to $50 per candidate or ballot issue in a single election. As I will explain in this memo, it is my opinion that this ordinance will not withstand constitutional challenge. City Clerk Marian Karr tells me that she has, on a number of occasions over the years, discussed this provision with previous City Attorneys and the Charter Review Committee. As I understand it, the ordinance was left in place despite general recognition that the ordinance would likely be found unconstitutional if challenged. I am not comfortable with this approach, particularly in light of recent federal court decisions that are binding in Iowa. The worst scenario, it would seem, would be to have a challenge to this provision during the course of an election with the possibility that different candidates will choose to operate under different rules. History of Ordinance In 1975 the City Council enacted what came to be known as the Iowa City Municipal Campaign Finance Ordinance. This ordinance required public disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures, placed limits on contributions and expenditures and set forth penalties for violation of the ordinance. The contribution limit in the original ordinance was $125.00 per person. In 1976, following the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1 (1976), which invalidated campaign expenditure limitations, the City Council repealed sections of the Municipal Finance Ordinance that limited expenditures. In addition, without explanation, the amending ordinance decreased the contribution limit from $125 per person to $50 per person. In 1983 the City Council repealed all provisions of the Municipal Finance Ordinance except the contribution limitation, including those provisions requiring that disclosure reports be filed with the Clerk of Court, and those making violation of the ordinance a misdemeanor and voiding an election in the event the ordinance was violated. The repealing ordinance states that these provisions were repealed because candidates for municipal office are subject to the campaign finance disclosure requirements of Chapter 56 of the State Code and that state law provided adequate regulation. State law does not impose contribution limits. In 1995 the Charter Review Committee recommended that the Council consider implementing an enforcement mechanism for the contribution limit. As I understand it, the Council declined to do so. Campaign Contribution Ordinance Memo Page 2 As I will explain below, the governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption is recognized by the Courts as a compelling interest that justifies limitations on campaign contributions. I have asked the City Clerk to provide me with any documentation that addressed the enactment or amendment of the City's campaign contribution limit. Importantly, I can find no evidence that the limit was imposed due to an actual or perceived problem of campaign corruption in Iowa City. Neither the ordinance nor the legislative history of the ordinance identifies a problem with campaign corruption or the appearance of corruption. Applicable Law The following may provide more detail than you are interested in. Given the length of time this ordinance has been on the books, however, and for purposes of future reference, I think its important to set forth my legal analysis in some detail. The seminal Supreme Court decision in this area is Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1 (1976). Buckley involved a constitutional challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. The Supreme Court found the Act's $1,000 limitation on contributions by individuals and groups to candidates and campaign committees to be constitutional. The Court recognized that the contribution limitations restricted one aspect of the contributor's First Amendment right to freedom of political association but that such restrictions were necessary to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption. Id~ at 28. The Supreme Court determined that our system of representative democracy is undermined by arrangements whereby large contributions are given to secure political quid pro quos and noted that the "deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate the problem is not an illusory one." Id_._=. at 27. Buckley approved limitations on contributions to candidates or their committees. In 1981 the Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance limiting contributions to committees formed to support or oppose a ballot issue was unconstitutional. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition For Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981). The Court found that the risk of corruption which justified limits on contributions to candidates was inapplicable with respect to contributions to committees supporting or opposing a ballot measure. Id~ at 297. Under this analysis, the portion of Iowa City's ordinance that imposes limits on contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot issues is unconstitutional. In a series of recent opinions the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of campaign contribution limits. (Iowa is in the Eighth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit's decisions are binding in Iowa.) In Shrink, Missouri Government PAC v. Adams et. al., 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998) the Eighth Circuit held that a Missouri law restricting the amount of campaign contributions that persons could make to candidates for public office was unconstitutional. These limits included a $275 limit on contributions to candidates for State Representative, or for any office where the population of the electoral district was less than 100,000. In Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998)the Eighth Circuit found unconstitutional legislation adopted by voter initiative limiting contributions to $300 for candidates for the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor and Attorney General and to $100 for all other state public offices. In Carver v. Nixon, 72 F,3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995) found unconstitutional a statute adopted by citizen initiative which limited individual campaign contributions per election cycle to $100.00 for candidates in districts with fewer than 100,000 residents and $200.00 for non-state-wide candidates in districts with more than 100,000 residents. In all three of these Eighth Circuit cases the contribution limits failed because their proponents produced no credible evidence of real or perceived undue influence attributable to large political Campaign Contribution Ordinance Memo Page 3 contributions. In reviewing these contribution limits the Eighth Circuit, consistent with Buckley, applied a "strict scrutiny standard of review". Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 161 F.3d at 521. Under this standard of review the State must demonstrate "that it has a compelling interest and that the contribution limits at issue are narrowly drawn to serve that interest." Id. (Citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; Russell, 146 F.3d at 567 and Carver, 72 F.3d at 638). The Eighth Circuit recognizes that preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is a compelling state interest. It requires, however, "some demonstrable evidence that there were general problems that resulted from contributions in amounts greater than the limits in place." Id. at 521. The Eighth Circuit has rejected the argument made by the State in these cases that "the corruption and the perception thereof are inherent in political campaigns where large contributions are made, and that it is unnecessary for the state to demonstrate that these are actual problems." Id. at 521. For example, in Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Eighth Circuit was unwilling to extrapolate from the examples of federal campaign corruption in Buckley that "in Missouri at this time there is corruption or perception of corruption from 'large' campaign contributions, without some evidence that such problems really exist" Id__. at 522 (citing Russell, 146 F.3d at 569; Carver, 72 F.3d at 638). The Court found insufficient an affidavit of the State Senator who co-chaired the committee on campaign finance reform that he and his colleagues believed there was a problem. The Court found that it had no way of knowing whether this single legislator's perception of corruption was the "public perception", whether it was objectively "reasonable" and whether it "derived from the magnitude of...contributions" that historically have been made to candidates running for public office in Missouri. Id. at 522 (citing Russell 146 F.3d at 569). Similarly, in Russell, the State presented no credible evidence to the trial court of actual undue influence or corruption stemming from large contributions, or reasonable public perception of such corruption. Much of the evidence presented by the State in Russell focused on support by State representatives who had received contributions from sources related to the tobacco industry of a bill that would have prohibited local governments from regulating tobacco. The Court found that it was insufficient simply to demonstrate that a legislator had received political contributions from those whose interests he tended to support. The Court noted that the State had presented no evidence of a change in the legislator's position due to an intervening contribution or evidence that he had sought to conceal his contributions from tobacco related sources. The Court stated: "If it were reasonable to presume corruption from the fact that a public official voted in a way that pleased his contributors, legislatures could constitutionally ban all contributions except those from the public official's opponents, a patent absurdity. That would spell the end to the political right, protected by the First Amendment, to support a candidate of one's choice." Russell, 146 F.3d at 569. Similarly, in Carver the Eighth Circuit found that the record was "barren of any evidence of a harm or disease that needed to be addressed." 72 F.3d at 643. The Court found that the State had made no showing "as to why it was necessary to adopt the lowest contribution limits in the nation and restrict the first amendment rights of so many contributors in order to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption associated with large campaign contributions." Id. at 644. In both Carver and Russell, in addition to holding that the states had not met their burden of proof, the Eight Circuit held that the contribution limitations were "dramatically lower" and thus different in kind from the limits upheld in Buckley and that the limitations were therefore unconstitutionally low. These opinions conclude that the compelling state interest which allows contribution limits is the actual or perceived corruption due to large contributions and that at Campaign Contribution Ordinance Memo Page 4 some point a limit becomes to low to allow meaningful participation in protected speech and association, and therefore, violates the First Amendment. Russell, 146 F.3d at 570; see also Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding $100.00 limit too low, stating: "We realize that the Buckley limit was never declared to be a constitutional minimum, but it does provide us with some guidance and a frame of reference in evaluating the constitutionality of Minnesota's $100 limit." Id. at. 1366). It appears likely that Iowa City's $50 limit would be found by the Eighth Circuit to be simply too low to allow meaningful participation in protected speech and association. Particularly troubling is the reduction in 1977 of the campaign contribution limit from $125 to $50 with no justification or explanation. Even assuming that the limit is not simply too low, however, it fails under the first leg of the Eighth Circuit's analysis. There is no evidence that this limit was put in place in order to address a real problem of corruption or a perception thereof as a direct result of campaign contributions in excess of that amount. Compounding the problem is the fact that the State of Iowa imposes no contribution limits, and therefore, we cannot piggyback on the State's evidence. The evidentiary burden that the Eighth Circuit requires be met in order to justify a campaign contribution limit consistent with the First Amendment could not be satisfied. The State of Missouri has petitioned for Supreme Court review of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Shrink Missouri Government PAC and the Supreme Court has agreed to review that decision. There appears to be a conflict between the Circuit Courts as to the evidenfiary burden required to justify a campaign contribution limit. See e.g. Kentucky Right to Life v. Terry, 108 F. 3d 637 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding $1,000 campaign contribution limit simply by citing Buckley). If the Council believes there is evidence that corruption and the reasonable perception of corruption in Iowa City from large campaign contributions is a problem perhaps the Supreme Court's decision, when made, will provide guidance for enacting a constitutionally defensible contribution limit. In the meantime, however, under the current state of the law in the Eighth Circuit, I believe the $50 campaign limit cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny and should be repealed. Cc: Steve Atkins Dale Helling Marian Karr Sarah Holecek eleanor\mem\contribu.doc ORDINANGE NO. 99-3879 AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING THAT GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES LEVIED AND COLLECTED EACH YEAR ON ALL PROPERTY LOCATED WITHIN THE NORTHGATE CORPORATE PARK URBAN RENEWAL PROJECT AREA, IN THE CITY OF IOWA CITY, COUNTY OF JOHNSON, STATE OF IOWA, BY AND FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE STATE OF IOWA, CITY OF IOWA CITY, COUNTY OF JOHNSON, IOWA CITY COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT AND OTHER TAXING DISTRICTS, BE PAID TO A SPECIAL FUND FOR PAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST ON LOANS, MONIES ADVANCED TO AND INDEBTEDNESS, INCLUDING BONDS ISSUED OR TO BE ISSUED, INCURRED BY SAID CITY IN CONNECTION WITH SAID URBAN RENEWAL REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT. WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Iowa City, Iowa, after public notice and hearing as prescribed by law and pursuant to Resolution No. 99-111 passed and approved on the 6th day of April, 1999, adopted an Urban Renewal Plan (the "Urban Renewal Plan") for an urban renewal area known as the Nodhgate Corporate Park Urban Renewal Project Area (the "Urban Renewal Project Area"), which Urban Renewal Project Area includes the lots and parcels located within the area legally described as follows: Lots 1-20 Highlander Development, First Addition, Iowa City, Iowa WHEREAS, expenditures and indebtedness are anticipated to be incurred by the City of Iowa City, Iowa in the future to finance urban renewal project activities carried out in fudherance of the objectives of the Urban Renewal Plan; and WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Iowa City, Iowa desires to provide for the division of revenue from taxation in the Urban Renewal Project Area, as above described, in accordance with the provisions of Section 403.19 of the Code of Iowa, as amended. Ordinance No. Page 2 99-3879 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF IOWA CITY, IOWA: Section 1. That the taxes levied on the taxable property in the Urban Renewal Project Area legally described in the preamble hereof, by and ,_ for the benefit of the State of Iowa, City of Iowa City, County of Johnson, Iowa City Community School District, and all other taxing districts from and after the effective date of this Ordinance shall be divided as hereinafter in this Ordinance provided. 8ection 2. That portion of the taxes which would be produced by the rate at which the tax is levied each year by or for each of the taxing districts upon the total sum of the assessed value of the taxable property in the Urban Renewal Project Area, as shown on the assessment roll as of January 1 of the calendar year preceding the first calendar year in which the City of Iowa City certifies to the County Auditor the amount of loans, advances, indebtedness, or bonds payable from the division of property tax revenue described herein shall be allocated to and when collected be paid into the fund for the respective taxing district as taxes by or for the taxing district into which all other property taxes are paid. Section 3. That portion of the taxes each year in excess of the base period taxes determined as provided in Section 2 of this Ordinance shall be allocated to and when collected be paid into a special tax increment fund of the City of Iowa City, Iowa hereby established, to pay the principal of and interest on loans, monies advanced to, indebtedness whether funded, refunded, assumed or otherwise, including bonds or obligations issued under the authority of Section 403.9 or 403.12 of the Code of Iowa, as amended, incurred by the City of Iowa City, Iowa, to finance or refinance, in whole or in part, urban renewal projects undertaken within the Urban Renewal Project Area pursuant to the Urban Renewal Plan, except that taxes for the payment of bonds and interest of each taxing district shall be collected against all taxable property within the Urban Renewal Project area without any limitation as hereinabove provided. Section 4. Unless or until the total assessed valuation of the taxable property in the Urban Renewal Project Area exceeds the total assessed value of the taxable property in the Urban Renewal Project Area as shown by the assessment roll referred to in Section 2 of this Ordinance, all of the taxes levied and collected upon the taxable property in the Urban Renewal Ordinance No. Page 3 99-3879 Project Area shall be paid into the funds for the respective taxing districts as taxes by or for said taxing districts in the same manner as all other property taxes. Section 5. At such time as the loans, advances, indebtedness, bonds and interest thereon of the City of Iowa City, Iowa referred to in Section 3 hereof have been paid, all monies thereafter received from taxes upon the taxable property in the Urban Renewal Project Area shall be paid into the funds for the respective taxing districts in the same manner as taxes on all other property. Section 6. All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed. The provisions of this Ordinance are intended and shall be construed so as to fully implement the provisions of Section 403.19 of the Code of Iowa, as amended, with respect to the division of taxes from property within the Urban Renewal Project Area as described above. In the event that any provision of this Ordinance shall be determined to be contrary to law, it shall not affect other provisions or application of this Ordinance which shall at all times be construed to fully invoke the provisions of Section 403.19 of the Code of Iowa with reference to the Urban Renewal Project Area and the territory contained therein. Section 7. This Ordinance shall be in effect after its final passage, proval and publication Attest: ecode~ord~northgt.doc citypr°ved Ordinance No. 99-3879 Page 4 It was moved by Vanderhoef and seconded by Ordinance as read be adopted, and upon roll call there were: AYES: NAYS: ABSENT: X Champion X Kubby X Lehman X Notion X O'Donnell X Thomberry X Vanderhoef Thornberry that the First Consideration 4/6/99 Vote for passage: AYES: Vanderhoef, Norton, 0'Donnell, Thornberry. NAYS: Champion, Kubby, Lehman, None. ABSENT: None. Second Consideration 4/20/99 Vote ~r passageAYES: Vanderhoef, Champion, Kubby, Lehman, Norton, 0'Donnell. NAYS: None. ABSENT: Thornberry. Date published 5/12/99 ORDNANCE NO. AN ORDNANCE PROVIDING THAT GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES LEVIED AND COLLECTED EACH YEAR ON 5[,L PROPERTY OF JOHNSON, STATE OF IOWA, BY AND ~OR THE BENEFIT OF THE STATE OF IOWA, CITY OF IOWA i/2{Y, COUNTY OF JOHNSON, IOWA CITY COMMUNITY ~HOOL DISTRICT AND OTHER TAXING DISTRICTS, BE PAI iTO A SPECIAL FUND FOR ISSUED OR TO BE ISSUED, INCU~RED BY SAID CITY IN CONNECTION WITH SAID U~N RENEWAL REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT. ' \ WHEREAS, the City Council of the Cit3( of Iowa City, Iowa, after public notice and hearing as prescribed by law and pursuant t~ Resolution No. 99-111 passed and approved on the 6th day of Apri 1 ~ ,1999, adopted an Urban Renewal Plan (the "Urban Renewal Plan") for an u ban renewal area known as the Northgate Corporate Park Urban Renewal Project A a (the "Urban Renewal Project Area ) which Urban Renewal Project Area ~ncludes t e lots and parcels located within the a~e'a le ally described as followjs: ' ~sbU~ LOTS 1-20 HIGHLANDER DEVELOPMENT, F~T ADDITION, IOWA CITY, IOWA WHEREAS, expenditures and indebtedness are anticiph~ed to be incurred by the ct'''' ' activities carried \ WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Iowa City, Iowa de.sires to provide for the division of revenue from taxation in the Urban Renewal Project Area, as above described, in accordance with the provisions of Section 403.19 of the Code of Iowa, as amended. -1- NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF IOWA CITY, IOWA: Section 1 That the taxes levied on the taxable property in the Urban Renewal Project Area legaxlGj described in the preamble hereof, by and for the State benefit of the of Iowa, City of Iowa City, County of johnson, Iowa City Community School District, and all other taxing districts from and after the effective date of this Ordinance shall be divided as hereinafter in this Ordinance provided. Section 2. That portion of the taxes which would be (oduced by the rate at which ' ' the assessment roll as of January 1 Of.the calendar yeareceding the first calendar year in hue described herein Section 3. That potion of the taxes e ~ear in excess of the base period taxes established, to pay the principal of and igferest on 1. monies advanced to, indebtedness, whether ~nded, re~nde~ assumed or including bonds or obligations issued under the authority~0f Section amended, incurred by the City of Io,~h City, Iowa, to fit part, urban renewal projects undert, aken within the Urban to the Urban Renewal Plan, exce~ that taxes for the each taxing district shall be collected against all taxable prol: Renewal Project Area without any limitation as hereinabove 403.12 of the Code of Iowa, as or refinance, in whole or in Project Area pursuant of bonds and interest of within the Urban Section 4. Unless or until the total assessed valuation taxable property in the Urban Renewal Project Area exceeds the total assessed value of thproperty in the Urban Renewal Project Area as shown by the assessment rollto in Section 2 of this Ordinance, all ofthe taxes levied and collected upon the taxab in the Urban Renewal Project, Area shall be paid into the funds for the e taxing districts as taxes by or for said;Iaxing districts in the same manner as all other prob~,rty taxes. -2- xSection 5. At such time as the loans, advances, indebtedness, bonds and interest thereon of the City of Iowa City, Iowa referred to in Section 3 hereof have been paid, all monies thereafter received from taxes upon the taxable property in the Urban Renewal Project Area shall be paid into the funds for the respective taxing districts in the same manner as taxes on all other property. Section 6. All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed. The provisions of this Ordinance are intended and shall be construed so as to fully implement the provisions of Section 403.19 of the Code of Iowa, as amended, with respect to the division of taxes from property within the Urban Renewal Project Area as described above. In the event that any provision of this Ordinance shall be determined to be contrary to law, it shall not affect other provisions or application of this Ordinance which shall at all times be construed to fully invoke the provisions of Section 403.19 of the Code of Iowa with reference to the Urban Renewal Project Area and the territory contained therein. Section 7. This Ordinance shall be in effect after its final passage, approval and publication as provided by law. Mayor ATTEST: City Clerk Read First Time: Apri 16 1999 Vote for passage:AYES: Vanderhoef, Champion, Kubby, Lehman, Norton, 0'l~onne]l, Thornberry. NAYS: None. ABSENT: None. Read Second Time: ,1999 Vote for passage: Read Third Time: ,1999 Vote for passage: PASSED AND APPROVED: ,1999